

Accompanying note on the interactive map of militarised mining areas in the Kivus

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Editorial

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Caption photo Front Page: A delivery of wolframite at a trading house in Butembo (Photo: IPIS April 2009)



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Executive summary

The MiMiKi map constitutes a first systematic attempt to clarify the issue of profit by armed groups from the extractive industry in the east of the DR Congo. The interactive map contains information on the location of mines, the presence of armed groups at mining pits and a number of other variables. Although most recent analyses written on the issue point out that the region's relative mineral wealth is not the primary cause of the armed conflict in the Kivus, its role in financing armed groups is indisputable. Because of this situation, Western companies buying ores originating from the Great Lakes region, have been targeted by international NGOs who are asking them to implement a thorough system of due diligence. In the light of the loudening call for a stricter regulation of the sector, the listing of mining sites in the Kivus is essential.

The MiMiKi map is a snapshot of the situation as it was in the period May-July 2009.

All the armed groups deployed in the region profit directly from the mining activities. Armed groups have positions at more than half of the sites listed on the MiMiKi map where they obtain an (extra) income. The FARDC control some of the most important mining sites and do not restrain themselves from intervening in mining activities at several of those.

The FDLR are particularly active in the gold mining business. There are great differences in the level of their involvement in the mining activities. Some FDLR units force people to work for them, others do not seem to bother the local population and are only involved in trading the minerals.

After its integration into the FARDC, the (ex-)CNDP access to the mines has clearly increased. The MiMiKi map indicates that the (ex-)CNDP soldiers have installed a system of taxation in the mining centres they control.

The MiMiKi map only shows a part of the mining sector, namely the extraction of the minerals. In order to find out whether Western companies are buying Congolese minerals from which armed groups might benefit, the whole trading chain needs to be established. Therefore, in addition to the MiMiKi map, IPIS has appended a specific table containing information on the activities of the official *comptoirs* (mineral traders) in 2008.

It has to be noted that the MiMiKi map is not yet complete and should be considered as a work in progress. To date, more than 200 active mining sites are located on the map, including the most important. There are a few remaining blind spots (areas on which IPIS has no first hand information) on the map.

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Introduction

The following text serves as an explanatory guide to the interactive map of militarised mining areas in the Kivus (MiMiKi) of 7 August 2009 published at <http://www.ipisresearch.be/mining-sites-kivus.php>.

The MiMiKi map constitutes a first systematic attempt to clarify the issue of profit by armed groups from the extractive industry in the east of the DR Congo¹. A lot has been said and written on the matter in both press articles and comprehensive reports². However, little systematic knowledge of the situation on the ground exists. In the light of the loudening call for a stricter regulation of the sector, the listing of mining sites in the Kivus is essential. Before systems of control, such as certification, can be designed and implemented, all mining activities in the Kivus need to be identified and mapped.

It has to be noted that the MiMiKi map is not yet complete and should be considered as a work in progress. To date, more than 200 active mining sites are located on the map, including the most important. There are a few blind spots (areas where IPIS has no first hand information on) on the map. In North Kivu they include (parts of) western and southern Lubero and northern Walikale. In South Kivu the remaining blind spots are (parts of) Kabare, northwestern and southern Shabunda, western Mwenga and northwestern Uvira³.

The MiMiKi map is a snapshot of the situation as it was in the period May-July 2009. In the second half of 2009 the situation could be different in several mining areas. With the Kimya II operation against the FDLR and renegade Mayi-Mayi, launched in July, the control over some mining sites will change, especially in South Kivu. The Umoja Wetu offensive of January 2009 in North Kivu has shown that miners tend to flee from the areas where military operations are held and that the FDLR lose several of the mining sites they control to the FARDC.

This accompanying note consists of three major parts. In a first part the research methodology used to build the map is discussed. It includes a description of the variables that were integrated in the map and a word on the sources that were used.

