{"id":39394,"date":"2025-07-08T17:17:15","date_gmt":"2025-07-08T15:17:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/?post_type=weekly-briefing&#038;p=39394"},"modified":"2025-07-08T17:43:43","modified_gmt":"2025-07-08T15:43:43","slug":"the-eu-critical-raw-materials-act-and-the-defence-industry","status":"publish","type":"weekly-briefing","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/fr\/weekly-briefing\/the-eu-critical-raw-materials-act-and-the-defence-industry\/","title":{"rendered":"The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the defence industry"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In recent years, the EU has reshaped its raw materials strategy in response to the energy transition, global supply chain competition, and a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/eu-peace-security-and-defence_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">geopolitical environment marked by increasing defence concerns<\/a>. The intersection between climate policy, industrial strategy and security policy has become increasingly apparent, particularly through the adoption of the Green Deal, the <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/eli\/reg\/2024\/1252\/oj\/eng\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Critical Raw Materials Act<\/a> (CRMA), and most recently the <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/qanda_25_790\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030<\/a>. While the first two frameworks are presented as tools to support the EU\u2019s energy and digital transitions, they also <a href=\"https:\/\/eeb.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Digital-Community-Guidelines-for-Strategic-Projects.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">raise important questions about their (growing) linkages to defence and security objectives<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The topic of raw materials for the defence industry lies at the very heart of the intersection of these policies. This means that this topic is linked to an array of controversial issues throughout the value chain of defence equipment. These issues include negative environmental and social impacts of mining activities, governance issues for instance concerning the selection of strategic projects under the CRMA \u2013 such as the lack of transparency in this process \u2013 but \u00a0also the <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/defence-readiness-omnibus_en#key-measures-proposed\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">easing of transfer controls<\/a> in relation to defence equipment produced with the raw materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the context of the rearming Europe policy, satisfying the defence industry\u2019s growing need for raw materials for arms production is part of the general boosting of the industry, including <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/nato-countries-approve-hague-summit-statement-with-5-defence-spending-goal-2025-06-22\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">increasing defence budgets<\/a>. This rearming Europe strategy is met with the concern that it is pursued <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tijd.be\/opinie\/algemeen\/veiligheid-is-meer-dan-tanks-en-raketten\/10612986.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">at the expense of other policies<\/a>, such as peacebuilding initiatives and social policies. Among such concerns is the <a href=\"https:\/\/corporateeurope.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2023-11\/CRM%20english%20final%20%281%29.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">suspicion<\/a> that the aim of boosting the defence industry might be pursued under the guise of and progressively <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tni.org\/files\/2024-07\/Niobium_and_the_%20EU.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">supplant<\/a> the EU\u2019s green ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This briefing aims to highlight some of the contentious issues surrounding the EU\u2019s raw materials and defence policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:15px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-overview-of-relevant-eu-policies\"><strong>Overview of relevant EU policies<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>The Green Deal<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The European Green Deal, launched in 2019, sets the objective of <a href=\"https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">making Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050<\/a>. The transition to renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, batteries, electric vehicles, hydrogen) significantly increases the demand for specific raw materials such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel for batteries, rare earth elements for wind turbines and electric motors, or copper and aluminium for grid infrastructure and electrification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>The Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024\/1252)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Adopted in March 2024, the CRMA is the EU\u2019s legislative response to growing concerns about Europe\u2019s dependency on third countries for <a href=\"https:\/\/ieu-monitoring.com\/editorial\/critical-raw-materials-eu-secures-access-to-diversified-and-sustainable-supply\/435025?utm_source=ieu-portal\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">critical materials needed for the energy and digital transitions, as well as for strategic sectors such as defence and aerospace<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c<strong>Critical raw materials<\/strong>\u201d are listed under Annex II of the CRMA. They are deemed \u201ccritical\u201d based on <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/qanda_25_865\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">their importance for the whole EU economy and the risk that their supply might be disrupted<\/a>. The list of 34 critical raw materials includes the 17 \u201c<strong>strategic raw materials<\/strong>\u201d, which are enumerated separately in Annex I of the CRMA. The CRMA considers those raw materials strategically important that are relevant for specific strategic sectors or technologies, namely \u201cfor the energy and digital transition as well as defence and aerospace applications\u201d (Section 2 of Annex I of the CRMA).