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On 26 July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani overthrew Niger’s democratically-elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, on the pretext that the government had mishandled the economy and had failed to make sufficient progress against the country’s various insurgencies.1 This Friday, 6 December 2024, will mark the junta’s 500th day in power. Using attacks against state security forces as a metric to gauge the country’s progress in combatting the jihadist threat suggests that the situation has arguably deteriorated since Gen. Tiani unconstitutionally relieved Bazoum of his duties.2 According to the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative data set, the country’s army, gendarmes, national guard, police, and other armed uniformed personnel have come under attack 51 times in the first nine months of 2024– more than any other year studied by the S4 Initiative, 20 percent more than had been recorded in the 500 days prior to the coup, and on pace to double what the S4 Initiative recorded for all of 2023. This raises questions about the direction the government has taken – and what kinds of support it may need.
One thing is certain: in short order, Gen. Tiani has fundamentally altered the country’s geopolitical landscape. Apart from remaining in the Lake Chad Basin Commission and contributing troops to that organization’s Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Niamey has upended several long-standing partnerships. Within a month of the junta assuming power, Niger severed its security agreements with France, and by December 2023, Paris had pulled out its roughly 1,500-strong military deployment, known as Operation Barkhane, from the country. In March 2024, Niamey ordered Washington (which had taken over two months to officially call the July 2023 takeover a “coup”) to remove its 1,000 or so troops from Nigerien soil, which was accomplished in August. Sandwiched in between these expulsions was an order by Niger given in December 2023 for the European Union (EU) to conclude its comparatively smaller security assistance missions in the country.3 Germany also withdrew its (much smaller contingent of) troops in August. The EU uniformed personnel from a dozen-plus countries departed Niger with alacrity, with most having departed the country by year’s end. Moreover, in December 2023, Gen. Tiani withdrew from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel).4 And in January 2024, Niamey formally informed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that Niger would no longer be a member, which will take effect in January 2025. (Burkina Faso and Mali also will leave ECOWAS.)
Besides tearing things down, Gen. Tiani has also sought to augment existing relationships and create new entities. Niger has entered into a series of economic, defense and security partnerships with China, Russia, as well as Turkey (among other non-Western countries), and has recruited mercenaries from Russia and Syria to serve alongside its forces. In September 2023, Niamey – together with Bamako and Ouagadougou – announced the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States, which held its first summit in July 2024 and includes a common defense pact.
In the short term, these changes do not appear to have improved Niger’s security situation. It is perhaps not surprising that, during this period of shifting alliances and the creation of new partnerships and institutions, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have become more confrontational – and more numerous – across the country. The two Boko Haram factions – People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (or JAS, based on its name in Arabic), and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – remain active across much of Diffa. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (or JNIM, also based on its name in Arabic, which is affiliated with al Qaeda and competes with the Islamic State for adherents and dominance) operate in much of Tahoua and Tillabéri. All four of these armed groups have assaulted Nigerien uniformed personnel during President Bazoum’s tenure and that of his predecessor, Mahamadou Issoufou. But three new pro-Bazoum armed groups have sprung up since the junta assumed power: the Patriotic Front for Justice, the Patriotic Liberation Front, and the Patriotic Movement for Freedom and Justice. These new NSAGs have attacked state security forces in Agadez and Dosso. Chadian as well as Libyan rebels and bandits also operate in Agadez from time to time and have ambushed Nigerien security forces. The threat these new groups pose, however, is comparatively modest to those mentioned above.
Nigerien security forces have come under attack in all of the country’s seven regions and its capital district. As the map above indicates, the situation across Diffa and Tillabéri is particularly fraught with jihadist groups attacking fixed sites, convoys, and patrols in 17 of 19 departments in those two regions. The 100 clashes chosen for the map were selected primarily to show the geographic breadth of the threat. (The S4 Data Set records just two assaults on security forces in Zinder: one involved a mob and the other ‘friendly fire’. Neither is recorded on the map.) They roughly reflect the distribution of attacks registered in the S4 Data Set since 2009—95% of which have occurred since October 2014. They are skewed toward incidents in which diversion of state-owned lethal materiel is believed to have occurred in meaningful quantities. About half of the nearly 300 recorded events – all based on open-source reporting – likely did not result in the loss of military equipment, or there is insufficient information to make an assumption concerning the diversion of materiel. Fuller accounts would likely result in more instances of attacks resulting in loss of arms and estimates of more equipment having been seized.