The second part describes the two annexes of the MiMiKi map: the 'Comptoirs 2008' table and the concessions map. The contents of both the annexes are discussed and their added value to the MiMiKi map is explained.

In a third part some striking observations of the authors on both the map and its annexes were added.

The fourth and final part discusses the possible use of the MiMiKi map to tackle the issue of militarised mining areas.

¹ Because of several restraints IPIS has opted to limit its interactive map to the two Kivu provinces. Naturally the mineral trade in the Eastern DRC goes beyond this area. It includes gold, coltan and cassiterite mining in North Katanga and gold, coltan, cassiterite and diamond mining in eastern Province Orientale and in eastern Maniema. Many minerals from the neighbouring provinces end up in the Kivu capitals Goma and Bukavu. Although security problems are less severe beyond the Kivus, armed militias continue to operate in several areas. Consequently, to complete the picture of militarised mining areas in the East, parts of the neighbouring provinces should be added to the map.

² A selection of some of the latest reports:

- Global Witness, *Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo*, July 2009, 106 pp.
- Enough, *A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals*, Enough Report, April 2009, 20 pp.
- Garrett N. & Mitchell H., *Trading Conflict for Development. Utilising the trade in minerals from Eastern DR Congo for development*, Resource Consulting Services Report, April 2009, 52 pp.
- Garrett N., *Walikale. Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu. Implications for poverty reduction and security*, CASM report, June 2008, 88 pp.
- Spittaels S. & Hilgert F., *Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC*, IPIS Mapping report, March 2008, 40 pp.

³ Several of these areas overlap with the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, which contains a number of artisanal mining sites. Unfortunately the ICCN park rangers were little cooperative in assisting IPIS in its work.

PART 1: How did IPIS produce the map and what is the value of the underlying data?

Because of the lack of precise geographic information, most of the data plotted on the map is new. It was gathered by teams of local researchers working for independent organisations. Because a vast territory had to be covered within a narrow time frame five different teams were engaged and each of those teams employed several researchers. The researchers, equipped with GPS devices and questionnaires (BOX 1), provided the geographic and thematic information on the mines included on the map, except where indicated otherwise⁴.

BOX 1:

Sample of the questionnaire

- Name:
- Location (*village, groupement, collectivité*, territory):
- Geographic coordinates:
- Resources:
- Number of workers (*creuseurs, porteurs* etc.):
- Estimate of the daily/weekly/monthly production per mineral:
- *Comptoirs* known to buy minerals at the site (if they work through a *négociant*, which one?):
- Who is the land owner? Who holds the mining concession?
- Presence of (an) armed group(s):
- Who commands the armed group(s)?
- What is their business at the site? (Do they tax the *creuseurs*? Do they dig themselves? Do they force people to work for them? Do they hire crews of workers without using force? Do they run the site and all activities? Are they paid by others to secure the site? Etc.)

The great advantage we had when working with different organisations and teams is that we could allocate to them those regions where they originate from. Consequently, they could rely on their own networks and contacts in the region, which allowed them to enter sites that others could not and speak to people who would never answer to the same questions asked by a stranger, especially a white man.

The downside of this approach is that data received from a multitude of researchers is likely to contain more inconsistencies due to the different 'research habits' developed by the teams engaged⁵.

In the territories of Walikale and Lubero the location of many of the mining sites is not based on exact geographic information⁶. These mines were too important to not include them on the map, but proved to be very difficult to access because they were too remote, too insecure or both. Listing mining activities in the DRC is a very complicated task (BOX 2).

⁴ In some cases where IPIS' local researchers were not able to provide the exact position of a mining site, the location of the site (or of the village nearby) is based on existing cartographic data (GPS or not). On the file card (see below) of each mining site a heading 'Geographic source' is therefore included. The heading 'Origin' indicates whether the location is based on GPS recordings or not. The thematic information on the file card is always provided by IPIS' local researchers.