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The CRMA designates strategic projects to increase the EU capacity to extract, process and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify EU supplies from third countries, with the aim of <a href=\"https:\/\/single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu\/sectors\/raw-materials\/areas-specific-interest\/critical-raw-materials\/strategic-projects-under-crma_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">contributing to the security of the EU\u2019s supply of strategic raw materials<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The EU\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/introducing-white-paper-european-defence-and-rearm-europe-plan-readiness-2030_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030<\/a>, presented in March 2025 by the European Commission, aims at enhancing the Union\u2019s defence capabilities by 2030. The strategy proposes to leverage over 800\u20ac billion in defence spending to strengthen Europe\u2019s defence infrastructure in response to geopolitical threats, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/BRIE\/2025\/769566\/EPRS_BRI(2025)769566_EN.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">mainly the war in Ukraine following the full-scale invasion by Russia and uncertainties over U.S. military support<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The recent Defence Readiness Omnibus reflects the White Paper for European Defence-Readiness 2030 by underlining that the EU\u2019s peacetime regulatory framework must adapt to enable rapid capability development, especially by <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/defence-readiness-omnibus_en#key-measures-proposed\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">simplifying legal and administrative frameworks relevant to defence readiness<\/a>. Among other priorities, it highlights the need to ensure timely access to raw materials critical for defence, addressing supply chain risks and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:15px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-shifting-eu-priorities-from-green-to-defence\"><strong>Shifting EU priorities from green to defence?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is hardly a shocking revelation that the EU\u2019s raw materials policy <a href=\"https:\/\/single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu\/sectors\/raw-materials\/areas-specific-interest\/critical-raw-materials\/critical-raw-materials-act_en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">explicitly aims to support the defence industry<\/a> and that many raw materials are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sfa-oxford.com\/knowledge-and-insights\/critical-minerals-in-low-carbon-and-future-technologies\/critical-minerals-in-defence-and-national-security\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">essential in defence technologies.<\/a> 26 of the 34 materials of the EU critical raw materials list are used in defence equipment (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">table 1<\/a>). While some raw materials have <a href=\"https:\/\/publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu\/repository\/handle\/JRC98333\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">limited use<\/a> in defence equipment (e.g. scandium or silicon metal), others are <a href=\"https:\/\/hcss.nl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/Strategic-Raw-Materials-for-Defence-HCSS-2023-V2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">widely<\/a> used by the aerospace and defence industry (e.g. aluminium, beryllium, copper, graphite, nickel, titanium metal).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, against the backdrop of the rearming Europe policy, the increased demand for specific raw materials essential for defence technologies may have implications for the EU\u2019s raw materials policy, namely the possible backsliding on the EU\u2019s green ambitions in favour of defence objectives. While more research is needed to determine the exact extent to which raw materials are used by the defence industry in the EU and whether this is an increasing trend at the expense of the energy transition, there are indicators pointing in the direction of such a trend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One such indicator is that the CRMA narrows down the \u201ccritical\u201d raw materials list to the list of \u201cstrategic\u201d raw materials that are relevant for the strategic sectors of the energy and digital transition as well as defence and aerospace. Thus, strategic raw materials are, by definition, earmarked for the defence industry and, logically, they are all used in defence equipment (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">table 1<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In addition, NATO published a list of \u201cdefence-critical\u201d raw materials in December 2024. These raw materials are deemed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_231765.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">integral to the manufacture of advanced defence systems and equipment and vital to maintaining NATO\u2019s technological edge and operational readiness<\/a>. The EU\u2019s strategic raw materials list is essentially congruent with this NATO list: all but one (beryllium) of the NATO defence-critical raw materials are considered strategic raw materials under the CRMA (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">table 1<\/a>). Consequently, the NATO defence-critical raw materials are also widely linked to the current strategic projects under the CRMA: 45 out of the 47 EU-based projects and 11 out of the 13 non-EU projects are tied to minerals that NATO classifies as defence-critical (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">table 2<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The fact that a large part of the CRMA list of strategic raw materials corresponds to the NATO list of defence-critical raw materials might suggest that strategic raw materials are especially designated for defence rather than the energy and digital transition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For some raw materials, it is even possible to identify that they end up especially in defence equipment. A recent study demonstrates that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tni.org\/files\/2024-07\/Niobium_and_the_%20EU.