On the 4th of December 2025, Presidents Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame symbolically signed the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, thus ratifying the Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to on the 27th of June 2025. The 4th of December was a busy day in Washington in terms of signing agreements, as the governments of DRC and Rwanda also signed a Regional Economic Integration Framework; the US and DRC signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement and a Memorandum of Understanding concerning an Expanded Security Partnership; and the US and Rwanda signed a Framework for Shared Economic Prosperity.
Cynically, just days after the signing of the Washington Accords, the Rwandan-backed rebels of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) captured Uvira, the second-largest city of South Kivu province.
Unfulfilled promises in the run-up to the signing ceremony
The rapid AFC/M23 advance towards Uvira had actually already begun several days before the signing ceremony. That the latter took place at all is surprising, not only because it occurred at the very moment that the conflict was escalating in South Kivu, but especially because no noteworthy progress was made in implementing the provisions of the peace agreement of June 27th. Parallel negotiations between the Congolese government and AFC/M23 in Doha, mediated by the government of Qatar, did not change anything in practice either, despite the signing of a Declaration of Principles in July 2025, which includes promises of a permanent ceasefire, and a Framework of peace providing a roadmap for further talks. On the contrary, fighting between the Congolese army (FARDC) and allied non-state armed groups of the Wazalendo coalition on the one hand, and AFC/M23 on the other, has continued unabated, while AFC/M23 consolidated and even expanded its territorial control. Since the capture of Goma and Bukavu – the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu – in early 2025, existing authority structures have been replaced with parallel administrations, including the appointment of AFC/M23 governors.
The US-brokered peace agreement primarily emphasises the “neutralisation of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)” – a Rwandan Hutu armed group created by former genocidaires that the Rwandan regime considers as a permanent security treat –, and the “disengagement of forces and lifting of defensive measures” by Rwanda, as a means of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of both countries. From the outset, there has been disagreement as to whether Rwandan’s defensive measures should be lifted before, at the same time as, or after the neutralisation of FDLR. Previous attempts by the Congolese army to eradicate the FDLR were not successful, not even those carried out in joint operations with the Rwandan army in 2009; and there are worrying indications that this time too, it will be a mission doomed to failure. Since the re-emergence of the M23 in 2021, the FDLR has recruited new combatants and has acted as an ally to the FARDC and the Wazalendo. Several FDLR fighters and commanders have since been embedded in Wazalendo units. Recent efforts of the Congolese army to disarm the FDLR in the framework of the Washington agreement have failed. Moreover, some FDLR combatants seem to hide in areas controlled by AFC/M23, which makes interventions by the FARDC even more complicated. Sarah Troutman, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, representing the US government at the DRC-Rwanda hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee on 23 January 2026, stated that her government continues to urge the DRC that more should be done to neutralise the FLDR.
DDR, peace, root causes of the conflict: the unbearable promises of the peace agreements
By signing the Peace Agreement, DRC and Rwanda agree to cease supporting non-state armed groups and to support disarmament and reintegration initiatives. However, the Congolese government has manoeuvred itself into an uncomfortable position by remobilising former rebels who were supposed to participate in the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Reintegration and Stabilisation Programme (P-DDRCS), as Wazalendo fighters. The Agreement explicitly refers to the P-DDRCS as a tool for disarmament and reintegration of combatants.
The Wazalendo form a loose coalition of diverse local armed groups, which have temporarily put aside mutual rivalries to fight against a common enemy. However, each armed group has retained its autonomy and pursues its own political and economic interests, leading to rivalry and fighting between different Wazalendo armed groups. Security dilemmas could therefore seriously hamper future disarmament efforts, as has been the case with previous DDR programmes.
Furthermore, Congolese officials have promised armed group commanders positions in the reserve force (Réserve Armée pour la Défense), a voluntary unit that was hastily created in response to the AFC/M23 crisis. Apart from the fact that these promises appear to run counter to the provisions of the P-DDRCS, essentially a civilian programme, Congo’s recent turbulent history has been characterized by failed rebel-military integration attempts, resulting in a weakened national army and the proliferation of armed groups.
An even more pressing question is what will happen with the tens of thousands of M23 fighters once a ceasefire would be reached. The AFC/M23 did not participate in the Washington process, and the US Peace Agreement does not refer directly to the AFC/M23, although it obliges DRC and Rwanda to lend full support to the Doha talks. The Congolese government wants the M23 fighters to withdraw from occupied areas to restore Congo’s territorial integrity. However, it is currently unclear how this should be achieved. When, during the DRC-Rwanda hearing, Congress representative Ronny Jackson asked if there was any plan to integrate Congolese M23 combatants into a “broader Congolese security platform”, Sarah Troutman diplomatically answered that she considered the reintegration of M23 combatants and DDR efforts as a critical aspect of the Doha talks. For the time being, however, there is no sign of any withdrawal of AFC/M23, except from Uvira, on the 20th January 2026, under pressure from the US. Exerting more pressure on Rwanda to comply with the agreement by ceasing its support for AFC/M23 would clearly weaken the latter’s position.
