{"id":31499,"date":"2023-11-16T16:46:24","date_gmt":"2023-11-16T15:46:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/?post_type=weekly-briefing&p=31499"},"modified":"2024-07-03T15:18:11","modified_gmt":"2024-07-03T13:18:11","slug":"m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks","status":"publish","type":"weekly-briefing","link":"https:\/\/ipisresearch.be\/fr\/weekly-briefing\/m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks\/","title":{"rendered":"M23 crisis flares again in North Kivu: context, dynamics and risks\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Past October, violence resurged in North Kivu province<\/strong>, as clashes intensified between the Movement of March 23 (M23) and various local militias, as well as the Congolese army (FARDC). An additional 200,000 people<\/a> have been displaced last month, exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation in the province which already counted over 590,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs<\/a>) due to the M23 crisis prior to the latest upsurge of violence.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

After a six-month lull in fighting, a coalition of local self-defence groups, known as \u2018Wazalendo\u2019, launched a series of offensives<\/a> against M23<\/strong> along two main frontlines: the Mweso-Kitchanga-Kirolirwe road in Masisi territory, and the roads linking Kiwanja with Mabenga and Ishasha in Rutshuru territory. Over the next weeks, this triggered fierce counter-attacks<\/a> by M23 against towns it lost <\/strong>earlier, such as Kitchanga, Bambu, Butare, Kibarizo and Kinyandonyi. They reportedly even engaged in the shelling of FARDC positions near Kibumba<\/a>, only 20km away from the provincial capital of Goma. (See map.) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As fighting continues, chances of de-escalation in the near future look few and far between.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Context behind the current escalations in violence<\/strong> <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The ongoing M23 crisis<\/a> in North Kivu began nearly two years ago<\/strong>, marking the second major iteration of the group\u2019s rebellion against the Congolese government. M23s first offensive began among a group of officers dissatisfied with the poor implementation of a peace treaty signed, on 23 March 2009, between Kinshasa and the rebels of Congr\u00e8s national pour la d\u00e9fense du peuple<\/em> (CNDP<\/a>), which enabled CNDP\u2019s integration into the DRC\u2019s military. Besides proclaiming to enforce the terms of the peace agreement, M23 increasingly claims to defend the interests of Congolese Tutsi<\/a> and Kinyarwanda-speaking minorities. <\/strong>In M23\u2019s discourse, the grievances of these minorities revolve around threats by Hutu militias and the state\u2019s ineptitude to protect them. Since its \u2018resurgence\u2019 in<\/strong> November 2021, the group has captured almost all of Rutshuru territory<\/strong>, pushed into Masisi and secured control over major axes linking the rest of North Kivu to the provincial capital of Goma. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent resurgence of violence follows the breakdown of a fragile ceasefire<\/a><\/strong> between the M23 rebellion and the FARDC. Announced on 7 mars 2023<\/strong>, it was meant to facilitate the withdrawal of M23 from territory it occupied in Masisi and Rutshuru, and to open a space for dialogue with the DRC government. Very little progress has been made however, and both the Congolese government and M23 have continuously accused each other of violating the ceasefire<\/a>. While Kinshasa gave September 24 as a final deadline for M23 to withdraw<\/strong>, it blamed the rebels of encroaching upon positions (near Kibumba) it had previously handed over to peacekeepers of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fighting occurs during the run up to presidential elections<\/a> in the DRC<\/strong>, planned for the end of December 2023. At the start of his administration in 2019, incumbent president Felix Tshisekedi promised to put an end to violence<\/a> in the country’s east. Yet measures taken to stabilise North Kivu, such as the declaration of a state of siege in May 2021, have had little success<\/a>. On the contrary, the M23 rebellion has resurfaced during the same period. Looking to salvage the image of his administration prior to the elections, Tshisekedi seems intent on military advances against M23<\/strong>, rather than diplomatic efforts. He has also ramped up nationalist rhetoric<\/a> against Rwanda, which is widely accused of backing M23.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, public opinion in North Kivu has grown increasingly critical of the incumbent administration<\/strong>, especially after the army violently cracked down on a protest<\/a> in Goma against the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in August 2023. In response to public indignation, Tshisekedi called for an accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO<\/a>, and replaced the military governor of North Kivu with FARDC Major General Peter Cirimwami<\/a>. The UN Group of Experts reported in 2022 (Annexes 41 and 50<\/a>) that the latter allegedly supported the \u2018Pinga-pact\u2019 between several armed groups in May 2022, and that his forces fought shoulder to shoulder with armed groups against M23<\/em>. At odds with previous disapproval from Kinshasa, Cirimwami\u2019s appointment seems indicative of Tshisekedi\u2019s desire to gain military victories in the East close to election day.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Map: Simon Schweitzer<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Main conflict dynamics and actors<\/strong> <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As the latest M23 insurgency enters its third year, the number of parties involved is steadily increasing<\/strong>. This makes conflict resolution all the more difficult, diminishing prospects for peace, both locally and regionally. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