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">the supply chain of niobium is dominated<\/a> by a small number of sectors, including the defence industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another indicator is that the defence industry\u2019s need for strategic raw materials is likely to increase. Since strategic raw materials are, by definition, characterised by a <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/qanda_25_865\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">supply risk<\/a>, this growing need might only be satisfied at the expense of the other sectors that the CRMA qualifies as strategic: those linked to the energy and digital transition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Furthermore, it has been alleged that the aerospace and defence industry\u2019s lobby had a considerable influence on the inclusion of certain raw materials under the CRMA. One example of such reportedly successful lobbying is the recognition of <a href=\"https:\/\/corporateeurope.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2023-11\/CRM%20english%20final%20%281%29.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">titanium<\/a> as a critical raw material.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, the sense of the rapidly growing priority of rearming Europe is supported by the impression that the defence industry enjoys a special status across different EU legislative and policy frameworks. Just think about the <a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/publication\/due-diligence-in-the-arms-sector-possible-implications-of-the-eu-corporate-sustainability-due-diligence-directive\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">exemptions for the defence industry built into the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive<\/a> or the clarifications in the Defence Readiness Omnibus package <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/defence-readiness-omnibus_en#key-measures-proposed\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">to allow defence readiness projects to benefit from existing derogations related to overriding public interests<\/a> for instance under environmental legislation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While it remains to be demonstrated that these indicators represent a general trend in the EU, this is something that can already be observed in relation to the current US raw material and military policy, with the current administration <a href=\"https:\/\/globalwitness.org\/en\/campaigns\/transition-minerals\/critical-minerals-were-once-for-renewables-now-theyre-for-war\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">invoking<\/a> the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/R43767\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Defense Production Act<\/a> to reinforce US raw material production.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:15px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-governance-and-transparency-risks-in-crma-strategic-projects\"><strong>Governance and transparency risks in CRMA strategic projects<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A major reason why it is difficult to assess the link between the EU raw materials and defence policy more concretely is that related processes are not very transparent. A matter where this lack of transparency is especially evident \u2013 and which might be considered illustrative of the wider EU raw materials and defence policies \u2013 is the selection process of strategic projects under the CRMA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In March 2025, the European Commission, through the CRMA, published the list of 47 strategic projects selected projects within the EU. The 13 selected projects taking place outside of the EU were <a href=\"https:\/\/single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu\/document\/download\/808502c2-21c7-4ca8-855f-ff0b528f91c4_en?filename=C_2025_3491_1_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">published on 4 June 2025<\/a>. These non-EU projects are intended to further diversify and secure the EU\u2019s access to critical and strategic raw materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Civil society organisations, research institutes, and members of the European Parliament from across the political spectrum, have increasingly criticised the <a href=\"https:\/\/eeb.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Strategic-Projects-Position-Paper-031224-2.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">lack of transparency<\/a> in how EU strategic projects are selected. Concerns have been raised over the opacity of decision-making processes, limited public consultation, minimal CSO involvement, and the influence of corporate and military lobbying. A <a href=\"https:\/\/eurmc.org\/news\/critical-raw-materials-strategic-projects-selection-bypasses-civil-society\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">2025 communication by the European Raw Materials Coalition (EURMC)<\/a> accused the European Commission of bypassing democratic oversight and eroding environmental safeguards under the guise of achieving \u00ab\u00a0strategic autonomy.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Specific examples from the EU strategic projects list underscore these concerns: in Portugal in the Barroso and Montalegre regions, communities have resisted projects marked by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https:\/\/www.clientearth.org\/latest\/press-office\/press-releases\/ngos-challenge-eu-commission-backing-of-controversial-lithium-mine-in-portugal\/&amp;ved=2ahUKEwi7r9yT5viNAxXnU6QEHeZuJDEQFnoECBEQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw1Vb4ngI2RFa34LEvXekO_9\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">legal irregularities and insufficient resource data<\/a>; in Sweden, proposed developments threaten S\u00e1mi indigenous territories <a href=\"https:\/\/www.saamicouncil.net\/news-archive\/statement-crma\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">without requiring free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC)<\/a>; in Serbia&rsquo;s Jadar region, legal challenges and corruption allegations have drawn <a href=\"https:\/\/balkangreenenergynews.com\/eu-mission-in-serbia-handed-100000-signatures-against-declaring-rio-tintos-jadar-a-strategic-project\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">intense scrutiny over EU involvement<\/a>; and along the Czech-German border at Zinnwald, only the Czech side of a shared lithium deposit has been designated, <a href=\"https:\/\/eeb.