⁵ It was for example clear that certain researchers answered some questions more meticulously than others because they deemed them more important. Such emphases sometimes differed between researchers. Similar attitudes could only be rectified after teams had returned from the field and had sent interim reports.

⁶ In Walikale territory many sites without GPS coordinates have been grouped in their respective support village (sv) or in a central point of the *groupement* in which they are known to be situated. In southern Lubero several such sites were grouped in a central point of two larger areas.

BOX 2:

The most important challenges facing anyone who wants to work on the issue are the following:

- There are many mining sites and they are widely dispersed.
- Artisanal miners often work in remote areas only accessible by foot and requiring several days of travel.
- Mining activity can easily shift from one area to another. Frequently new sites are discovered, forgotten mines are rediscovered and existing mines are abandoned.
- Mapping mining sites in the East of the country is further hampered by the persistent insecurity in this area. The conflict situation prevents research teams from travelling freely. Moreover it has weakened the capacity of state institutions to monitor the sector, limiting their usefulness as a source of information.

Given the extremely complicated situation on the ground and the compromises in terms of research methodology IPIS had to reach in order to gather sufficient data in a short span of time, it should be clear that the MiMiKi map is not an exercise in exact science. The map is most certainly incomplete (some data on the most insecure and remote sites is missing) and it may even contain a number of errors. However, bearing in mind the urgency and the difficulty of the exercise, IPIS considers these flaws of only secondary importance compared to the multitude of valuable information the source combines. The map should be considered as a first solid point of reference to which new elements and precisions can be added.

The interactive MiMiKi map contains information on a number of variables. The information appears on file cards when clicking on the mining symbols. For each mining site the map shows:

The name(s) of the mine

A mine can be named after a village, a river, a concession number or any striking geographic feature in the area. Sometimes the names originate from nicknames (often promising great wealth or good fortune). Some mines have several names. Usually individual pits at mining sites have (nick)names of their own adding to the confusion.

The location of the mine

The MiMiKi map shows information on both the geographic and the administrative location of the mine. The geographic location is given in decimal degrees. Administratively the 'territoire', 'collectivité', 'groupement' and village in which the mining areas lie are identified. In the Kivus, where there are no 'districts', the 'territoire' is the administrative unit immediately below the province. The other units are listed according to their administrative rank. Sometimes we have also added the 'localité' which is an administrative unit between the 'groupement' and the village.

The resources that are being extracted

At most of the sites primarily a single mineral is mined, at others there are several. In the latter case we have ranked them in order of importance and numbered them accordingly (from 1 to 3). The 4 main resources traded in the Kivus are cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold. The extraction of other resources is marginal. Coltan and wolframite are often extracted together with cassiterite. Gold is generally mined separately.

The number of workers

The number of workers is based on estimates of research teams that visited the site and figures put forward by the 'PDG' of the mine⁷. Besides the miners themselves, who constitute the largest group, the estimates include other workers assisting with the extraction. Although the production of a mining site is not necessarily exactly related to the number of workers present, it gives a fair idea of its general importance.

The presence of armed groups

The MiMiKi map indicates whether an armed group is present at the mining site or at least frequents it. Because of persistent reports of illicit profit from mining by the FARDC, their presence at mining sites is also included. Moreover, whenever possible, we have tried to make a distinction between FARDC units that existed before and after the integration of the CNDP and PARECO in March 2009. It is possible that multiple groups are present. For each group we have

⁷ At artisanal mining sites, the so-called *Président-Directeur Général* (PDG) is the person who runs the mine. He has bought the right to exploit the site and hires miners to work in it. Therefore he is the best source of information on the exact number of miners that are active at the site (he collects from them).

added the name of its commander (if known) and its impact on the mining activity, paying special attention to predatory behaviour.

It has to be noted that commanders are often known by their first name or a nickname.

