{"id":28007,"date":"2023-02-06T16:41:07","date_gmt":"2023-02-06T15:41:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/\/?post_type=weekly-briefing&#038;p=28007"},"modified":"2024-07-03T15:20:53","modified_gmt":"2024-07-03T13:20:53","slug":"why-m23-is-not-your-average-rebel-group","status":"publish","type":"weekly-briefing","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/nl\/weekly-briefing\/why-m23-is-not-your-average-rebel-group\/","title":{"rendered":"Why M23 is not your average rebel group"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div style=\"height:10px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph\">Ce briefing est \u00e9galement disponible en <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/\/fr\/weekly-briefing\/pourquoi-le-m23-nest-pas-un-groupe-rebelle-comme-les-autres\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">fran\u00e7ais<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The past year saw some major changes in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has been ravaged by armed groups for decades. One group in particular rose to the forefront,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/africacenter.org\/spotlight\/rwanda-drc-risk-of-war-new-m23-rebellion-emerges-explainer\/\">the Mouvement du 23 Mars<\/a>&nbsp;(M23). The objectives of M23 are perched at the intersection of local, national and regional power interests as was highlighted among others in the latest report by the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/securitycouncil\/sanctions\/1533\/panel-of-experts\/expert-reports\">UN Group of Experts<\/a>&nbsp;on the DRC, which details how this rebel group is supported by Rwanda. Tensions between the two countries were exacerbated when Rwanda, on 24 January 2023, shot at a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/africa\/rwanda-shoots-at-dr-congo-fighter-jet-for-violating-its-airspace\/2796459\">Congolese fighter jet<\/a>, accusing the Congolese army (Forces Arm\u00e9es de la RDC, or FARDC) of violating its airspace.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After a short introduction on the history of M23, this briefing examines three aspects that illustrate how the movement distinguishes itself from other rebel groups. First, we focus on how the revival of M23 changes alliances on the ground. Secondly, we elaborate on the regional impact of M23. Finally, we examine some peace attempts amid ethnic tensions and their chances of success.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>M23 in historical perspective<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">M23 emerged from the rebel group&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/pdfid\/51d2c87d4.pdf\">Congr\u00e8s national pour la d\u00e9fense du peuple<\/a>&nbsp;(CNDP), which laid down arms on 23 March 2009, following a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/peacemaker.un.org\/sites\/peacemaker.un.org\/files\/CD_090323_Peace%20Agreement%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CNDP.pdf\">peace agreement<\/a>&nbsp;stipulating that its soldiers would be integrated into the Congolese police and army, while the CNDP&#8217;s political wing would become an officially acknowledged party. However, a faction within the CNDP subsequently denounced the poor implementation of the agreement and developed into a new rebel group that came to the fore as M23 in 2012. Besides proclaiming to enforce the terms of the peace agreement, M23 claims to defend the interests of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/information.tv5monde.com\/afrique\/rdc-le-m23-se-positionne-comme-le-bouclier-de-la-communaute-tutsi-478030\">Congolese Tutsi and Kinyarwanda-speaking minorities<\/a>. In M23&#8217;s discourse, the grievances of these minorities revolve around threats by Hutu militias and the state\u2019s ineptitude to protect them. Despite these proclaimed objectives, M23 has perpetrated&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2012\/12\/428982\">human rights violations<\/a>&nbsp;against civilians, including Tutsi, most notoriously when it&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020\">occupied&nbsp;<\/a>the provincial capital of Goma, North Kivu in 2012. It took&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/monusco.unmissions.org\/en\/first-official-monusco-fardc-joint-assessment-mission-chanzu\">joint military action<\/a>&nbsp;by the FARDC and the UN to defeat M23, causing combatants to flee to Rwanda and Uganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since its military defeat in 2013, and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/kivusecurity.org\/map\">barring some minor incidents<\/a>, M23 lay dormant for almost a decade until late 2021 when it ramped up attacks again. In March 2022, violence escalated with the shoot-down of a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/africa\/un-helicopter-with-8-on-board-crashes-in-dr-congo-army-blames-m23-rebels\/2549657\">UN helicopter<\/a>&nbsp;killing six UN troops. In addition, M23 took control of vast parts of Rutshuru territory. Especially the raid of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rfi.fr\/fr\/afrique\/20220527-est-de-la-rdc-le-m23-a-atteint-la-base-militaire-strat%C3%A9gique-de-rumangabo\">Rumangabo military base<\/a>&nbsp;in May 2022 and the capture