


# The Politics of Pillage: the political economy of roadblocks in the Central African Republic

By Peer Schouten and Soleil-Perfect Kalessopo



# Colophon

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Cover photo: Artistic interpretation of a roadblock at Kaga Bandoro, commissioned by Peer Schouten, Kaga Bandoro, September 2016.

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# Abbreviations

3R	<i>Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation</i> (Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation)
APRD	<i>Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie</i> (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy)
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
EUR	Euro
FACA	Central African Armed Forces
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCFA	<i>Franc de la communauté française d'Afrique</i> (West African Franc)
FNEC	<i>Fédération nationale des éleveurs de Centrafrique</i> (National Federation of Livestock Breeders of Central Africa)
FPRC	<i>Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique</i> (Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa)
FPDC	<i>Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain</i> (Democratic Front of the Central African People)
KM	Kilometre
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MISCA	International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MPC	<i>Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique</i> (Patriotic Movement for Central Africa)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PK	<i>Point kilométrique</i> (Kilometer Point)
RJ	<i>Révolution et Justice</i> (Revolution and Justice)
RN	National Road
RPRC	<i>Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de Centrafrique</i> (Patriotic Rally for the Renewal of Central Africa)
SOCATRAF	<i>Société Centrafricaine de Trafic Fluvial</i> (Central African River Transport Company)
UFDR	<i>Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement</i> (Union of Democratic Forces for Renewal)
UN	United Nations
UPC	<i>Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique</i> (Union for Peace in Central Africa)
WFP	World Food Programme

## Executive summary

This report explores the political economy of trade routes in the Central African Republic (CAR). Its main finding is that control over transit is a much coveted stake in the CAR's ongoing conflict, with road space constituting a significant source of illicit wealth accumulation among different state and non-state actors. This translates into the omnipresence of roadblocks.


This report identifies a total of 284 roadblocks. Of these, 117 (or 41%) are operated by government forces, 149 (or 52 percent) by ex-Seleka groups, and 40 (or 14%) by anti-balaka groups. In some cases, two different armed actors share control over a single roadblock. In general, however, roadblocks operated by governmental structures (ranging from different administrative entities, to the police and the military) are largely concentrated in the south-western part of the country. Roadblocks operated by different armed groups concentrate around trade routes crossing the rest of the country.

Ex-Seleka groups control more roadblocks than government forces overall, but the gendarmerie is the largest individual operator of roadblocks, with a presence at 92 or 32% of all mapped roadblocks in the CAR. The gendarmerie is followed by the FPRC, present at 61 or 21% of roadblocks. Third place is shared by the UPC, the MPC and anti-balaka groups, each controlling around 40 or 14% of barriers.

This report identifies three main economic circuits on which roadblocks concentrate: the cattle circuit has 62 barriers (22% of the total) where ex-Seleka groups impose taxes; the Sudanese circuit is also dominated by former Seleka factions and has 64 barriers (23%); and finally, the 'legal' circuit has 26 barriers (9%) controlled by state services. The remainder of the CAR's roadblocks are scattered across its wider road network.

The involvement of ex-Seleka groups in these economic circuits, however, goes beyond taxation at roadblocks. Customs or 'free passage' taxes are levied on traders passing through areas under their control, and in some cases obligatory, paid, escorts are imposed. Case studies outlined in this report detail these mechanisms of extortion. We estimate that ex-Seleka armed groups generate around EUR 6 million per year by imposing taxes on the main economic circuits in the area under their control. Of this, EUR 3.59 million per year derives from their interference with the cattle circuit, and 2.38 EUR million from the Sudanese circuit.





Map 1: Roadblocks in the Central African Republic

# 1. Introduction

This report focuses on the role of trade routes in the political economy of conflict in the Central African Republic. Its premise is that whilst each party to the conflict in the CAR claims ‘freedom of movement’ as a principle grievance in their political discourse, all in fact seek to extend their hold over as many strategic nodes on trade routes as possible. This is because by controlling these roads, armed groups can impose taxes, control profitable commercial activities, and limit the economic actors involved, thus themselves restricting freedom of movement within the country.