M23<\/a> continues to bolster its military strength<\/strong>. According to the most recent UN Group of Experts\u2019 report (pp. 14-17), it trains new recruits (their total number of combatants was estimated at around 3,000 in March 2023), tries to establish new alliances (for example with the armed group Twirwaneho in South Kivu), purchases new military equipment, and benefits from military support from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aiming to halt M23\u2019s expansion, but restricted by the terms of the ceasefire, the FARDC seems to have chosen to fight the group by proxy<\/a><\/strong>. This through covert military and financial support to a coalition of Congolese armed groups<\/a>, including but not restricted to Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain<\/em> (APCLS), Nduma D\u00e9fense du Congo-R\u00e9nov\u00e9<\/em> (NDC-R), Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changemen<\/em>t (CMC), Mouvement Patriotique d\u2019Autod\u00e9fense<\/em> (MPA), and Nyatura groups. Even elements of Kigali’s sworn enemy, the Forces D\u00e9mocratiques de Lib\u00e9ration du Rwanda<\/em> (FDLR<\/a>) have joined the coalition. This collaboration was recently consolidated under the watch of military governor Cirimwami<\/a>, when he met armed groups\u2019 representatives in Mubambiro in September, ostensibly to discuss Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These armed groups have unified under the name \u2018Wazalendo\u2019<\/a> <\/strong>(meaning \u2018patriots\u2019 in Kiswahili) but remain above all a loose\u2014fragmented\u2014agglomeration of local self-defence groups. Besides material and logistical support from the army, the government seems to provide some legitimacy to these \u2018patriots\u2019, adopting draft decree<\/a> n\u00b023\/014 of 22 mai 2023, which established the R\u00e9serve Arm\u00e9e de la D\u00e9fense<\/em>. Additionally, some prominent politicians have voiced their careful support<\/a>, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that, \u201cyou cannot blame a Congolese for taking up a weapon to defend his country\u201d.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of the existing abundance of armed groups in North Kivu, several private military companies<\/a> (PMCs) have arrived in the province over the last year. The FARDC has contracted Agemira RDC and Congo Protection<\/strong> to maintain the fleet of the Congolese air force, and to provide military training to the army. Congo Protection currently has around 1,000 private soldiers<\/a> in the DRC. These private contractors have also been assigned to guard three newly purchased combat drones<\/a>, which were shipped a few weeks ago to the border with Rwanda. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the international community has deployed several peacekeeping operations in North Kivu. Yet paradoxically, as fighting continues to escalate, the days of the two largest of these seem numbered. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UN peacekeeping mission<\/a> is facing the reality that it has overstayed its welcome over the past few years. Despite its size and length, MONUSCO has failed to stabilise eastern DRC, and it is deeply unpopular in North Kivu<\/strong>. The mission has also become an easy scapegoat for Congolese leaders looking to divert criticism away from the shortcomings of the Congolese army (e.g. against M23) and the failing DDR strategy. In the wake of the deadly crackdown in Goma, President Tshisekedi echoed this disillusionment with MONUSCO and announced at the UN General Assembly in September that he wished for the accelerated departure<\/a> of the force. Despite this, MONUSCO and the FARDC have still launched a joint military operation, \u2018Springbok<\/a>\u2019, to stop M23 from invading Sake or Goma.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The other major peacekeeping force, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF<\/a>), arrived in the DRC in April 2022. Since then, Kinshasa has been deeply critical of the force\u2019s lack of aggression against M23<\/strong>, even levelling accusations of EACRF \u2018cohabitation\u2019 with the rebel group. The extent of current mistrust is illustrated by a recent attack of Wazalendo<\/a> on a Ugandan EACRF contingent. Consequently, Kinshasa has asked the regional force to leave the country after the expiration of its mandate in December this year. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Congolese government did, however, praise the EACRF\u2019s Burundian contingent. Prompting some sources to speculate that the DRC might consider extending the presence of Burundian troops<\/a> through bilateral agreements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

M23, on the other hand, denounces the activities of the Burundian force, which it accuses of fighting alongside the FARDC and certain Wazalendo groups. Consequently, several incidents have occurred over the past few weeks between M23 and Burundian troops<\/strong>. The Burundian army reported that two of its supply convoys had been refused passage<\/a> by M23 in Masisi territory. Meanwhile, the rebels have also arrested several dozens of Burundian soldiers<\/a>, who they accuse of having fought alongside the FARDC. