{"id":38215,"date":"2025-02-11T13:23:06","date_gmt":"2025-02-11T12:23:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/?post_type=weekly-briefing&p=38215"},"modified":"2025-02-11T15:19:16","modified_gmt":"2025-02-11T14:19:16","slug":"promoting-ddr-programmes-while-arming-non-state-armed-groups-congos-paradoxical-conflict-resolution-policies-in-the-context-of-the-m23-insurgency","status":"publish","type":"weekly-briefing","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/nl\/weekly-briefing\/promoting-ddr-programmes-while-arming-non-state-armed-groups-congos-paradoxical-conflict-resolution-policies-in-the-context-of-the-m23-insurgency\/","title":{"rendered":"Promoting DDR programmes while arming non-state armed groups: Congo\u2019s paradoxical conflict resolution policies in the context of the M23 insurgency"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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When President F\u00e9lix Tshisekedi came to power in 2019, he firmly promised the Congolese citizens to end the conflicts and restore peace in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). To reach these goals, his government wanted to combine regional diplomacy<\/strong> to establish political and security cooperation between DRC and neighbouring countries, with enhanced military operations<\/strong> against armed groups along with new demobilisation initiatives<\/strong><\/a> to reintegrate ex-combatants into society. Tshisekedi also wanted to reform the army<\/a> and make it more effective so that it could better deal with the various conflicts in the country. However, until today, violence continues unabated in the provinces of Ituri, and North and South Kivu, causing millions of people to flee their homes<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of particular concern are the developments in the government’s fight against the rebel group Mouvement du 23 Mars<\/em> (M23). The latter gained control over large parts of North Kivu, culminating in the siege of the provincial capital Goma, end of January 2025. The Congolese government, having focused mainly on a military approach in the past years, and being aware that the Congolese army (FARDC) alone would not be able to deal with the current crisis, decided to mobilise non-state armed groups to fight against M23 along with the FARDC<\/strong>. Considering the problematic rebel-military integration attempts of the past, the creation of this armed volunteer corps could be the next Pandora\u2019s Box in the Congo saga, possibly jeopardising future peace processes. It also blatantly contradicts the government\u2019s painstaking efforts to implement programmes to disarm and demobilise non-state armed groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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M23\u2019s advance in Eastern Congo<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

M23 was first created in 2012 by former Congr\u00e8s National pour la D\u00e9fense du Peuple<\/em> (CNDP) officers who were not satisfied with the government\u2019s implementation of a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009<\/a>, that should have allowed CDNP to transform into a political party and its military units to integrate into the Congolese army. CNDP itself was created by former officers of the Rwanda-backed rebel movement Rassemblement Congolais pour la D\u00e9mocratie <\/em>(RCD) – one of the signatories of the Sun City Peace Agreement that ended the Second Congo War in 2003 – who did not accept the authority of the new central government. M23 re-emerged in 2021, supposedly out of dissatisfaction with the way the government has implemented the provisions of the Declaration of Nairobi<\/a> (2013) about amnesty and social reintegration. M23 also claims to protect the rights of Congolese Tutsi in Eastern Congo (RCD and CNDP formulated similar claims in the past).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

M23 resurged with the military support of Rwanda<\/a> (a clear infringement of Congo\u2019s sovereignty). For many years Rwandan President Paul Kagame has accused DRC of never taking adequate action against Forces D\u00e9mocratiques de Lib\u00e9ration du Rwanda <\/em>(FDLR), a Hutu-dominated armed group in Eastern Congo, founded by perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. He claims that FDLR poses a security risk<\/a> for Rwanda and for Congolese Tutsi. The Congolese army has occasionally used FDLR as a proxy against Rwanda-backed rebel groups, as has been the case in the current crisis<\/a>. Additionally, recent security agreements and economic deals<\/a> between DRC and Uganda have also caused nervosity in Kigali. By supporting non-state proxies in Eastern DRC, Rwanda has tried to secure its economic, political and security interests<\/a> in the region over the past three decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since M23 forged an alliance with Alliance du Fleuve Congo <\/em>(AFC), an opposition movement founded in 2023 by the Congolese politician Corneille Nangaa, it embraces more radical political ambitions, aiming at putting an end to the current Congolese government<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since Tshisekedi came to power, several initiatives at the national and regional levels have been launched to address the multiple conflicts in Eastern Congo, and M23 in particular.