To illustrate the degree to which this logic underpins the ongoing conflict, this report presents the first comprehensive mapping of roadblocks in the Central African Republic, as well as an estimate of their contribution to conflict financing. The report aims to complement existing knowledge about the conflict economy in the CAR and to make an evidence-based contribution to debates on this topic.

Roadblocks are a ubiquitous phenomenon in the CAR. They constitute a major means of illicit revenue generation and survival for armed groups, as well as for state agents. In this report, we identify 284 roadblocks. Of these, 117 (or 41 percent) are operated by government forces, 149 (or 53 percent) by ex-Seleka groups, and 40 (or 14 percent) by anti-balaka groups. These figures also indicate that, in some instances, different armed actors share control over the operation of roadblocks between them.

Roadblocks operated by government structures (ranging from different administrative entities to the police and the army) are largely concentrated in the southwestern part of the country, whilst armed group operated roadblocks are situated along the main axes crossing the rest of the country.

All road users are obliged to pay taxes at roadblocks. These taxes vary by type of actor: trucks and motor cycles are subject to specific regimes, while traders and passengers pay taxes on cargo. Taxes apply not only to manufactured goods, but also to natural resources (e.g. wood or minerals), as well as local farm produce (e.g. coffee or maize), fish or cattle.

Roadblocks are, however, but one element in the political economy of trade routes in the Central African Republic. Today, the Central African Republic is divided into several zones of influence, each with home to a limited number of main economic circuits. Groups formerly constituting the Seleka movement (hereinafter ex-Seleka) have set up comprehensive schemes for the taxation of all economic traffic in areas under their control. However, this report also explores other strategies through which armed groups profit from, restrict and choke the CAR’s main economic circuits, including through the imposition of obligatory escorts, market taxes, and customs duties for zones under armed group control.

Findings from this research lead us to estimate that ex-Seleka factions now composing the MPC, UPC and FPRC together generate at least EUR 3.59 million a year from their taxation of the cattle circuit, and another EUR 2.38 million from tax imposition along Sudanese trade routes. In contrast to this more systemic predation, anti-balaka groups rely more on ambushes and the imposition of ad hoc levies on road users.

## 1.1 Structure of the report

This report is divided into two parts: the first presents the general dynamics that characterize the political economy of roadblocks in the CAR, as well as the principle findings of the research (number of barriers, divisions by actor, and overall patterns).

The second part presents an in-depth overview of the three main economic circuits around which roadblocks cluster: the cattle circuit, the Sudanese circuit and the legal circuit. It includes case studies of the political economy of roadblocks in each of these sectors, as well as estimates of the benefits that parties to the conflict derive from their involvement in each of these specific economic circuits.



These two parts are contextualised in a preceding background chapter and followed by a conclusion and annexes. Each chapter begins with a summary outlining key findings.

## 1.2 Methodological note

This report is based on a year's field research (mid-2016 and mid-2017) dedicated to mapping roadblocks and their attendant dynamics in the areas most affected by the roadblock phenomenon. During this period, over 200 interviews were conducted with those affected by roadblocks and other stakeholders. This includes representatives of each armed group mentioned, numerous representatives of different United Nations agencies, NGOs, local notables and state representatives. In addition, the data collected has been triangulated with other reports on the political economy of conflict.<sup>1</sup>

It is equally important to highlight the limitations of this study. This study does not focus on the contribution of mineral resources to conflict and armed group financing, though this is also a key sector of the Central African economy. Moreover, as is clear from the above, funding and logistical restraints have meant that the roadblock mapping does not cover the entire national territory. Among those areas not encompassed by this study are the Bangassou-Obo axis and the area around Bocaranga and Sam-Ouandja, as well as more remote pathways. Around 90% of all roadblocks discussed here have been mapped through field visits; the remaining 10% are sourced from other experts, local sources, NGOs or media over the period September 2016 to September 2017. Information from third parties has always been triangulated through independent verification. If this report focuses more on ex-Seleka groups than on anti-balaka, this is because most rebel roadblocks are operated by the former.

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1 The main findings of this report have also been peer reviewed by experts on the Central African situation. See acknowledgements in the colophon.