Title holder - Ownership structure of the mine

Most of the mines in the Kivus are situated in a concession area for which a company (or an individual) holds a research or an exploitation permit (mining title or right), granted by the *Cadastre Minier*. However, very few of these companies are actually present at the sites within their concession. In that case, sometimes other companies, which are present at the sites, unlawfully claim to have a permit. Mostly, mining sites are run according to a traditional system of land rights. Customary chiefs of tribes and clans, or families that were the first to occupy a site, claim such rights and generally levy taxes of their own on the mining activities. On the map, whenever applicable, we have listed both the official title holder and the traditional land owners.

Buying *comptoirs* and *négociants*

Our teams of researchers have spoken with miners at each of the mining sites they have visited. Sometimes the *creuseurs* (artisanal miners) who work in those mines know to whom their yields of the day/week are being sold (by themselves or through middlemen)⁸. This is an interesting perspective on the issue of the trading chain. However, it should be kept in mind that one cannot exclude errors due to simple ignorance or false rumours within their circles. For all sites on which we have received sufficient information, we have added the destination of the minerals that are extracted. Wherever possible we have added names of *négociants* (traders) or *comptoirs* (trading houses). If such information could not be gathered we have added the name of a town (or a country in the case of direct export).

The labels of the mining sites included on the map appear in two different colours. A red name indicates that a site is 'militarised', a green name that it is not. It has to be noted that there are different degrees of militarisation. Wherever there was material gain by an armed group from mining activities, we have considered the site as militarised. Although there is a clear difference between an army unit hired by a company to secure a mining site and a unit extorting money from miners at another, we have treated both sites as militarised and consequently we have labelled them both with a red name. We have done the same for sites where unpaid or badly paid soldiers work as miners themselves to earn some sort of a living.

⁸ Whether they want to share the information is another question. Often they are scared to give any information out of fear of being robbed.

PART 2: Why have two annexes been added and what information do they contain?

The 'Comptoirs 2008' table

Before Congolese minerals are exported, they pass through the hands of several middlemen. In its simplest form, a miner sells his yields to a *négociant*, who arranges transport to a major trade centre where he sells them to a *comptoir*. The *comptoir* exports the products and sells them to Western and Asian companies⁹.

The MiMiKi map only shows a part of the mining sector, namely the extraction and to a certain extent the transport of the minerals. It is not possible to orderly show *comptoirs*, the last link in the trading chain (before export), on a map. The *comptoirs* are all situated in 3 or 4 major towns.

However, in order to find out whether Western companies are buying Congolese minerals from which armed groups might benefit, the whole trading chain needs to be established. Therefore, in addition to the MiMiKi map, IPIS has appended a specific table containing information on the activities of *comptoirs* in 2008.

The 'Comptoirs 2008' table includes trading houses of Butembo, Goma and Bukavu. Although an important circuit of 'unofficial' *comptoirs* exists, only the official ones feature in the table (BOX 3)¹⁰. For each *comptoir* the following elements are listed:

The places where the *comptoirs* trade

Some only have activities in one town, others in several.

The resources they trade

Not only does the table show the different minerals being traded by a *comptoir*, it also specifies for each mineral the quantity that was officially sold to international companies in 2008. The numbers given were taken from several reports of the *Division des Mines*.

Where they buy from

The *comptoirs* table indicates the *négociants* the *comptoirs* buy minerals from. Alternatively the areas where they buy from are given. In some cases both have been added. The information originates from official documents of the *Division des Mines* supplemented with data gathered by IPIS' local partners.

Who they sell to

This column of the table shows the buyers of Congolese minerals in Western Europe, Asia, Russia and Canada. The data come from official documents of the *Division des Mines* supplemented with data gathered by IPIS' local partners.

Ownership structure

Under the ownership heading the names of the *comptoir* management are added as well as other known associates or representatives. The information originates from official documents of the *Division des Mines* supplemented with data gathered by IPIS' local partners.

As with the MiMiKi map, the table is not complete but contains a multitude of insightful information that can be complemented and/or updated with additional elements.