of the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rtbf.be\/article\/est-de-la-rdc-le-m23-occupe-la-ville-de-bunagana-a-la-frontiere-avec-louganda-11011536\">Bunagana<\/a>&nbsp;border town in June, were catalysts for M23&#8217;s grip on North Kivu. While the former attack provided M23 with access to military-grade weapons, the latter operation increased its revenue base through illegal taxation of the border trade. In late November 2022, M23 also captured the strategic &#8216;groupements&#8217; of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.africanews.com\/2022\/12\/23\/drc-m23-rebels-pull-out-of-town-near-goma\/\">Kibumba and Buhumba<\/a>, in Rutshuru territory. This allowed them to cut off&nbsp;<em>Route National<\/em>&nbsp;2, a major access road to Goma. Consequently, some&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/live-news\/20221103-10-years-after-rebel-occupation-east-dr-congo-city-fears-new-assault\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">feared<\/a>&nbsp;that their control of supplies to Goma was a first step in reconquering the city.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The enemy of my enemy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first consequence of M23&#8217;s revival is that various rival groups concluded a non-aggression pact during an&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/securitycouncil\/sanctions\/1533\/panel-of-experts\/expert-reports\">informal meeting<\/a>&nbsp;in May 2022, in Pinga, North Kivu. These former rivals may have had different reasons for their coalition, but&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/afrique.tv5monde.com\/information\/rd-congo-quelles-sont-les-forces-armees-qui-luttent-contre-le-m23\">patriotic motives<\/a> certainly play a role, as many perceive M23 as a foreign proxy.&nbsp;In addition to this rebel coalition, also the FARDC is looking for unusual allies in their fight against M23. For instance,&nbsp;said UN midterm report details how the FARDC supplied weapons and ammunition to, and even engaged in combat with, various non-state armed groups. Advocacy group&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2022\/10\/18\/dr-congo-army-units-aided-abusive-armed-groups\">Human Rights Watch<\/a> denounced these practices, as they condone and support groups that stand accused of serious human rights violations. Eventually, DRC&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/securitycouncil\/sanctions\/1533\/panel-of-experts\/expert-reports\">president F\u00e9lix Tshisekedi<\/a>&nbsp;condemned the FARDC and reshuffled the army commanders in North Kivu on 6 July 2022. However,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/allafrica.com\/stories\/202211240059.html\">video footage<\/a>&nbsp;suggests that, still&nbsp;in the autumn&nbsp;of 2022, the FARDC was collaborating with the rebels of the&nbsp;Forces d\u00e9mocratiques de lib\u00e9ration du Rwanda&nbsp;(FDLR).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A second example of how M23 is altering the balance of power on the ground, are its own interactions with the East African Community Regional Force (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/great-lakes\/democratic-republic-congo\/east-africas-dr-congo-force-case-caution\">EACRF<\/a>), which supports the FARDC in fighting armed groups in eastern Congo. Even though it is targeted by the EACRF, M23 seems to take advantage of the latter\u2019s involvement. For example,&nbsp;Lawrence Kanyuka, M23\u2019s political spokesperson, announced in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mobile.twitter.com\/LawrenceKanyuka\/status\/1606132038830006273\/photo\/1\">a press release<\/a>&nbsp;that his movement would surrender the town of Kibumba to the EACRF, which may have been an attempt to increase legitimacy and bargaining power on the regional level. Whatever the case may be, it is remarkable that M23 chose to vacate the town to the EACRF rather than the FARDC. The press release of M23 elaborated on this positive attitude towards the regional armed force: &#8220;<em>This is a gesture of goodwill in the name of peace&#8221;<\/em>&nbsp;and \u201c<em>M23<\/em>&nbsp;<em>expresses its gratitude to regional leaders for their continued efforts to find a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC&#8221;.<\/em>Nevertheless, local actors confirmed that&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.africanews.com\/2023\/01\/03\/drc-m23-remains-in-kibumba-according-to-local-sources\/\">M23 has not left Kibumba<\/a>&nbsp;after all,&nbsp;which M23 in turn&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mobile.twitter.com\/LawrenceKanyuka\/status\/1610603144152596482\/photo\/2\">refuted<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>M23 at the crossroads of regional rivalries&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A second aspect distinguishing M23 from other armed groups, is its impact on the fragile power balance in the African Great Lakes Region. The decades-long rivalry between Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC puts the group at the intersection of national and regional power dynamics.