## 2. Background

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the historical background to the contemporary proliferation of roadblocks in the country. It further highlights the importance of roadblocks as a source of conflict financing, as well as a major obstacle for economic development in the CAR.

### 2.2 Historical context

The problem of roadblocks in the CAR is not a new one, and understanding their historical antecedents is crucial to understanding their contemporary manifestation and significance.

Historically, the 1990's saw a proliferation of highway robbers (also known as *zaraguinas* or *zarginas*), first in the west, and shortly thereafter in the east of the country. At the time, local self-defence groups began to erect roadblocks to protect their own access to scarce natural resources as well as to prevent incursions by Sudanese poachers and pastoralists.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, the APRD and the anti-balaka mobilized in response to the threats posed by highway bandits, who, financed by businessmen, rendered mainly cattle and trade routes unsafe.<sup>3</sup>

In 2009, IPIS had already highlighted trade routes as a key issue for stakeholders in the conflict at the time,<sup>4</sup> most notably for the APRD, an armed group active between 2005 and 2008. In the zone surrounding Paoua, IPIS noted that:

*'The APRD controls most roads and operates a number of roadblocks. Commercial transporters are obliged to pay taxes to the APRD for their security on the road. These taxes aside, the population of the region suffers little from rebel activities.'*<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, in 2011, it was observed that between Bangui and Bangassou (a distance of 730 km), there were 25 barriers where state services imposed taxes of around 10,000 FCFA per commercial vehicle per roadblock.<sup>6</sup>

In 2012, the Central African government issued Decree 12.148 concerning legal barriers. This decree was accompanied by a list of 92 legal barriers across the country (see Annex 1 for the full document). The Decree constituted an attempt to regulate roadblocks – a response to the widespread proliferation of illegal roadblocks and taxes throughout the CAR around that time. According to the Central African government, at the time that this decree was issued there were no less than 193 roadblocks across the country at which a variety of illicit taxes were being levied.<sup>7</sup>

It reflects that there have always been areas that have been beyond effective government control in the CAR. Here, various armed actors have fought for *de facto* control over trade routes, which, once secured, have seen the erection of barriers for the maintenance of control and predation. Even within areas under

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2 Chauvin, Emmanuel et Christian Seignobos, 2013, "L'imbroglia centrafricain", *Afrique Contemporaine*, 248: 119, p. 129.

3 See Hilgert, F. et Spittaels S, 2009, *Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic*, Antwerp : IPIS, p. 16 and p. 37, and Chauvin et Seignobos 2013 op cit p. 131, Dufumier, Marc, et Benoit Lallau, 2015, "Impossible développement agricole en République centrafricaine?", *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*: 535-55, p. 543.

4 Hilgert and Spittaels, 2009, *ibid*, p. 23.

5 *Ibid*.

6 Unknown, 2011, "République Centrafricaine : Résumé Analytique" Washington : U.S. Department of State, p. 24.

7 Radio Ndéké Luka (2012, 5 July), "Le Président Bozizé met fin aux barrières illégales", Bangui: Centrafrique Presse. On a more pragmatic level, it was also a response from the government to the World Bank's requirement to remove all physical and non-physical barriers on the Douala-Bangui corridor (except the Beloko border post) as a condition for a loan of several million dollars. See Pascal, Lionel, 2014, "La privatisation des missions douanières en République Centrafricaine (RCA): une opportunité d'amélioration des Finances Publiques?", Doctoral Thesis, Université de Bordeaux, p. 143.

government control, most barriers have been unauthorized, and even legal barriers are used for illicit taxation.<sup>8</sup>

One notable contextual point on the development of and conflict over trade circuits and their attendant roadblock economies in the CAR is the particular role of Arab traders. They first arrived in the Central African Republic at the beginning of the 20th century together with herders from southern Chad, who had been encouraged to settle in the CAR in order to supply Bangui with livestock. Since that time, Arab traders have been responsible for developing the country's long-distance trade.<sup>9</sup> Until the crisis in 2013, commercial activities, including transportation, were provided almost exclusively by Central African Muslims, with a sizeable involvement of Muslims of other nationalities.<sup>10</sup> A sense of exclusion from this trade among the country's Christian community formed part of the grievances that fuelled the inter-communal violence of 2013/14.<sup>11</sup> The issue of who gets to participate in the long-distance trade, through which value addition and securing a 'cut' of such value accrues, was thus already a key factor at the origin of the current crisis.<sup>12</sup>