⁹ In theory *négociants* and *comptoirs* could sell their products to different clients but generally *négociants* tend to work exclusively for a single *comptoir* and *comptoirs* supply a single company.

¹⁰ At this point of time, IPIS considers the documentation it has on the unofficial circuit insufficient to add the information to the table. It is not excluded that it will be added at a later stage.

BOX 3:

The official vs. the unofficial circuit

Even if official trade in the Kivus, especially in cassiterite and coltan, is on the rise since a few years, many Congolese minerals still cross the border without appearing on a single official document¹¹. Minerals are mostly smuggled by truck or boat. Especially gold is prone to illegal export.

Official *comptoirs* can be involved in the illegal trafficking of minerals –this has been confirmed by numerous sources¹²– but they are not the only perpetrators. Besides the official circuit of exporters an unofficial circuit of unregistered *comptoirs* exists. These traders buy minerals from *négociants* and sell them in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. In the case of gold some undertaking businessmen even sell it directly in the Gulf States¹³.

It is difficult to estimate the exact extent of the fraud that is being committed in the Kivus as a whole. In the past years several estimates have been put forward in a number of reports ranging from 43% in Goma¹⁴ to 97% in Butembo¹⁵. The existing data and statistics, however, are at best partial, making any estimate a daring exercise. It is clear, however, that the illegal export is substantial. In June 2009 IPIS engaged a team of local researchers in Bukavu to list the mineral traders who were publicly known to export cassiterite, coltan, wolframite or gold to neighbouring countries outside of the '*comptoir* circuit' (and thus by definition illegally). The team produced a list of 17 Bukavu traders who occasionally or constantly smuggle minerals across the border¹⁶. Other teams drafted similar lists of fraudulent traders in Butembo and Uvira, where the official circuit is virtually non-existent.

Among the illegal traders are some of the richest men in the provinces¹⁷.

The trading chain does not end at the *comptoirs* in Goma and Bukavu. To establish the chain as a whole it would be necessary to further track the Congolese minerals down to the smelters, the end-users and the consumers. However, this exercise is beyond the scope of the MiMiKi map and remains a challenge for further research.

The concessions map

Throughout its research, IPIS came across several sources from the *Cadastre Minier* (CaMi) on mining titles in the Kivus. However, an updated map on the current situation was not available. Such a map is an essential piece of the mining puzzle. Therefore IPIS combined GIS data from an older CaMi map (30 January 2008) with a recent list of mining titles (31 December 2008) and merged these into a new map.

For the sake of clarity the mining titles are published as a separate map but they could easily be added as an extra layer to the MiMiKi map.

The concession areas on the map are clickable and show information on the holder of the mining title, the permit number, the type, the validity period and the minerals for which it is valid.

It has to be noted that the positioning of the mining concessions by CaMi is not necessarily precise. Several permits are, for instance, almost completely situated in Lake Kivu.

¹¹ Statistics in: Division provinciale des mines du Nord-Kivu, *Rapport Annuel 2008*, February 2009, 40 pp. (without annexes), clearly indicate the increase in reported trade from Goma since 2006.

¹² Interviews by IPIS in Butembo and Bukavu, conducted in April-May 2009, but also in several written publications, for example: Johnson D. & Tegera A., *Rules for Sale. Formal and informal cross-border trade in Eastern DRC*, Pole Institute Report, May 2007, 122 pp.

¹³ Kabamba P., *Trading on War: Conflict, Trade and Ethnicity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Lecture paper, May 2009, 34 pp.

¹⁴ Garrett N., Walikale. *Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu. Implications for poverty reduction and security*, CASM report, June 2008, p. 51.

¹⁵ PACT, *Researching Natural Resources and Trade Flows in the Great Lakes Region*, June 2007, p. 36.

¹⁶ Research report by local partner, June 2009.

¹⁷ Interviews by IPIS in Butembo and Bukavu, conducted in April-May 2009.