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Factsheet-Strategic-Projects-Zinnwald-190225.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">raising procedural concerns<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The lack of transparency in project selection, limited community participation, and evidence of environmental and human rights impacts question whether strategic autonomy is being pursued at the expense of the values the EU claims to uphold. A case in point is that the European Commission is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.greenlegal.eu\/wp\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/Legal-Notice-CRMA-June-2025.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">alleged to have failed to explain<\/a> whether the selected projects satisfy the sustainability criteria of Article 6(1)(c) CRMA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Many of these mining initiatives already pose considerable environmental and social costs, especially for local livelihoods and ecosystems, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tni.org\/files\/2024-01\/The_Raw_Materials_Rush.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">in the name of the green transition<\/a>. While these impacts are deeply concerning whatever the ends for which the raw materials are used, civil society\u2019s perception of the EU raw materials policy might deteriorate should it prove true that raw material extraction is redirected toward military objectives, raising fears that defence priorities may ultimately supplant climate and sustainability goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As the EU deepens its commitment to securing critical raw materials, the lines between climate ambitions, industrial competitiveness, and defence preparedness are increasingly blurred. While the CRMA is framed as essential for the energy and digital transitions, its entanglement with defence objectives raises concerns among rights-holders and CSOs. To ensure that its green ambitions are not waning behind the ReArm Europe\/Readiness 2030 agenda, or to demonstrate in a transparent manner that this is not the case, the EU needs to take these concerns seriously and address them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\" noreferrer noopener\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"744\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366-744x1024.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39407\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366-744x1024.png 744w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366-218x300.png 218w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366-768x1057.png 768w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366-1116x1536.png 1116w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-1_Raw-materials-listed-as-critical-by-the-European-Union-and-NATO-and-indications-of-their-use-in-defence-e1751989012366.png 1135w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 744px) 100vw, 744px\" \/><\/a><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Table 1: Raw materials listed as critical by the European Union and NATO and indications of their use in defence<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\" noreferrer noopener\"><img decoding=\"async\" width=\"744\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546-744x1024.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-39410\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546-744x1024.png 744w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546-218x300.png 218w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546-768x1057.png 768w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546-1117x1536.png 1117w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/Table-2_List-of-strategic-projects-under-the-EU-Critical-Raw-Materials-Act-e1751989344546.png 1134w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 744px) 100vw, 744px\" \/><\/a><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Table 2: List of strategic projects under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:20px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-further-reading\"><strong>FURTHER READING<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/research-paper\/2025\/03\/critical-raw-materials-and-european-defence\/\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Critical Raw Materials and European Defence | IISS\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" style=\"max-width: 200px;\" width=\"200\" height=\"112\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/iiss_critical-materials-and-european-defence_844-486.webp\" class=\"attachment-200x200 size-200x200\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/iiss_critical-materials-and-european-defence_844-486.webp 866w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/iiss_critical-materials-and-european-defence_844-486-300x168.webp 300w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/iiss_critical-materials-and-european-defence_844-486-768x431.webp 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 200px) 100vw, 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Critical Raw Materials and European Defence | IISS<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Security of supply issues are of growing concern for defence policymakers. This relates to components, platforms and munitions, but also to the raw materials that are used in manufacturing processes.