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From a Rwandan perspective, M23\u2019s backing of Congolese Tutsi and its fight with the Rwandese rebel group&nbsp;FDLR,&nbsp;results in some aligned interests. According to President Kagame, dismantling the FDLR is a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/panorama.rw\/new-year-2023-message-by-president-paul-kagame\/\">security priority<\/a>. This he emphasised as follows in a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@david.himbara_27884\/kagame-threats-to-invade-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-these-are-his-own-words-fd41ecc43848\">speech<\/a>&nbsp;in February 2022:&nbsp;<em>&#8220;[\u2026] But when anyone crosses a red line, we don&#8217;t ask anybody for permission to intervene. We simply move in and sort the problem out.&#8221;<\/em>&nbsp;It is, therefore, no surprise that&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/securitycouncil\/sanctions\/1533\/panel-of-experts\/expert-reports\">the UN midterm report<\/a>&nbsp;indicated that the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) is partially responsible for the revival of M23 by supplying both military and operational support, despite Rwanda\u2019s denial. Besides security concerns, observers also point out the importance of political-economic interests. For instance, earlier promises to increase the gold trade from DRC to Rwanda, including plans for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/copperbeltkatangamining.com\/drc-the-process-of-refining-congolese-gold-by-rwanda-suspended\/\">refining Congolese gold<\/a>&nbsp;in Rwanda, and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/844158\/politique\/rdc-casse-tete-autour-dune-offensive-conjointe-contre-les-groupes-armes-a-lest\/\">joint military actions<\/a>&nbsp;are on hold due to the deterring relationship between the two countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, rival Uganda got permission&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mediacentre.go.ug\/media\/dott-services-must-respect-timelines-drc-roads-gen-katumba\">to pave 1182 km of roads<\/a>&nbsp;in North Kivu, which is estimated to significantly increase the border trade between the DRC and Uganda. However, Kagame perceives the road between Rutshuru and Goma as a red line that would upset the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/great-lakes\/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda\/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo\">Rwandan sphere of influence<\/a>&nbsp;in North Kivu. This project is also linked to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/africanarguments.org\/2022\/06\/total-success-the-real-goals-of-uganda-operation-shujaa-in-drc\/\">Operation Suhjaa<\/a>, a military operation to secure the road project and to fight the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist extremist group. Besides roads, regional mining interests also come into play, as Rwanda and Uganda are the main conduits for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/20221208_ILRG_IPIS_Armed-conflict-insecurity-and-mining-in-eastern-DRC.pdf\">illegally smuggled gold<\/a>&nbsp;from their western neighbour. Finally, the multi-billion&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cic.nyu.edu\/resources\/ugandas-operation-shujaa-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-fighting-the-adf-or-securing-economic-interests\/\">East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline project<\/a>&nbsp;at the Ugandan-DRC border, further increases tensions. There is a lot of pressure to get this project running as soon as possible, while many observers dread a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/totalenergies.com\/media\/news\/press-releases\/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project\">Cabo Delgado scenario<\/a>, where insurgents cause force majeure. This explains why Uganda is eager to fight rebels at home and abroad.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Peace talks amid ethnic tensions&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In addition to changing local alliances and exacerbating regional tensions, the rise of M23 is causing growing anti-Tutsi and anti-Kinyarwanda sentiments. In response, president Tshisekedi&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.africanews.com\/2022\/11\/04\/drc-tshisekedi-calls-on-youth-to-mobilise-against-m23\/\">urged his citizens<\/a>&nbsp;<em>&#8220;not to give in to xenophobic remarks and other speeches of hatred or stigmatisation of Rwandophone communities.<\/em>\u201d Nevertheless,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/securitycouncil\/sanctions\/1533\/panel-of-experts\/expert-reports\">hate speech, xenophobia and conspiracy theories<\/a>&nbsp;are rife among leading figures in politics, civil society, and local communities.