PART 3: Some remarkable findings

The MiMiKi map and the *comptoirs* table uncover a number of remarkable trends. Below, IPIS has highlighted some of the most important.

Striking findings on the mines

Direct profit by armed groups

It should come as no surprise that all armed groups profit directly from the mining activities in the Kivu provinces. Armed groups have positions at slightly more than 50% of the sites listed on the MiMiKi map and receive an (extra) income through their deployment. Even the FARDC in certain areas do not restrain themselves from intervening in mining activities and numerous abuses exist. Clearly, the ex-CNDP units are prone to tax mining activities, but they are not the only ones. Abuses by the FARDC, committed by pre-existing units, occur at several mining sites in the territory of Walungu.

The different degrees of FDLR implication in the mineral trade

The FDLR are particularly active in the gold mining business. They control only few cassiterite/coltan/wolframite mines compared to the areas where they have an interest in the gold sector. Information on the level of FDLR involvement is incomplete but it is clear that there are great differences. Some FDLR units seem to force people to work for them (e.g. several sites in Walikale territory), others do not seem to bother the local population and are only involved in trading the minerals (e.g. Fizi territory).

Sites that are not under the physical control of an armed group can still be a source of conflict finance

A telling example of an important mining area that is not under direct military control but generates an income for an armed group are the Misisi gold mines in the southern Fizi territory. A click on Misisi on the MiMiKi map shows us that the site is not under the control of the FDLR militia. The FDLR frequent the town but do not interfere in the ongoing mining activities. However, they supply the town with goods and foodstuffs, trading them for gold, which they sell in Tanzania¹⁸.

Besides physical control and trade a third way to profit from the mining economy is off-site taxation. Several sources indicate for example that ex-CNDP soldiers continue to control the major road axes to Goma taxing all transports that pass¹⁹. Transport routes and roadblocks are not yet included on the MiMiKi map but can easily be added.

The importance of the gold sector

The Eastern DRC's best known (conflict) resources are coltan and cassiterite. Officially, the gold sector is almost non-existent in the Kivus. Of all major trading towns, only in Bukavu there are two recognised *comptoirs* that can export gold, and their exports showing up in official statistics are negligible²⁰. However, the MiMiKi map shows that a lot of gold mining is going on. Relying on the numbers of the MiMiKi map we find that more than 20 000 people are working in the gold mines listed on the map²¹. Moreover, the areas with gold mining activities include many zones controlled by armed groups.

A heightened interest of the CNDP in the mining business

In its report *Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC* of March 2008, IPIS concluded that the CNDP: "... receives rather limited profits from mining activities. There are only a few mining sites within the territory controlled by the CNDP"²². However, after its integration into the FARDC, the (ex-)CNDP access to the mines has clearly increased. Units led by (ex-) CNDP commanders are for example deployed at the key site of Bisie and at several other mines in Walikale, including some medium-sized gold mines. The MiMiKi map shows that the (ex-) CNDP soldiers have installed a system of taxation in the mining centres they control²³.

¹⁸ Interviews by IPIS in Uvira, conducted in May 2009.

¹⁹ Interviews by IPIS in Goma, conducted in April-May 2009.

²⁰ According to statistics of the *Division des Mines* of South Kivu included in the *comptoirs* table, the two official *comptoirs* (Namukaya and Cotracom) together have exported less than 65 kg in 2008. Compared to the gold mining activity we find on the MiMiKi map, this number is ridiculously low.

²¹ This is a serious underestimate because these numbers do not include the miners working at sites that figure on the MiMiKi map but for which no estimate of the miners is known. Moreover they do not include the miners working at sites that do not figure on the MiMiKi map, most importantly the miners extracting gold in neighbouring provinces who export their products through the Kivus.

²² IPIS, *Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC*, IPIS Mapping report, March 2008, p. 24.

