{"id":36113,"date":"2024-06-20T13:30:19","date_gmt":"2024-06-20T11:30:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/?post_type=publication&p=36113"},"modified":"2025-01-16T15:23:23","modified_gmt":"2025-01-16T14:23:23","slug":"shifting-frontlines-visualizing-the-evolution-of-the-m23s-territorial-influence-in-early-2024","status":"publish","type":"publication","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/nl\/publication\/shifting-frontlines-visualizing-the-evolution-of-the-m23s-territorial-influence-in-early-2024\/","title":{"rendered":"Shifting frontlines: Visualizing the evolution of the M23\u2019s territorial influence in early 2024"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In early 2024, IPIS, ASSODIP, and DIIS published a report on the stakes and motivations of the \u201cMarch 23 Movement\u201d (M23)<\/a>, a rebellion causing serious insecurity and humanitarian suffering in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The movement took up arms again in 2021, and it rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province in 2022, with military support from the Rwandan army<\/a>. The IPIS-ASSODIP report included several maps, displaying the areas influenced by M23 up to 2023<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military situation in North Kivu has evolved since late 2023, following renewed fighting between the Congolese army (FARDC) and allied armed groups \u2014 that have unified under the name of \u201cWazalendo \u2014 on one side, and M23 on the other. Therefore, IPIS has updated the map displaying the \u2018area of influence\u2019 of M23. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Methodology<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

To define M23\u2019s area of influence, IPIS mainly used data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and complemented it with additional information from news articles from Jeune Afrique, Radio Okapi, RFI, etc. The incidents (armed clashes, attacks against civilians, bombings, territorial conquest, \u2026) have been selected and analysed manually to map the area of influence. As a caveat, we must emphasize that defining M23\u2019s area of influence in this way entails certain risks: if the main media channels did not report on armed actor movements in a particular area, those incidents could not be taken into account when creating the maps. Additionally, by linearly connecting individual incidents to construct the area of influence, we incur some error relative to the real \u2018area of influence\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This can lead to a certain inaccuracy in the displayed ‘area of influence\u2019. Consequently, they should not be seen as precise frontlines, but rather as a rough indication of the areas influenced by M23. While we did cross-check the maps (and \u2018area of influence\u2019) with some North Kivu-based partners and stakeholders, we welcome all feedback and suggestions<\/a> for improvements.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Some incidents occur outside of M23\u2019s area of influence, this mostly involves bombings or attacks by M23 without them managing to take over the territory.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Military situation in 2023<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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A ceasefire was established in March 2023 between M23 and the Congolese army, to facilitate the withdrawal of M23 and to create an opportunity for dialogue with the DRC government. While little progress was made with regard to negotiations, it did provide for a six-month lull in fighting in 2023<\/a>. Nevertheless, incidents continued to occur between the warring parties, and both the Congolese government and M23 have accused each other of violating the ceasefire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In October 2023, the Wazalendo \u2014 a highly fragmented amalgamation<\/a> of pre-existing Nyatura and Ma\u00ef-Ma\u00ef groups \u2014 started attacking M23 positions<\/a>, which soon backfired as M23 launched a counteroffensive<\/a>. It resulted in an escalation of violence, involving additional humanitarian suffering and shifting frontlines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The situation calmed down for a few weeks in December 2023, following a temporary truce brokered by the USA. The truce was meant to enable the retreat of M23 from Mushaki and Kirolwire-Kitchanga<\/a>. Nevertheless, the Congolese army stepped up fighting in January 2024, accusing the Rwandan army of supplying additional troops to DRC, in support of M23. Once again this offensive backfired as M23 responded with intensive attacks against FARDC and Wazalendo positions, resulting in the expansion of M23\u2019s area of influence<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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M23\u2019s territorial expansion in 2024<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As M23 increased its attacks in 2024, the frontlines have shifted both in Masisi territory \u2014 where heavy fighting started around Sake in February 2024 and M23 eventually managed to capture the well-known mining town of Rubaya \u2014 and in Rutshuru territory, where M23 expanded to the north (up to Lake Edward) from March 2024 onwards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n