Another thorny issue concerns the war crimes that AFC/M23 and Wazalendo members have committed. The M23 rebel group and several Wazalendo commanders are sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. Although officially, amnesty for war crimes is not tolerated in the context of the P-DDRCS, and convicted combatants cannot join the reserve force, some high-ranking Wazalendo commanders who have been promised positions in the army are well-known perpetrators of serious human rights violations. An integrated approach combining disarmament and demobilisation efforts with transitional justice is essential to fight impunity for human rights violations, but the unappealing prospect of being brought to justice could keep armed group members from disarming.
The Doha Framework of peace commits the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities, to restore state authority over the entire Congolese territory, to implement governance reforms, and to establish national reconciliation. A challenging obstacle lies ahead as most implementation protocols still must be negotiated between the two parties. The key question remains how realistic it is to find common ground that can serve as a solid foundation for change and sustainable conflict resolution. Both parties are diametrically opposed to each other when it comes to the organisation of the state. While the Congolese government clearly adheres to the unitary state and is unwilling to compromise on the territorial integrity of the DRC – a principled position unequivocally supported by the UN Resolution 2773 –, AFC/M23, which initially focused on overthrowing the current government, is now demanding the establishment of a federal state providing autonomy in the territories under its control. Establishing federalism would require a revision of the constitution, which is unacceptable to Kinshasa and North Kivu civil society organisations, fearing that this would lead to the balkanisation of the country. According to some, an autonomous Kivu region would serve Rwanda’s long-term strategy that would aim to control a buffer zone to safeguard its security and economic interests. Consequently, the current conflict seems structurally impossible to negotiate as the parties’ ambitions are mutually exclusive, leaving few other options than the choice between an intervention of an external force that would be capable of enforcing a new balance of power and ending large-scale violence, or the acceptance of the “normalisation of an endless war”.
The Doha Framework stipulates explicitly that root causes of the conflicts should be addressed but does not specify which ones. Long-standing disputes over access to land and the role of customary authorities in land management, which have fuelled tensions between communities, have never been resolved by the Congolese government. Will both parties be able to find a political settlement this time, in a context made even more complex by the recent replacement of customary chiefs by AFC/M23 partisans and the redistribution of land by the AFC/M23 administration?
The Washington and Doha processes could be considered somewhat complementary, but the fact that different stakeholders participate(d) in different talks confuses the parties’ responsibilities. Moreover, the Congolese civil society, the Congolese political opposition, and the Wazalendo have been excluded from the negotiations. If fundamental causes of the conflict are to be seriously addressed, an inclusive national dialogue will be necessary. The latest development in the peace process is that the Angolan president will now mediate to establish such an inter-Congolese dialogue.
Both peace initiatives are also largely driven by the mediators’ interests. While Qatar is heavily investing in aviation and infrastructure in Rwanda and seeks important investments in agriculture, mining and infrastructure in DRC, the US aims to secure unrestricted access to DRC’s critical mineral resources, considering them vital to its economic and national security. Although it has received little media attention, the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the US and DRC is by far the most elaborate document that has been signed on the 4th of December. And yes … it’s all about critical minerals. In fact, peace and stability do not even need to be restored in eastern DRC for the execution of this agreement to start, as it covers all critical mineral reserves in the DRC. In January 2026, the DRC government, in accordance with its obligations as stipulated in the agreement – provided the US with a first list of state-owned copper/cobalt, lithium and manganese assets for potential US investors. This partnership is instrumental in the geopolitical competition, allowing the US to regain a foothold in DRC’s Copperbelt in ex-Katanga province, which is currently dominated by China.
Can economic integration bring durable stability?
The Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) was signed as an integral part of the Washington Accords. This Framework intends to promote close economic cross-border cooperation in a variety of sectors between Rwanda and the DRC, as a means of enhancing regional peace and prosperity. According to the US Department of State, the REIF will also “establish resilient and secure global critical minerals supply chains vital to the future of US industry”. That economic collaboration can contribute to peace and prosperity is a valuable argument, but it only works in a stable environment, which can only be realised if underlying causes of conflicts are successfully addressed. To make this happen, responsible and accountable governments are needed, governments that are willing to implement drastic governance reforms, including regarding the national security forces. These conditions are far from being met. Furthermore, a peace deal with an economic integration framework that only includes Rwanda and DRC, overlooks the complexities of regional economic, political and security dynamics. Uganda and Burundi not only have boots on the ground in DRC, but they also have important economic stakes in the country. In 2021, tensions between Rwanda and Uganda rose after the DRC decided to intensify bilateral cooperation on security and trade with Uganda. Burundi, accusing Rwanda of supporting anti-government rebels that operate out of Congo, is economically dependent on the DRC, as one of its main export partners. Excluding other neighbouring countries from such an integration network might trigger new tensions with countries that are not part of the deal.
Finally, the Washington and Doha processes focus on the AFC/M23 crisis, but there is more than one conflict going on in the DRC. The Ugandan-origin Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continue terrorising civilians in rural areas in North Kivu and Ituri, despite joint counter-insurgency operations of the Ugandan and Congolese armed forces. Armed conflicts, rooted in unresolved, long-standing grievances, have been ongoing for years in Ituri, pitting communities against each other. Since 2022, intercommunity violence has been flaring up in several western provinces, leading to large-scale internal displacements. Simmering tensions between so-called autochthonous and migrant communities in ex-Katanga are escalating, increasing the risk of violent confrontations. Ending the AFC/M23 crisis, if that is even realistic, does not mean that all other conflicts will disappear.
FURTHER READING
This briefing was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of the editorial is the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