²³ They probably use this taxation system in more sites than indicated on the map. In Kalehe territory for instance, the ex-CNDP was installed only recently after the FDLR were chased during the Kimya II offensive, and the situation remains volatile. We have included among the militarised sites

The importance of Idjwi

It is interesting to note that, based on the numbers of workers observed by our research teams, Idjwi employs at least as many miners as Bisie. Consequently, the production of minerals should not differ too much. This is not reflected in the export statistics of the *Division des Mines*, indicating that possibly many of the Idjwi minerals are smuggled out of the DRC. We should add, however, that on Idjwi the problem of militarised mining sites does not seem to occur.

Mini-mines

More than 50 mines figuring on the map count less than 50 workers operating them. Bearing in mind that such sites are less known and were not very high on the priority list of our research teams, this number is probably much higher in reality. Individually such mines are insignificant and have virtually no impact on the trade. Together, however, they become a factor that should not be neglected (simplistically put: 100 sites of 25 workers make 1 Bisie).

Crisis

The impact of the crisis on the mining sector is not visible on the MiMiKi map because we have not included the relevant data. Our research teams have visited several sites that had recently been abandoned because the global economic crisis –and its impact on the minerals markets – had made the exploitation of the sites no longer profitable. Because non-producing sites have no relevance for the current trade we have opted not to include them on the map, preferring not to overload the map with less relevant information. The mining sites concerned mostly contain wolframite and cassiterite deposits.

Striking findings on the trade centres

Most of the mineral trading activity in Butembo remains off the radar

Butembo is a bustling city, packed with traders and seemingly in constant expansion. It is known as a very important trading centre for imported consumer goods and luxury products. Butembo is also a key trading centre for minerals, especially gold. However, this does not reflect in the official statistics. The *comptoirs* table shows there are only three official *comptoirs* in Butembo, none of which trades in gold. Our map clearly shows that in the vicinity of Butembo several gold mines are situated. Moreover, beyond the map, minerals from important gold (and cassiterite) mining sites in the neighbouring Province Orientale are transported to Butembo for export²⁴. In the territory of Lubero the FDLR have an important stake in the gold sector. In neighbouring Ituri implication of Mayi-Mayi militias in gold extraction cannot be excluded. Reportedly important cassiterite sites in Bafwasende territory (Province Orientale) are controlled by Mayi-Mayi Simba.

The trading capitals of the Kivus are partly supplied with minerals from other provinces. The contribution of minerals originating from other provinces to the total export of the major Kivu trading towns is considerable. The table clearly shows that most of the *comptoirs* in Bukavu buy minerals from Northern Katanga (and to a lesser extent Maniema). For Goma, IPIS did not manage to gather information for individual *comptoirs*. However, statistics from the Mining Division of North Kivu indicate that in Goma the situation is similar. In the case of wolframite more than 90% of the officially exported quantity originates from Maniema²⁵.

In several earlier reports IPIS has documented the problems at militarised mining sites in Northern Katanga²⁶.

only those where illegal taxation was (already) evident.

²⁴ Interviews by IPIS in Butembo, conducted in April 2009.

²⁵ Division provinciale des mines du Nord-Kivu, *Rapport Annuel 2008*, February 2009, p. 30.

²⁶ These reports can be downloaded at: http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping_katanga.php and <http://www.ipisresearch.be/updates-katanga.php>

PART 4: Possible uses of the map with a view to regularisation of the mining sector

Although most recent analyses written on the issue point out that the region's relative mineral wealth is not the primary cause of the armed conflict in the Kivus, its role in financing armed groups is indisputable. Because of this situation, Western companies buying ores originating from the Great Lakes region, have been targeted by international NGOs who are asking them to implement a thorough system of due diligence (BOX 4). Such a system requires clear criteria, agreed upon by all stakeholders, and a central databank where relevant information on all mining sites is kept up to date. Bearing in mind the current state of the mining sector in the Kivus, notably its geographical distribution and its cluttered organisation, a digital map is probably the simplest and clearest way to manage such a databank. The map allows to:

- Link information on mines to information on *négociants* and *comptoirs* who buy at the site²⁷.
- Link information on mines and the presence/misbehaviour/profitting of armed groups.
- Link the location of production centres to the locations of markets and transport routes.
- Keep track of possible movements of *négociants* and *comptoirs* activity.
- Define areas where similar problems exist.
- Visualise all elements mentioned above.

