On January 27, 2025, the Congo River Alliance/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) – supported by Rwanda – took control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and then moved on to Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, which fell in February 2025.

The re-emergence of M23 in 2021 and its rapid advance prompted the Congolese government to resort to non-state armed groups – the so-called Wazalendo – to fight the rebellion, alongside the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). Given the problematic attempts to integrate rebels into the army in the past, this strategy could jeopardise current and future peace processes. It also contradicts earlier government commitments to disarmament and demobilisation, namely the new implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Programme (P-DDRCS). 

This report, written in collaboration with an anonymised civil society organisation in North Kivu, examines the emergence of the Wazalendo phenomenon and its impact on conflict dynamics in eastern DRC. It maps out the origins, motivations, and compositions of the Wazalendo armed groups, as well as their ambiguous relationship with the Congolese government, the FARDC, and other non-state armed actors. 

The study draws on qualitative research, conducted through individual interviews and focus groups in the city of Goma, in Sake in the Masisi territory, and in villages in the Nyiragongo territory. The interviews took place between December 2024 and January 2025, before the fall of Goma, and included military personnel, Wazalendo combatants, and representatives of local authorities, civil society and a political party, as well as citizens directly impacted by the activities of the Wazalendo. 

In 2022, armed groups in North Kivu formed an opportunistic coalition against the M23, adopting the name ‘Wazalendo’. Although the government initially advised the army against calling on non-state armed groups as auxiliary forces, it ultimately created the Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie, selecting certain groups from the Wazalendo coalition.

By mobilising non-state armed groups to fight the M23 rebellion, the government has de facto legitimised actors responsible for serious human rights violations. Against this backdrop, the study assesses the compatibility of this approach with the government’s stated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) objectives, and analyses the position of the Wazalendo within ongoing peace processes.  

Considered “volunteers” and receiving no pay, Wazalendo fighters are compelled to generate their own income, to the detriment of the local population. Community perceptions of the Wazalendo are therefore deeply ambivalent. While their mobilisation initially sparked a feeling of patriotism, the groups have increasingly been associated with abuses, illegal taxation, roadblocks, and the exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, collaboration with the FARDC has suffered from a lack of communication and coordination, with the Wazalendo sometimes acting on their own initiative. Consequently, some army officers are skeptical about this collaboration and consider it to be a failed government policy. 

The future of these armed groups is a growing concern, particularly as the AFC/M23 crisis has provided opportunities for recruitment and expansion.  Fragmented and driven by their own ethnic agendas, state control over Wazalendo groups remains limited. Wazalendo combatants and their commanders are likely to demand rewards for defending territorial integrity, raising serious concerns about the feasibility of future DDR programmes, such as the P-DDRCS. Moreover, the government created the Réserve Armée pour la Défense (RAD), to better protect the country’s territorial integrity. Representatives of the government and the RAD have promised Wazalendo commanders and their combatants that they could join the armed reserve after the war, through the new P-DDRCS. These promises run counter to the spirit of the P-DDRCS, only allowing integration of combatants into the army on an individual basis. 

The authors argue that demobilisation alone or attempts to (re)integrate Wazalendo fighters into the army or society will not be enough to break cycles of violence. Sustainable peace will require addressing the root causes of persistent conflicts, such as access to land, socio-economic inequalities, and discrimination against certain communities. Ultimately, the AFC/M23 crisis and the Congolese government’s mobilisation of Wazalendo armed groups are not solely a security issue but, above all, a political problem that requires an inclusive approach based on national dialogue. However, this approach must be reconciled with transitional justice, as several armed actors involved have committed serious human rights violations. 

Photo: Wazalendo militiamen fighting M23 rebels march in Sake, DRC. August 31, 2024. ©Moses Sawasawa

All M23-related maps designed by IPIS

Mapping the M23’s territorial influence in eastern DRC

Since 2021, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has once again been plunged into crisis due to the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), triggering a severe humanitarian emergency and widespread displacement. The conflict is driven by both local intercommunity tensions and broader regional dynamics, including support to armed groups by neighboring countries and tensions over the legal and illegal mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. As M23 intensified its attacks, IPIS maps the group’s territorial expansion and influence in eastern DRC using ACLED data on M23-related incidents and various other sources.

This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the Belgian Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the Belgian Development Cooperation.