In short, the CAR's recent roadblock landscape has reflected the rise of the 2013 Seleka rebellion from the north-east, its repulsion from the capital in 2014 by anti-balaka from the south-west, and the subsequent fragmentation of these respective armed movements.<sup>13</sup> Each wave of armed actor over the CAR's territory has been accompanied by the installation or takeover of roadblocks.<sup>14</sup> In the turmoil of recent years, however, the importance of control over trade routes has only increased, today constituting a key source of funding for former Seleka factions.<sup>15</sup>

As a result, traffic in the CAR is now heavily militarized. Any travel over long distances is accompanied by weaponry, whether it is the movement of pastoralists, traders, or humanitarianists.<sup>16</sup> The few urban road sections designated 'weapon-free zones' by the UN form nearly the only exception to the militarization of road space across the country.<sup>17</sup> It is within this historical context that we explore the significance of roadblocks for CAR's political economy.

## 2.3 Roadblocks as a source of conflict financing

Reports on the conflict economy of the Central African Republic generally focus on natural resources, as if this sector represents the entirety of the political economy of the conflict.<sup>18</sup> This report seeks to moderate this discourse.

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8 As IPIS observed in 2009, low morale and overdue salaries were among key motivations of this proliferation (Hilgert and Spittaels 2009, *op cit*, p. 12).

9 Chauvin 2012 *op cit* p. 17; Chauvin et Seignobos 2013 *op cit* p. 144-5.

10 Tessandier et al 2011 *op cit* p. 38.

11 F. Hilgert et al, (2014) *Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic*, Antwerp: IPIS, p. 53.

12 In fact, the importance of road control in the CAR's political economy goes back much further in history. The country is sparsely populated, making escape an obvious strategy to avoid the imposition of economic activities and taxes on production during colonial times. In addition, the permeability of national borders has given rise to roadblocks within the country as well as to a culture of omnipresent suspicion of road users. However, producers are nonetheless forced to put their products into circulation to make a profit, and collection posts erected on trade routes have always formed a key feature of how mobility has been governed and taxed in the CAR (See Lombard, Louisa, 2013, "Navigational Tools for Central African Roadblocks", *PolAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, 36: 157-73). This logic is a colonial legacy: the main purpose of roads was to link resources (especially agricultural production) to ports. As such, these roads could be termed 'extraction roads'. Indeed, customs brought in about 20% of State revenue until the crisis of 2013. By extension it has always therefore been targeted by political strongmen, and its collection has been so corrupted that it was partially privatized.

13 See Hilgert et al 2014 *op cit*.

14 See ICG, 2014, "The Central African Republic's Hidden Conflict", Washington: International Crisis Group, pp. 18-19.

15 Observations already made by the final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2015/936), para 89.

16 Hilgert et al 2014 *op cit* p. 68, Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2016/1032) para 74; Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2015/936), para 109.

17 Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2016/1032), para 13.

18 See Chauvin, Emmanuel. 2015. "Pour une poignée de ressources. Violences armées et pénurie des rentes en Centrafrique", *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*: 481-500 ; and Global Witness 2015 "Une chasse aux pierres", accessible at <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/central-african-republic-car/chasse-aux-pierres/>.

Natural resources are crucial to an understanding the CAR's conflict – livestock, coffee, wood, gold and diamonds currently generate significant revenues for armed groups.<sup>19</sup> However, the exact manner of their exploitation and its role in the country's conflict is often poorly understood. Rather than focusing their operations exclusively on resource production sites – as is often depicted in popular media – armed groups frequently concentrate their efforts along the pathways through which natural resources are put into circulation, as well as along traditional trade routes through which all kinds of goods are commercialized. In doing so, they follow a long-standing historical pattern of trade route taxation – a pattern deeply rooted in Central African political culture (see next section). An acknowledgment of this fact necessitates a broadening of the focus of research on conflict financing from areas rich in natural resources to trade routes. This broadening is crucial not only to understanding the vast and usually overlooked dynamic of predation on trade routes, but is also key to formulating interventions designed to curb the conflict financing opportunities presented by such resources. In neighbouring Congo, the subject of a separate roadblock mapping<sup>20</sup>, for instance, most efforts to stem conflict financing have been centred on validating mining sites.