Besides its role as a monitoring mechanism, the map might also serve as a tool for policy planning. It can be used to determine where intervention is required. For example in rethinking the deployment of mining agents or the opening/closing of markets. Moreover it allows to assess the possible consequences of measures planned. For example it can help to predict possible migrations of *creuseurs*²⁸.

BOX 4:

The recent push for due diligence

Concern over natural resource predation by armed groups in the DRC has been slumbering for many years among Western publics. There have been a few periods of heightened attention but little measures were taken to tackle the issue.

However, since the December 2008 report of the UN Group of Experts, the matter is high on the political agenda²⁹. In recent campaigns NGOs such as Global Witness³⁰ and Enough³¹ are urging Western companies that use Congolese minerals to exert due diligence on their supply chain. In the DRC the control of the mining sector is one of the central features of the 'STAREC plan', in Europe several political initiatives are being taken and suddenly it seems that also the United States have become interested in the issue³². Even the tin industry has reacted launching a "phased and constructive approach towards improved due diligence, governance and traceability"³³.

The MiMiKi map can only be a valuable tool if it is updated regularly. Updates require a regular flow of information on the deployment of armed groups, the human rights situation at mining sites, changes in mining activity at sites and the buyers who frequent them. Should a system for updates be established, the DRC government and MONUC should provide information on the first aspect. On the second aspect, input from a capacitated Congolese civil society is required (possibly with temporary MONUC assistance). Information on the last two aspects should come from the sector and Congolese state agents.

The current map has been produced without the involvement of the mining sector. Input was given by (some) of the relevant Congolese state services, local experts, international experts and Congolese civil society. Engaging the rest of the Congolese administration, the sector and MONUC are essential to the completion of the map and to the production of regular updates.

²⁷ It is for example possible to link the information of the *comptoirs* table to the information on the MiMiKi map. It would provide additional information on where the *comptoirs* buy their minerals and the *négociants* who work for them. In the current map, we have not joined the two information sources because we wanted to show the difference between the perspective from the field (*creuseurs*: MiMiKi map) and the perspective from the export centres (mining agents: *comptoirs* table).

²⁸ As was described above, the MiMiKi map includes estimates of the numbers of workers at each mining site.

²⁹ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1807*, 12 December 2008, 127 pp.

³⁰ <http://www.globalwitness.org/fwag/>

³¹ <http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/special-page/conflict-minerals>

³² In April 2009 the American Senators Brownback, Durbin and Feingold introduced the 'Congo Conflict Minerals Act'. Under this legislation, U.S.-registered companies using coltan, cassiterite, or wolframite from the DRC would be required to annually disclose the mines of origin.

³³ http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_NEWSART/view.asp?Q=BF_NEWSART_313589

List of abbreviations

CaMi	<i>Cadastre Minier</i>
CASM	Communities and Small-Scale Mining
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i>
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FRF	<i>Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes</i>
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
IPIS	International Peace Information Service
ITRI	International Tin Research Institute (formerly)
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PARECO	<i>Coalition de Patriotes Résistants Congolais</i>
PDG	<i>Président-Directeur Général</i>
PE	<i>Permis d'exploitation</i> (Exploitation permit)
PR	<i>Permis de recherche</i> (Research permit)
RGC	<i>Référentiel Géographique Commun</i> (www.rgc.cd)
RMCA	Royal Museum for Central Africa (Tervuren, Belgium)
STAREC	Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan
sv	support village