{"id":41466,"date":"2026-03-11T21:16:52","date_gmt":"2026-03-11T20:16:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/?post_type=weekly-briefing&p=41466"},"modified":"2026-03-12T09:45:56","modified_gmt":"2026-03-12T08:45:56","slug":"a-misleading-narrative-how-the-islamic-state-framing-distorts-responses-to-the-allied-democratic-forces","status":"publish","type":"weekly-briefing","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/fr\/weekly-briefing\/a-misleading-narrative-how-the-islamic-state-framing-distorts-responses-to-the-allied-democratic-forces\/","title":{"rendered":"A misleading narrative: How the Islamic State framing distorts responses to the Allied Democratic Forces"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was considered the deadliest armed group operating in eastern DRC in 2024, responsible for 38% of all conflict-related deaths<\/a> in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. Created in 1995 from a merger between Uganda\u2019s Tabligh movement and remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) with the objective of overthrowing the Ugandan government, it has over time gradually redefined itself. Following sustained military offensives by Ugandan, Congolese and MONUSCO troops, and the 2015 arrest of its leader Jamil Mukulu in Tanzania, the ADF appeared on the \u201cbrink of extermination<\/a>\u201d, and regrouped under the new leadership of Seka Musa Baluku. Baluku reoriented the ADF towards the global Salafi-jihadist movement, adopting an Islamist and jihadist rhetoric, to secure support and funding<\/a>. In 2019, the ADF was publicly recognised by the Islamic State (IS) as part of its Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and subsequently designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States and United Nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This briefing argues that while the ADF has adopted jihadist rhetoric and maintains a real (though limited) relationship with IS, the dominance of the \u201cISCAP\u201d label is analytically distorting and operationally counterproductive. The \u201cglobal jihad\u201d frame amplifies ideological and transnational dimensions while pushing the local political economy of violence and borderland dynamics into the background. Research on the ADF demonstrates that ADF violence is multilayered, shaped by ideological, military, political and economic logics<\/a> that often intersect. It also legitimises heavily militarised counterterrorism responses that have repeatedly failed to protect civilians (often even exacerbating insecurity) and avoid confronting state predation, corruption, and marginalisation, the structural conditions that sustain recruitment and violence. Understanding how and why the IS label has become dominant, and who benefits from it, is therefore essential to reassessing current policy approaches.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The political utility of the \u2018Islamic State Central Africa Province\u2019 label <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Labels such as \u201cterrorist organisation\u201d shape which actors are considered legitimate interlocutors, what measures are deemed acceptable, and which kinds of violence become visible. Drawing on securitisation theory, the designation of the ADF as an IS affiliate functions as a securitising move that legitimises exceptional measures. The question is therefore not only whether the ADF is<\/em> an IS affiliate, but who gains from insisting that it is<\/em>. This framing has been instrumentalised by multiple actors, most consistently and effectively the Ugandan state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ugandan authorities have long portrayed the ADF as an existential terrorist threat, at times alleging links to Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab<\/a>\u2014claims repeatedly contested by the UN Group of Experts<\/a> on the DRC. The ADF\u2019s formal association with IS has since bolstered Uganda\u2019s narrative. Domestically, this construction serves regime-security priorities<\/a> by justifying militarisation and deflecting allegations of torture by Ugandan security forces. Internationally, it has positioned Kampala as a key partner in the US-led \u201cwar on terror\u201d<\/a>, facilitating access to military training, equipment and financial assistance. Regionally, the ISCAP label has provided political cover for repeated military interventions in the DRC, including the 1998 invasion. These deployments intersect with longstanding economic and geopolitical interests<\/a>: eastern DRC constitutes a crucial market for Ugandan products, access to gold, and a buffer to protect Uganda\u2019s oil installations. Observers thus argue that Operation Shujaa, a joint military offensive by Ugandan and Congolese forces launched in 2021 against the ADF, \u00a0is not purely a counterterrorism operation, noting that Ugandan military operations have been concentrated in gold-rich areas of Ituri, Beni and Lubero<\/a>\u2014areas it considers within its zone of influence\u2014 and along Ugandan-financed road corridors. The IS label therefore functions as a securitising device that provides an impetus for a deeper and more durable Ugandan presence in eastern DRC. \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For IS, recognition of the ADF must be read against the backdrop of territorial losses in Syria and Iraq in 2019. Anticipating defeat, IS leadership sought to transition back to insurgency while maintaining a global narrative of resilience and expansion through the proclamation of new \u201cprovinces\u201d. The ADF, operating in remote areas with no significant local Muslim populations, offered few operational benefits but significant symbolic value. By accepting Baluku\u2019s pledge and incorporating ADF operations into its propaganda, IS could demonstrate geographical expansion, sustain its brand, and signal that its struggle continued<\/a>. Finally, for the ADF itself, IS recognition is a \u201cbadge of honour\u201d that elevated its importance within the regional conflict landscape. It appears to have facilitated access to training, financial and logistical support, reflected in the increased use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and drones<\/a>. Crucially, rather than seeking legitimacy through governance or community support, the ADF generates external legitimacy vis-\u00e0-vis IS Central by demonstrating operational capacity and ideological commitment through high-profile violence against civilians. The relationship has therefore been less about command and control than about mutual reputational benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

What the ISCAP label obscures<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

While the \u201cISCAP\u201d label is not wholly inaccurate, certain ADF members genuinely espouse transnational jihadist ideas, and communities in the Beni region experience ADF violence as terror in a literal sense, foregrounding the group\u2019s IS affiliation as the primary frame of analysis obscures the other drivers of violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n