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Martial law, military alliances, and peace talks<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, the government decreed martial law<\/strong> in North Kivu and Ituri, granting full executive power to a military provincial governor, to give the army more leeway in its battle against armed groups. On 2 February 2025, Tshisekedi extended this martial law<\/a> once again. The proclamation of the state of siege<\/strong> did not put an end to rampant armed violence in Eastern Congo, on the contrary, M23\u2019s resurgence took place after martial law was proclaimed. Paradoxically, under martial law, FARDC has increasingly relinquished its monopoly on the use of force,<\/a> allowing proxies to establish rebel governance in the areas under their control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the government reached bilateral agreements for joint military operations<\/strong> on Congolese territory, with Uganda to fight against Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)<\/a>, and with Burundi to target Burundian armed groups active in South Kivu.<\/a> Neither ADF nor the Burundian rebels were totally defeated, on the contrary, some of the Burundian armed groups became proxies of M23<\/a>. More recently, rather unsuccessful regional military initiatives have been set up by the East African Community (EAC)<\/a> and the Southern African Development Community<\/a> (SADC) to counter M23 in North Kivu. The Burundian army<\/a> is currently engaging in the fight against M23 (in South Kivu), further increasing the risk of a regional conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Simultaneously, the Congolese government has participated in several peace talks<\/strong>, such as the Nairobi Process (together with various armed groups) in 2022, under the auspices of the EAC, and the Luanda Process (trilateral peace talks about M23 between DRC, Rwanda and Angola<\/a>) that eventually resulted in a ceasefire agreement in August 2024, which, however, was never respected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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DDR efforts and failed rebel-military integration<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Over the past decades, Congolese governments have set up Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes<\/strong>, with the support of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission<\/a> (MONUSCO), to dismantle non-state armed groups and to facilitate the return of former rebels to civilian life, or to allow them to integrate in the army. These programmes failed<\/a> for several reasons, such as: the incomplete implementation of programmes due to a lack of funding; the weak engagement vis-\u00e0-vis the challenges demobilised rebels must face when they return to civilian life; short-term interventions without the prospect of a durable solution; and manipulation by political elites. Furthermore, Rebel-military integration policies have been particularly problematic<\/strong><\/a>, even contributing to the creation of new armed groups. Overall, integration failed because several militias refused to join the regular armed forces due to persisting security dilemmas<\/a>, or because commanders left the integration process, not being satisfied with the incentives offered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aware of the ineffectiveness of previous programmes, Tshisekedi announced in July 2021 a new Programme de D\u00e9sarmement, D\u00e9mobilisation, Rel\u00e8vement Communautaire et Stabilisation<\/em> (P-DDRCS)<\/strong>. The ambitious programme aims<\/a> to strengthen social cohesion and democratic dialogue, restore state authority, rehabilitate and reintegrate communities, and promote socio-economic development and public information and communication. Demobilisation and community-based reintegration of armed group combatants are supposed to be part of a comprehensive community support approach<\/a>. Interestingly, unlike previous programmes, P-DDRCS seems not to allow automatic integration of armed group combatants into the regular security forces, although it leaves the door open for voluntary enrolment on an individual base<\/a>. However, the P-DDRCS programme has been facing challenges<\/strong>: the national coordinator<\/a> has been replaced twice since the start; agents responsible for implementing the programme have complained that their salaries are not being paid<\/a>; a provincial coordinator was arrested on suspicion of embezzlement of P-DDRCS funds<\/a>; resources are lacking<\/a> to adequately implement the programme; and the number of disarmed and reintegrated combatants<\/a> is rather low.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A shift in the fight against M23 – An anti-M23 alliance that comes with risks<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

While in May 2022 President Tshisekedi still disapproved of the possibility of using non-state armed groups<\/a> to support the army in its fight against M23, the government decided in September 2023 to create the Volontaires pour la D\u00e9fense de la Patrie (VDP)<\/strong><\/a> from selected members of a loose association of non-state armed groups which were operating under the name of Wazalendo (\u2018patriots\u2019)<\/strong>, \u201cto serve as its \u2018official\u2019 proxy force<\/strong>\u201d in the war against M23. According to the UN Group of Experts<\/a> on the DRC, the collaboration between FARDC and VDP is \u201csystematic and coordinated\u201d. This collaboration however entails significant long-term security risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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VDP vs Wazalendo<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

