Shifting frontlines: Visualizing the evolution of the M23’s territorial influence in early 2024

.tb-image-slider--carousel{opacity:0;direction:ltr}.tb-image-slider .glide{position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide{height:auto;position:relative;margin-left:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide--clone{cursor:pointer}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide img{width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view{width:100%;transition:opacity 350ms ease-in-out;position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__view img{-o-object-fit:contain;object-fit:contain;width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-out{opacity:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-in{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow{border:none;position:absolute;z-index:10;top:50%;display:inline-flex;justify-content:center;align-items:center;width:40px;height:40px;text-align:center;padding:0;cursor:pointer;transform:translateY(-50%);border-radius:50px;transition:all 0.2s linear;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:focus{outline:none;box-shadow:0 0 5px #666;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7);opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:hover{background:rgba(255,255,255,0.9)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left{left:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left svg{margin-left:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left span.tb-slider-left-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m70,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2 1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8l-23.5-23.5 23.5-23.5c1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8s-4.2-1.6-5.8,0l-26.4,26.4c-0.8,0.8-1.2,1.8-1.2,2.9s0.4,2.1 1.2,2.9l26.4,26.4z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right{right:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right svg{margin-right:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right span.tb-slider-right-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m51.1,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2l26.4-26.4c0.8-0.8 1.2-1.8 1.2-2.9 0-1.1-0.4-2.1-1.2-2.9l-26.4-26.4c-1.6-1.6-4.2-1.6-5.8,0-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8l23.5,23.5-23.5,23.5c-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide:hover .glide__arrow,.tb-image-slider .glide:focus .glide__arrow{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider--crop .glide__slide img{-o-object-fit:cover;object-fit:cover;height:100% !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__slides{list-style-type:none;padding-left:0;margin-left:auto}.tb-image-slider__caption{position:absolute;bottom:0;width:100%;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.6);text-align:center;color:#333}.tb-image-slider__caption :empty{background:transparent !important;margin:0;padding:0}.tb-image-slider__caption figcaption{padding:5px 2px;margin-top:5px}@media only screen and (max-width: 781px) { .tb-image-slider--carousel{opacity:0;direction:ltr}.tb-image-slider .glide{position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide{height:auto;position:relative;margin-left:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide--clone{cursor:pointer}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide img{width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view{width:100%;transition:opacity 350ms ease-in-out;position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__view img{-o-object-fit:contain;object-fit:contain;width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-out{opacity:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-in{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow{border:none;position:absolute;z-index:10;top:50%;display:inline-flex;justify-content:center;align-items:center;width:40px;height:40px;text-align:center;padding:0;cursor:pointer;transform:translateY(-50%);border-radius:50px;transition:all 0.2s linear;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:focus{outline:none;box-shadow:0 0 5px #666;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7);opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:hover{background:rgba(255,255,255,0.9)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left{left:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left svg{margin-left:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left