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kinshasa is also looking for military support from the South African Development Community (SADC<\/a>)<\/strong> to tackle M23. Meetings to discuss a SADC force are ongoing, as Kinshasa wants boots on the ground as soon as possible. Yet lack of details on their organisation, including funding, have delayed news of a deployment date<\/a>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Risks for a further escalation of violence<\/strong> <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Looking forward, the continuation of the M23 crisis, violence, and human rights violations entail a variety of long-term security risks<\/strong>. So far, regional and national strategies to mitigate these have failed, instead undermining prospects for sustainable peace. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, Kinshasa\u2019s choice to adopt a military route to defeat M23 over a diplomatic one, ignores root causes of conflict in North Kivu, particularly those pertaining to intercommunity tensions over access to land and political power. A narrow<\/strong> military strategy will, if successful, merely suppress M23<\/strong>, but will not resolve the local and regional frustrations that have enabled it to thrive. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The past two years of violent conflict have also spurred xenophobia<\/a>, particularly against Congolese Tutsi <\/strong>and other Kinyarwanda-speakers. This has been instrumentalized by M23 to legitimise its expansion, claiming that it does so to protect the Tutsi community against an alleged genocide.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, while the FARDC\u2019s strategy of a proxy war (through collaboration with local self-defence groups) may grant military results in the short-term against M23, it also threatens to embolden the same armed groups behind the current conflict\u2019s longevity. Critically, renewed recruitment and rearmament<\/a> by these armed groups undermines past and future DDR initiatives. Support to Wazalendo groups will most likely precipitate a cycle of violence<\/strong> which outlives the current crisis.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, Tshisekedi\u2019s decision to shift away from international peacekeeping, towards regional\u2014or even bilateral\u2014security arrangements involves serious risks. A hasty withdrawal of UN troops<\/a> from the eastern DRC could create a security vacuum<\/strong>, and risks facilitating additional abuses by armed groups against the civilian population. It is unclear whether the Congolese army has the capacity to fill this void. In the meantime, regional security agreements do offer the DRC some new allied boots on the ground. However, when these arrangements involve the deployment of troops from neighbouring countries, it risks inciting regional rivalries<\/a>, which may also flare on Congolese soil. This threat is real, considering the rising tensions between M23 and the Burundian contingent of the EACRF<\/strong>, and the UN Group of Experts’ reports and denunciations of continuous direct interventions by the RDF<\/a> on Congolese territory. Meanwhile just last month, the UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes warned for a potential direct confrontation<\/a> between the DRC and Rwanda<\/strong>. Ringing the alarm due to the ongoing military build-up by both states, the lack of a constructive dialogue between Kinshasa and Kigali, and the persistence of hate speech. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Picture<\/span>: M23 combatants marching into Goma in November 2012<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Further reading<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Multi-Layered Violence in the DRC: Is History Repeating Itself?<\/div>
Analysis by Erik Kennes, Senior Research Fellow in the Africa Program at Egmont and Nina Wil\u00e9n, Director of the Africa Program at the Egmont, for Institut Montaigne.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
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Contre le M23, Kinshasa fait le pari risqu\u00e9 des groupes arm\u00e9s<\/div>
Depuis d\u00e9but octobre, le bruit des armes se fait de nouveau entendre au Nord-Kivu. On avait pourtant cru que la pr\u00e9sence des militaires de la force r\u00e9gionale est-africaine (EAC) et les multiples m\u00e9diations de Luanda et Nairobi pour imposer un cessez-le-feu et un retrait du M23 avait fait taire les f\u2026<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
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Massacre in Goma Clouds DR Congo\u2019s Elections and UN Mission\u2019s Future<\/div>
On 30 August, elite troops slaughtered over 50 civilians planning to protest perceived foreign interference in the eastern DR Congo, three months ahead of elections. The government has asked the UN for an \u201caccelerated\u201d withdrawal. Crisis Group experts Richard Moncrieff and Onesphore Sematumba explai\u2026<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
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Dans l\u2019est de la RDC, comment et pourquoi les hostilit\u00e9s ont repris \u2013 Jeune Afrique<\/div>
Depuis d\u00e9but octobre, des combats opposent \u00e0 nouveau les rebelles du M23 \u00e0 des groupes arm\u00e9s soutenus par les FARDC. Le gouvernement congolais accuse le Rwanda \u00ab\u00a0d\u2019une nouvelle intrusion\u00a0\u00bb sur son territoire. \u2013 Jeune Afrique<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
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M23, FARDC, milices\u2026 Regain de tensions autour de Goma \u2013 Jeune Afrique<\/div>
Des affrontements entre groupes arm\u00e9s ont repris autour de la capitale du Nord-Kivu depuis le 1er octobre. Le mouvement rebelle accuse l\u2019arm\u00e9e congolaise d\u2019\u00eatre pass\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019offensive, ce que les autorit\u00e9s d\u00e9mentent. \u2013 Jeune Afrique<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n
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S\/2023\/431 : UN Documents : Security Council Report<\/div>
S\/2023\/431 – This is the letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n
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