VDP was created to make the distinction between armed groups considered as \u2018official\u2019 proxies of the FARDC, and other militia also operating under the name of \u2018Wazalendo\u2019. However, this distinction seems less clear on the ground,<\/a> as VDP combatants and FARDC have sometimes been deployed together with combatants of other Wazalendo groups (which are not part of the VDP), against M23.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who are the VDP <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Important armed groups that make up the official VDP are Nduma D\u00e9fense du Congo \u2013 R\u00e9nov\u00e9 <\/em>(NDC-R), Nyatura<\/em>, and Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain<\/em> (APCLS). Interestingly, the overall military command of VDP is in the hands of NDC-R leader Guidon Shimiray Mwissa, a war criminal who is listed on the UN Security Council sanctions list<\/a>. The office of the late General Peter Cisimwami<\/a>, former governor of North Kivu, coordinated the operations of the VDP. His death just before the fall of Goma, has most probably created great confusion in the ranks of the anti-M23 alliance.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Although it is not unusual that the Congolese army uses \u2018allied\u2019 non-state armed groups as proxies<\/a> to fight against groups hostile to the government, it is the first time that this type of military collaboration has been officialised, actually legitimising certain non-state armed groups that have been destabilising North Kivu for a long time<\/strong>, and that have a track record of serious human rights violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not only M23 combatants and Rwandan soldiers are guilty of violating human rights<\/a>,- especially in areas with a Hutu population where they \u201csystematically abducted, tortured and executed men and destroyed villages\u201d -, also VDP and other Wazalendo combatants have been accused of committing human rights abuses<\/a> against civilians<\/strong> (including killings, looting, sexual violence, and destroying of houses).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These ‘allied’ armed groups also have a notorious reputation of rent-seeking behaviour and predation<\/strong>. Since April 2024, M23 combatants have controlled the important coltan mining site of Rubaya, in Masisi, which enables M23 to consolidate the traffic of Congolese coltan to Rwanda<\/a> (M23 has installed a rebel administration to organise the coltan production in Rubaya, and levies illegal taxes on the sale and transport of minerals). However, before the arrival of M23 in Rubaya, the mining site was controlled for almost a year by VDP militia. According to the Group of Experts of the United Nations, coltan, extracted under VDP occupation, was also smuggled to Rwanda.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, cracks appeared in the alliance between VDP and FARDC in September 2024, when the latter launched an attack against FDLR positions, following the Congolese government\u2019s commitment to neutralise FDLR in the context of the Luanda peace process. Considering FDLR as a tactical ally against M23, VDP leaders perceived the FARDC attack as a betrayal of the alliance<\/a>, and decided to embed FDLR combatants in VDP units.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent months, several violent clashes between VDP\/Wazalendo units and FARDC<\/a>, allegedly resulting from misunderstandings, have been reported, illustrating the sometimes chaotic and confusing situation on the ground<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A National Reserve Defence Force: Prospects for armed groups to be integrated in the army? <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In November 2022, President Tshisekedi launched a patriotic appeal<\/strong> to the population to support the army<\/strong> in its fight against M23. In March 2023, the government submitted a draft law related to the creation of a National Reserve Defence Force<\/a> as a separate entity within the FARDC to better protect the country\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity against recurrent aggressions, enabling not only former army soldiers, but also volunteers to join the national defence forces. This fits into a strategy that assumes that the current crisis in Eastern Congo, must be dealt with primarily militarily<\/strong>. The creation of the VDP has paved the way for non-state armed groups to later become part of this Reserve army that is still in the making<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A dangerous balancing act<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Aiming to disarm and demobilise non-state armed groups through the P-DDRCS programme on the one hand and simultaneously mobilising militia to fight against a rebellion on the other hand, seems a dangerous balancing act. Creating a volunteer army (VDP) composed of several notorious armed groups, seems to run counter to the ambitions of P-DDRCS. Yet, the government reportedly told VDP leaders that they would be allowed to join the future Reserve army<\/a> once the conflict ends, through the P-DDRCS programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As aforementioned, previous Congolese governments had bad experiences with the integration of ex-combatants into the army, a process that led to the emergence of new cycles of violence and the creation of new rebel groups. Offering the opportunity to non-state armed groups that have committed human rights violations, to fight alongside the FARDC against a common enemy, seems a very risky undertaking, especially when these groups operate as separate units and maintain their own command structures.