span.tb-slider-left-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m70,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2 1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8l-23.5-23.5 23.5-23.5c1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8s-4.2-1.6-5.8,0l-26.4,26.4c-0.8,0.8-1.2,1.8-1.2,2.9s0.4,2.1 1.2,2.9l26.4,26.4z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right{right:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right svg{margin-right:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right span.tb-slider-right-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m51.1,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2l26.4-26.4c0.8-0.8 1.2-1.8 1.2-2.9 0-1.1-0.4-2.1-1.2-2.9l-26.4-26.4c-1.6-1.6-4.2-1.6-5.8,0-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8l23.5,23.5-23.5,23.5c-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide:hover .glide__arrow,.tb-image-slider .glide:focus .glide__arrow{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider--crop .glide__slide img{-o-object-fit:cover;object-fit:cover;height:100% !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__slides{list-style-type:none;padding-left:0;margin-left:auto}.tb-image-slider__caption{position:absolute;bottom:0;width:100%;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.6);text-align:center;color:#333}.tb-image-slider__caption :empty{background:transparent !important;margin:0;padding:0}.tb-image-slider__caption figcaption{padding:5px 2px;margin-top:5px} } @media only screen and (max-width: 599px) { .tb-image-slider--carousel{opacity:0;direction:ltr}.tb-image-slider .glide{position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide{height:auto;position:relative;margin-left:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide--clone{cursor:pointer}.tb-image-slider .glide__slide img{width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view{width:100%;transition:opacity 350ms ease-in-out;position:relative}.tb-image-slider .glide__view img{-o-object-fit:contain;object-fit:contain;width:100%;float:none !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-out{opacity:0}.tb-image-slider .glide__view--fade-in{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow{border:none;position:absolute;z-index:10;top:50%;display:inline-flex;justify-content:center;align-items:center;width:40px;height:40px;text-align:center;padding:0;cursor:pointer;transform:translateY(-50%);border-radius:50px;transition:all 0.2s linear;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:focus{outline:none;box-shadow:0 0 5px #666;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.7);opacity:1}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow:hover{background:rgba(255,255,255,0.9)}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left{left:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left svg{margin-left:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--left span.tb-slider-left-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m70,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2 1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8l-23.5-23.5 23.5-23.5c1.6-1.6 1.6-4.2 0-5.8s-4.2-1.6-5.8,0l-26.4,26.4c-0.8,0.8-1.2,1.8-1.2,2.9s0.4,2.1 1.2,2.9l26.4,26.4z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right{right:5px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right svg{margin-right:-1px}.tb-image-slider .glide__arrow--right span.tb-slider-right-arrow{display:inline-block;width:25px;height:25px;background-image:url("data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 129 129' width='25' height='25'%3E%3Cg%3E%3Cpath d='m51.1,93.5c0.8,0.8 1.8,1.2 2.9,1.2 1,0 2.1-0.4 2.9-1.2l26.4-26.4c0.8-0.8 1.2-1.8 1.2-2.9 0-1.1-0.4-2.1-1.2-2.9l-26.4-26.4c-1.6-1.6-4.2-1.6-5.8,0-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8l23.5,23.5-23.5,23.5c-1.6,1.6-1.6,4.2 0,5.8z' fill='%23666'/%3E%3C/g%3E%3C/svg%3E")}.tb-image-slider .glide:hover .glide__arrow,.tb-image-slider .glide:focus .glide__arrow{opacity:1}.tb-image-slider--crop .glide__slide img{-o-object-fit:cover;object-fit:cover;height:100% !important}.tb-image-slider .glide__slides{list-style-type:none;padding-left:0;margin-left:auto}.tb-image-slider__caption{position:absolute;bottom:0;width:100%;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.6);text-align:center;color:#333}.tb-image-slider__caption :empty{background:transparent !important;margin:0;padding:0}.tb-image-slider__caption figcaption{padding:5px 2px;margin-top:5px} } 