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.lse.ac.uk\/africaatlse\/2022\/09\/23\/hate-speech-on-social-media-nurtures-the-protracted-conflict-in-eastern-d-r-congo\/\">Traditional and social media<\/a>&nbsp;amplify these sentiments even further, which results in violence against Tutsi and Rwandophone communities. The situation is compounded by politicians who tap into the grievances of their voters and deliberately fuel these sentiments ahead of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/issafrica.org\/iss-today\/brinkmanship-is-a-losing-proposition-in-the-eastern-drc\">national elections<\/a>&nbsp;later this year. In turn, this ambience of polarisation undermines grassroots support for peace talks and long-term stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Still, pacifying eastern Congo was one of the electoral promises of president Tshisekedi. To this end, he declared a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2022\/03\/22\/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east\">state of siege<\/a> in North Kivu and Ituri in May 2021, and agreed to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/great-lakes\/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda\/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo\">joint-military actions<\/a>&nbsp;with neighbouring countries. Despite these measures, the revival of M23 could not be stopped.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rfi.fr\/en\/africa\/20221130-inter-congolese-dialogue-opens-as-east-africa-community-seeks-to-end-drc-rebel-activity\">The East Africa Community<\/a>&nbsp;tried a different approach by organising several peace talks with Congolese officials, rebel leaders and regional partners to address grievances&nbsp;and negotiate disarmament conditions.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Despite the EAC&#8217;s peace-making efforts, several issues hamper lasting peace on the ground. First,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/allafrica.com\/stories\/202212070064.html\">M23 was not invited<\/a>&nbsp;to the Nairobi peace talks, as president Tshisekedi considers them&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/actualite.cd\/2022\/11\/04\/avancee-du-m23-discours-de-felix-tshisekedi-integralite\">a terrorist organisation and a proxy of Rwanda<\/a>. Second, both M23 and the FARDC accuse each other of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/reliefweb.int\/report\/democratic-republic-congo\/atrocity-alert-no-328-dr-congo-international-justice-and-genocide-victims-day\">not respecting ceasefires<\/a>. Third, the abovementioned ethnic tensions exacerbate the violence even further. Finally, it is a short-sighted presumption that stability would return to eastern Congo if only M23 would lay down its weapons.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In any case,&nbsp;military responses in the past have not prevented M23&#8217;s resurgence. Hence, a different&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/issafrica.org\/iss-today\/brinkmanship-is-a-losing-proposition-in-the-eastern-drc\">approach<\/a>, which focuses on structural reforms, local grievances and restoring dialogue between Tshisekedi and Kagame is needed.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph\">Photo: Congolese fighter jet hit by a missile. Agence de Presse Africaine, January 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-further-reading\">Further reading<\/h2>\n\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/publication\/armed-conflict-insecurity-and-mining-in-eastern-drc-reflections-on-the-nexus-between-natural-resources-and-armed-conflict\/\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Armed conflict, insecurity, and mining in eastern DRC: reflections on the nexus between natural resources and armed conflict | 7 December 2022 | IPIS\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/1490262759567_Mambassa-PPA-DD.jpg\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Armed conflict, insecurity, and mining in eastern DRC: reflections on the nexus between natural resources and armed conflict | 7 December 2022 | IPIS<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">This report offers a new framework for looking at the eastern Congo conflict, one within which new evolutions of the past twenty years find a place. Indeed, violent conflict in eastern Congo has changed dramatically in all aspects over the past two decades. Yet too often policymakers and observers appear to assume that we are dealing with a proxy war orchestrated by the DRC\u2019s eastern neighboring countries. The over-simplified and incorrect narrative is then that large rebel movements are directed by neighboring countries to satisfy their insatiable hunger for \u2018conflict minerals\u2019.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thenewhumanitarian.org\/opinion\/2023\/01\/23\/M23-Congo-Kishishe-information-warfare\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"How to avoid false narratives around DR Congo\u2019s M23 conflict: struggles over fact and meaning create real effects on the ground | 23 January 2023 | The New Humanitarian\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/assets.thenewhumanitarian.org\/s3fs-public\/styles\/social_large\/public\/2023-01\/M23%20DRC.JPG?itok=W6K2GzT8\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">How to avoid false narratives around DR Congo\u2019s M23 conflict: struggles over fact and meaning create real effects on the ground | 23 January 2023 | The New Humanitarian<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Rumour, hate speech, and inflated body counts have all spread like wildfire during the current M23 rebellion.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"What M23\u2019s on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC\u2019s precarious search for peace | 22 May 2022 | The Conversation\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/462773\/original\/file-20220512-16-na032.