Still, the cost to the state – in terms of the loss of security personnel and materiel from these clashes – is considerable. By Niamey’s own admission, its men and women in uniform have suffered more than 500 casualties in just 13 incidents (see table below). Niger is comparatively transparent when it comes to acknowledging the sacrifices its uniformed personnel make in defense of the country. It has frequently decreed periods of national mourning connected to terrorist attacks. The diversion of government-owned lethal materiel to the perpetrators of these assaults, however, is rarely (if ever) fully divulged. A conservative estimate would be that jihadist groups have secured numerous armored vehicles and other heavy weapons systems, dozens of gun trucks, hundreds of light weapons, thousands of small arms, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition through armed confrontations with Nigerien security forces.
Importantly, the diversion of state-owned materiel does not necessarily imply culpability of state security agencies. The security environment across much of the country is daunting and Nigerien forces have largely performed ably. There are few instances when uniformed personnel have been reported to flee into the bush in large numbers and abandon their equipment (as has occurred in other countries with greater frequency). Moreover, Niger has a long-standing policy of refraining from arming community self-defense groups as other countries have done (such as in neighboring Nigeria). On this score, Gen. Tiani has stayed the course undertaken by his civilian predecessors.5 This policy has reduced the loss of state-owned lethal equipment but has not stopped NSAGs from attacking civilians – on several occasions with horrific consequences.
Moving forward, it is not immediately or intuitively clear whether or how the Alliance of Sahel States will succeed where G5 Sahel and ECOWAS did not. It’s also fair to ask how support from states such as China and Russia will generate better results than those achieved in cooperation with France and the United States. Jihadist groups have proven adept at manipulating and exacerbating social discontent and cleavages. (Tensions between herders and farmers, and between ethnic groups, are well documented, and provide fertile ground for jihadist groups when it comes to recruitment.) NSAGs have long demonstrated a proclivity to obtain substantial weaponry from the very states that are seeking to defeat them. Absent any political negotiations and agreements, or in the light of Niamey’s decision to reduce its security presence in contested areas, there is little reason to believe attacks on state security forces will subside any time soon, or that results will differ markedly from recent experience. Despite the profound changes to Niger’s government, diplomacy, and security over the past 500 days, ways need to be found to support Niamey’s efforts to contain and counter insurgent attacks – both on Nigerien security forces as well as the country’s civilians – to reduce both the flow of illicit arms and ammunition as well as human suffering.
Further reading
* Eric G. Berman is director of the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University’s Program of African Studies.
- Some have claimed that personal ambition and grievance were factors that motivated Gen. Tiani. President Bazoum had reportedly decided to remove him as head of the Presidential Guard. ↩︎
- A recent Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) report on the activities of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) provides information and analysis on other (regional) indicators such as casualties resulting from jihadist groups’ attacks on civilians, and the growth of territories under the control of such entities. ↩︎
- The EU fielded two small security assistance operations in Niger: an EU Capacity Building Mission (known as EUCAP Sahel in Niger, which was established in 2012); and an EU Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM Niger, authorized in 2022). EUCAP and EUMPM were formally closed in June 2024. ↩︎
- G5 Sahel, established in 2014, comprised Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. One of the regional organization’s undertakings was to field a joint military force (known as FC-G5S) to counter the jihadist threat facing the sub-region. Mali withdrew from the regional bloc and its joint force in May 2022 when it was passed over to head the organization as planned. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger both proclaimed they would leave the joint force. Chad and Mauritania subsequently expressed their intention to dissolve the organization. ↩︎
- Some Nigerien communities (e.g. in parts of Tahoua and Tillabéri) have taken up arms to defend themselves against jihadist threats. Some of the weapons have come from Libya. Others likely from the black market and battlefield capture. ↩︎
This briefing was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of the editorial is the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