In early 2024, IPIS, ASSODIP, and DIIS published a report on the stakes and motivations of the “March 23 Movement” (M23), a rebellion causing serious insecurity and humanitarian suffering in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The movement took up arms again in 2021, and it rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province in 2022, with military support from the Rwandan army. The IPIS-ASSODIP report included several maps, displaying the areas influenced by M23 up to 2023.

The military situation in North Kivu has evolved since late 2023, following renewed fighting between the Congolese army (FARDC) and allied armed groups — that have unified under the name of “Wazalendo — on one side, and M23 on the other. Therefore, IPIS has updated the map displaying the ‘area of influence’ of M23.

Methodology

To define M23’s area of influence, IPIS mainly used data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and complemented it with additional information from news articles from Jeune Afrique, Radio Okapi, RFI, etc. The incidents (armed clashes, attacks against civilians, bombings, territorial conquest, …) have been selected and analysed manually to map the area of influence. As a caveat, we must emphasize that defining M23’s area of influence in this way entails certain risks: if the main media channels did not report on armed actor movements in a particular area, those incidents could not be taken into account when creating the maps. Additionally, by linearly connecting individual incidents to construct the area of influence, we incur some error relative to the real ‘area of influence’.

This can lead to a certain inaccuracy in the displayed ‘area of influence’. Consequently, they should not be seen as precise frontlines, but rather as a rough indication of the areas influenced by M23. While we did cross-check the maps (and ‘area of influence’) with some North Kivu-based partners and stakeholders, we welcome all feedback and suggestions for improvements.

Some incidents occur outside of M23’s area of influence, this mostly involves bombings or attacks by M23 without them managing to take over the territory.

Military situation in 2023

A ceasefire was established in March 2023 between M23 and the Congolese army, to facilitate the withdrawal of M23 and to create an opportunity for dialogue with the DRC government. While little progress was made with regard to negotiations, it did provide for a six-month lull in fighting in 2023. Nevertheless, incidents continued to occur between the warring parties, and both the Congolese government and M23 have accused each other of violating the ceasefire.

In October 2023, the Wazalendo — a highly fragmented amalgamation of pre-existing Nyatura and Maï-Maï groups — started attacking M23 positions, which soon backfired as M23 launched a counteroffensive. It resulted in an escalation of violence, involving additional humanitarian suffering and shifting frontlines.

The situation calmed down for a few weeks in December 2023, following a temporary truce brokered by the USA. The truce was meant to enable the retreat of M23 from Mushaki and Kirolwire-Kitchanga. Nevertheless, the Congolese army stepped up fighting in January 2024, accusing the Rwandan army of supplying additional troops to DRC, in support of M23. Once again this offensive backfired as M23 responded with intensive attacks against FARDC and Wazalendo positions, resulting in the expansion of M23’s area of influence.

M23’s territorial expansion in 2024

As M23 increased its attacks in 2024, the frontlines have shifted both in Masisi territory — where heavy fighting started around Sake in February 2024 and M23 eventually managed to capture the well-known mining town of Rubaya — and in Rutshuru territory, where M23 expanded to the north (up to Lake Edward) from March 2024 onwards.

Areas occupied by M23 forces from January to 15 May 2024.

Masisi

Masisi territory has experienced intense fighting since February 2024. By May, M23 had gained control of two out of Masisi’s four chiefdoms, notably Bashali and Bahunde.

So far, the government forces and Wazalendo still control Sake, making it the last stronghold on the road to Goma. However, the town is currently under significant pressure. In February 2024, M23 established positions in the surrounding hills, such as Vuvano, Kiuli, and Mbwambaliro in the Kimoka area. Additionally, M23 completed the encircling of Sake (and thus Goma) since the movement captured Shasha, which is located on national road number two. In the meantime, most of Sake’s inhabitants have reportedly fled, leaving only Wazalendo in the town. According to a local leader more than 50% of the houses have been pillaged.

As M23 controls the hills surrounding Sake, it regularly shells the town. On March 16, for example, eight blue helmets got injured as a bomb fell on a MONUSCO camp in Mubambiro. Another incident happened on May 3, when 18 people died and 32 were injured after bombs from the M23 frontlines fell on a displaced person’s camp along the Goma-Sake axis, notably in Mugunga (Lushagala).

In April, fighting continued along different roads leading to Sake, such as the ones to the north to Kimoka (and Kitchanga), northwest to Rutobogo (and Masisi) and south to Shasha (and Minova).

South of Sake, shells regularly fell on some of the towns along national road number 2 between Sake and Minova, including Minova and Bweremana, as M23 controls the hills along this stretch of the road (e.g. Ndumba and Kiluku). According to a local administrator, displaced people from Minova consequently moved further south into Kalehe territory in South Kivu province. M23 continued to push further south along this road, and on May 4 it temporarily captured Bitonga, but lost it again soon after. A Burundian army unit that was stationed in Bitonga reportedly retreated to Minova.