<\/a> These groups receive weapons, ammunition, uniforms and cash<\/a>, and it is tolerated that they establish rebel governance<\/strong> in the zones they control. Several incidents in the recent past have demonstrated that VDP leaders act self-willed (e.g. regarding the collaboration with FDLR), and that the Congolese army does not really control the actions of VDP\/Wazalendo. The creation of the VDP seems to be part of an ill-considered military strategy to cope with a growing insurgency in the short term, without considering possible long-term consequences<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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New fronts, shifting alliances and the risk of new cycles of violence<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The conflict is expanding into South Kivu, with M23 now also occupying a part of Kalehe territory. A coalition of FARDC and VDP\/Wazalendo units is trying to stop the further advance of M23, meaning there is a growing risk that VDP\/Wazalendo will now also gain more influence in South Kivu. The crucial question is how the Congolese government will deal with thousands of VDP\/Wazalendo fighters and their commanders, some of whom have committed war crimes, once the war is over<\/strong>. Integrating them into the Reserve army, as has been suggested, seems an approach destined to fail<\/a>. Combatants will claim they were indispensable in defending the territorial integrity of Congo, an act of patriotism that they will no doubt like to see richly rewarded. Integration into the Reserve army may not sound like an attractive option to them, knowing that soldiers hardly get any pay. Given the many flaws of the current P-DDRCS, a reintegration into society of thousands of combatants through this programme, does not seem realistic either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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No military way-out<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Only sustained regional diplomatic efforts<\/strong> to bring the warring parties (as well as indirectly involved neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Burundi) around the negotiating table and continued international pressure on Rwanda to stop its support to the insurgency can make an end to the fighting. The complexity and the regional dimension of the current crisis ask for a comprehensive peace approach<\/strong>, that not only deals with local problems concerning the right to access land or the discrimination of specific communities but also considers regional security issues and works towards equitable trade agreements between neighbouring countries. Finally, a genuine reform of the Congolese defence forces<\/strong> should be considered a top priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Photo: Weapons and ammunition found in Rutshuru territory. \u00a9MONUSCO-Abel Kavanagh<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Further reading<\/h2>\n\n\n
<\/a>
<\/div><\/div>
The (new) M23 offensive on Goma: Why this long-lasting conflict is not only about minerals and what are its implications? \u2013 Q&A | February 2025 | IPIS<\/div>
By the morning of January 29th, the rebels largely controlled the strategic city of Goma. To provide a quick and understandable explanation of the causes of this humanitarian crisis, the role of natural resources, and in particular minerals, is often overemphasized. While mining and mineral trade inevitably play an important role \u2014 being a vital part of the local economy \u2014 it is important to assess economic assets more broadly, as well as political interests and social grievances.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
<\/a>
<\/div><\/div>
DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 \u2013 why this may backfire | January 2025 | The Conversation<\/div>
Merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the underlying causes of the eastern DRC crisis.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
<\/a>
<\/div><\/div>
The M23 \u201cversion 2\u201d – Local stakes, motivations, perceptions, and impacts | April 2024 | IPIS<\/div>
Since 2021, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has once again fallen victim to the \u201cMarch 23 Movement\u201d (M23). Supposedly defeated in 2013, the M23 took up arms again in 2021, and by 2022 had rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n
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This briefing was<\/em> produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of the editorial is the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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