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1356&amp;h=668&amp;fit=crop\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">What M23\u2019s on-and-off insurgency tells us about DRC\u2019s precarious search for peace | 22 May 2022 | The Conversation<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Recent clashes put eastern Congo\u2019s M23 into the headlines again, but many other security problems persist in the area as diplomats struggle to tackle the underlying causes.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/africacenter.org\/spotlight\/rwanda-drc-risk-of-war-new-m23-rebellion-emerges-explainer\/\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Rwanda and the DRC at risk of war as new M23 rebellion emerges: An explainer | 29 June 2022 | Africa Center for Strategic Studies\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/africacenter.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/06\/DRC-Rwanda-1-3x2-1.jpg\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Rwanda and the DRC at risk of war as new M23 rebellion emerges: An explainer | 29 June 2022 | Africa Center for Strategic Studies<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">The precipitous escalation of the security crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) risks reigniting interstate conflict in the Great Lakes region. The myriad actors and interests involved, however, often defy easy analysis. <\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/spectator.clingendael.org\/en\/publication\/anti-tutsi-hate-speech-refuels-conflict-eastern-dr-congo\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Anti-Tutsi hate speech refuels conflict in Eastern DR Congo | 24 August 2022 | Clingendael Institute\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/spectator.clingendael.org\/sites\/spectator\/files\/styles\/header_image\/public\/2022-08\/Ndahinda%20-%20Congolese%20protesters%20set%20up%20a%20fire%20barricade%20outside%20a%20United%20Nations%20peacekeeping%20force%27s%20warehouse%20in%20Goma%20in%20the%20North%20Kivu%20province%20of%20the%20DRC%20July%2025%2C%202022.%20Reuters.JPG?itok=qv8Xh9lB\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Anti-Tutsi hate speech refuels conflict in Eastern DR Congo | 24 August 2022 | Clingendael Institute<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Armed hostilities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the deteriorating relations with Rwanda increasingly threaten regional security. Key drivers of the recent waves of violence are hate messages and conspiracy theories on social media targeting the Tutsi population of the DRC.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/s42831.pcdn.co\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests-1.pdf\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Uganda\u2019s Operation Shujaa in the DRC: Fighting the ADF or Securing Economic Interests? | June 2022 | Congo Research Group and Ebuteli\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Uganda\u2019s Operation Shujaa in the DRC: Fighting the ADF or Securing Economic Interests? | June 2022 | Congo Research Group and Ebuteli<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Once again, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is in turmoil. In November 2021, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebellion began launching attacks against the Congolese government in the area just west of the Ugandan and Rwandan borders. <\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>All articles and other news items referenced in this briefing come from third party media sources. Not being the author, IPIS is not responsible for the content of the news items or articles contained or referred to in this briefing.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ce briefing est \u00e9galement disponible en fran\u00e7ais The past year saw some major changes in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has been ravaged by armed groups for decades. One group in particular rose to the forefront,&nbsp;the Mouvement du 23 Mars&nbsp;(M23). The objectives of M23 are perched at the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":28008,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"tags":[99,7442],"publication-author":[7353],"publication-gis":[],"briefing-category":[7051],"publication-editor":[],"narrative":[],"class_list":["post-28007","weekly-briefing","type-weekly-briefing","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","tag-drc","tag-m23","publication-author-brian-sabbe","briefing-category-ipis-briefing"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v28.3 (Yoast SEO v28.3) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Why M23 is not your average rebel group - IPIS<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/weekly-briefing\/why-m23-is-not-your-average-rebel-group\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"nl_NL\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why M23 is not your average rebel group\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Ce briefing est \u00e9galement disponible en fran\u00e7ais The past year saw some major changes in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has been ravaged by armed groups for decades. 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