In April 2024, M23 made advances to the west of Sake. In the beginning of the month, fighting has been reported around Nyakajanga (Niacajanga) and Bihambwe. Eventually, towards the end of April, after two days of fighting, M23 captured the important mining town of Rubaya. This conquest made international headlines as the area produces significant volumes of coltan, a strategic mineral for energy transition. The Congolese government accuses M23 of exporting Rubaya’s production directly to Rwanda. According to a local civil society organization, M23 distributed mining equipment to promote the revival of mineral exploitation at Rubaya’s mines.

After capturing Rubaya, M23 advanced further north(-west) and south. Combat between Wazalendo and M23 has been reported near Katale and Biteete, just a few kilometers from Masisi town. Inhabitants reportedly fled in the direction of Walikale territory.

South of Rubaya, heavy fighting has been signaled in the groupements of Ufamandu and Mupfuni (Muvunyi)-Kibabi, where M23 took control of Kibabi, Ngungu and Kinigi in the first days of May. A few days later, fighting has also been reported around Remeka and Luke.

M23’s expansion in the south of Masisi in May 2024, yet again, triggered another wave of displacement.

Rutshuru

In early March 2024, renewed fighting broke out in the northeastern part of Rutshuru territory, specifically in the groupements of Mutanda and Kihondo. M23 gained control of Nyanzale, Kashalira, Kirima, Kikuku and Kibirizi. The movement also advanced to the surroundings of Rwindi (occupying the Rwindi river valley), and conquered Rwindi town on the 8^th of March, allegedly with the support of heavily equipped Rwandan troops. Additionally, M23 captured Kashuga (Kashua) — on the border between the territories of Walikale, Masisi and Rutshuru — located about 10 kilometres north of Mweso. However, the Congolese government forces managed to retrieve Kashuga and Misinga in May.

In April, fighting continued around Kibirizi and north of Kikuku. M23 reportedly even tried to push further northwards to Kanyabayonga along the roads from Birundule and Rwindi, but the Congolese army managed to repel the offensive. Due to the hostilities, many people fled north to Kanyabayongo and some other villages in Lubero territory, such as Kayna and Kirumba. An estimated 35,000 displaced families are currently sheltering in Kanyabayongo due to the upsurge in violence. Early June, armed clashes between FARDC and M23 continued along the road leading up to Kanyabayonga. At that time, M23 managed to capture Bulindi (close to Birundule, see the map of April 2024), and attacked Butalongola (only 5 kilometers south of Kanyabayonga).

Also in the north of Rutshuru, M23 allegedly controls Vitshumbi at the shores of Lake Edward since March 11. This affects fishing on the lake and increases food insecurity in surrounding areas. In the second half of May, the Congolese government tried to recover Kibirizi and Vitshumbu from M23, but so far without success.

Report | The M23 “version 2” – Local stakes, motivations, perceptions, and impacts

Since 2021, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has once again fallen victim to the “March 23 Movement” (M23). Supposedly defeated in 2013, the M23 took up arms again in 2021, and by 2022 had rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province.

Briefing | Why the DR Congo is putting Apple on the spot

End of April, several international media relayed accusations against Apple sourcing ‘conflict minerals’ from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The reality behind these allegations is however quite complex. The reasons for the Congolese government to speak out now, seem to go beyond concerns related to human rights violations along mineral supply chains. The allegations are rather triggered by regional tensions in the Great Lakes region and the worsening security situation in Congo’s North Kivu province. Nevertheless, preoccupations over industry efforts to source more responsibly are valid.

Editorial | Démêler la crise du M23 : vers la stabilité et la paix

La région du Nord-Kivu subit une grave crise humanitaire et sécuritaire. Cette crise constitue un risque sérieux d’escalade vers une crise régionale.

Briefing | M23 crisis flares again in North Kivu: context, dynamics and risks

Past October, violence resurged in North Kivu province, as clashes intensified between the Movement of March 23 (M23) and various local militias, as well as the Congolese army (FARDC). An additional 200,000 people have been displaced last month, exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation in the province which already counted over 590,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs)

This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the Belgian Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD). The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the Belgian Development Cooperation.