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/corporateeurope.org\/en\/2023\/11\/blood-green-deal\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Blood on the Green Deal | Corporate Europe Observatory\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/corporateeurope.org\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/facebook\/public\/2023-11\/arms_budget_square_en.png?itok=p2U7cP-c\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Blood on the Green Deal | Corporate Europe Observatory<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, or CRMA, is in the final stages of its adoption. Unlike other flagship legislations under the \u2018Green Deal\u2019, which have been the subject of fierce political battles, the CRMA enjoys broad support from all sides of the political spectrum. <\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/weekly-briefing\/the-eu-critical-raw-materials-act-handshakes-extracting-processing-and-recycling-why-not-reducing-and-prioritizing\/\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"The\u00a0EU\u00a0Critical Raw Materials Act:\u00a0Handshakes, extracting, processing and recycling. Why not reducing and prioritizing? | IPIS\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/11\/EU-CRM-CRMACT-IPISBRIEFING-scaled.jpg\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">The\u00a0EU\u00a0Critical Raw Materials Act:\u00a0Handshakes, extracting, processing and recycling. Why not reducing and prioritizing? | IPIS<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">The European continent struggles with the dilemma to secure its raw material supply chain for the sake of its green transition and energy sovereignty, at the cost of more pollution, ecosystem destruction and handshakes with undemocratic resource-rich countries.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n<div class=\"vlp-link-container vlp-layout-ipis wp-block-visual-link-preview-link\"><a href=\"https:\/\/hcss.nl\/report\/strategic-raw-materials-for-defence\/\" class=\"vlp-link\" title=\"Strategic raw materials for defence - Mapping European industry needs | HCSS\" rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-side\"><div class=\"vlp-block-2 vlp-link-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/hcss.nl\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/Strategic-raw-materials-for-defence-Mapping-European-industry-needs-1.png\" style=\"max-width: 200px; max-height: 200px\" \/><\/div><\/div><div class=\"vlp-layout-zone-main\"><div class=\"vlp-block-0 vlp-link-title\">Strategic raw materials for defence &#8211; Mapping European industry needs | HCSS<\/div><div class=\"vlp-block-1 vlp-link-summary\">Raw materials are essential for Europe\u2019s energy and digital transitions, but their importance to the military domain is less often discussed. This report outlines the most commonly used raw materials in European defence applications and provides a risk assessment of supply security and geopolitical risks.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n<div style=\"height:47px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-7387b849 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-vertically-aligned-center is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\" style=\"flex-basis:33.33%\">\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"228\" src=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-1024x228.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-31742\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-1024x228.png 1024w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-300x67.png 300w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-768x171.png 768w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-1536x342.png 1536w, https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/EN_FundedbytheEU_RGB_POS-2048x456.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/a><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\" style=\"flex-basis:66.66%\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>This briefing was<\/em> <em><em>produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of the editorial is the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In recent years, the EU has reshaped its raw materials strategy in response to the energy transition, global supply chain competition, and a geopolitical environment marked by increasing defence concerns. The intersection between climate policy, industrial strategy and security policy has become increasingly apparent, particularly through the adoption of the Green Deal, the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), and most recently the ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030. While the first two frameworks are presented as tools to support the EU\u2019s energy and digital transitions, they also raise important questions about their (growing) linkages to defence and security objectives.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":39404,"template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"tags":[7383,7565,7564,5217],"publication-author":[7336,7549],"publication-gis":[],"briefing-category":[7051],"publication-editor":[],"narrative":[],"class_list":["post-39394","weekly-briefing","type-weekly-briefing","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","tag-arms-trade","tag-critical-raw-materials","tag-energy-transition","tag-supply-chains","publication-author-markus-fahlbusch","publication-author-maureen-walschot","briefing-category-ipis-briefing"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.7 (Yoast SEO v27.7) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the defence industry - IPIS<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/weekly-briefing\/the-eu-critical-raw-materials-act-and-the-defence-industry\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the defence industry\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In recent years, the EU has reshaped its raw materials strategy in response to the energy transition, global supply chain competition, and a geopolitical environment marked by increasing defence concerns. The intersection between climate policy, industrial strategy and security policy has become increasingly apparent, particularly through the adoption of the Green Deal, the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), and most recently the ReArm Europe Plan\/Readiness 2030. 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