## 2.4 The central role of transport in the Central African economy

The Central African economy is dominated by the primary sector in the broadest sense (subsistence farming, livestock breeding, hunting, and artisanal mining).<sup>21</sup> At the most basic economic level, marketing locally produced goods (such as sugar, coffee, gold, cattle and wood) depends on transporting these goods to distant markets. Economic gain, in other words, is contingent upon getting local products to a place where they are valued more than the cost of their production and transport. As elsewhere, in the CAR these products are sent by traders to regional markets where manufactured goods, mostly imported, are also offered. This trade takes place in circuits composed of both evacuation and supply chains, which together form relatively stable long-distance exchange circuits.

As natural resources can only increase in value by being put into circulation, placing roadblocks at obligatory points of passage for their commercialization is an easy and efficient means of intervention from a rebel's perspective. It allows them to benefit from a portion of the added value without engaging in labour-intensive exploitation, or the complex effort of managing mining sites. Contrary to common supposition, roadblocks are not exclusively placed on supply routes for bulky, and therefore easily identifiable and taxable, goods. Rather, roadblock operators place roadblocks close to places where relevant economic activity is concentrated (e.g. mines, markets, grazing areas, urban centres) or on the main trade routes servicing them. This enables them to tax anyone crossing these obligatory passage points. Indeed, roadblocks are even more important for the subsistence of armed groups operating in areas without any significant natural resource production.<sup>22</sup>

Whilst predation on road space as a source of conflict financing is extremely important, however, it does not, of course, diminish the significance of other forms of conflict financing not covered by this report, such as the control of mining sites, corruption and contraband.

## 2.5 Roadblocks as an obstacle to development

The importance of roadblocks goes beyond financing armed groups. The system of roadside taxation has reached such an extent that it has become a kind of 'economic asphyxiation'. During the Bangui

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19 See Annex 2 for an overview of the armed groups identified during this research.

20 See Schouten, Peer, Janvier Murairi and Saidi Kubuya. *Everything that moves, will be taxed: the political economy of roadblocks in the Kivu provinces, Democratic Republic of Congo*. Antwerp/Copenhagen: IPIS/DIIS, November 2017.

21 Outside of the capital, Bangui, which houses 45% of the population, agriculture in the broadest sense of the word dominates and is responsible for around 50% of GDP.

22 <sup>7</sup> Chauvin, Emmanuel, 2012, "Conflits armés, mobilités sous contraintes et recompositions des échanges vivriers dans le nord-ouest de la Centrafrique", in *Les échanges et la communication dans le bassin du lac Tchad*, ed. Baldi Sergio and Magrin Géraud, p. 14. Moreover, competition for control over road space in the CAR becomes particularly acute because there are relatively few of these critical roads in a country with the approximate size of France.

Forum—a popular consultation held with the population of each prefecture in 2015—roadblocks were consistently among the main grievances cited by the population.<sup>23</sup>

Given the CAR's landlocked position, its road network is crucial to its economic development. With little domestic industry to speak of, it is heavily dependent on imports, even for food security. As consumer goods are largely imported, around 72% of household expenditure goes to foodstuffs purchased at markets that are, in turn, subject to fluctuations in transport costs. As the World Food Program observes,

*'In this context, the functioning of markets and the evolution of prices have a direct impact on the capacity of households to meet their level of subsistence.'*<sup>24</sup>

The present day disarray of national economic circuits in the CAR is in large part due to the presence of roadblocks on trade routes. The near complete spatial disintegration of national economic circuits is illustrated by radical price differences for staple foods between different urban centres.<sup>25</sup>

For example, in roadblock-plagued areas, local populations cease to go to both the field or to the market. In the area around Zangba, epicentre of confrontations between the UPC and anti-balaka in 2017, this has led to a 600% increase in the price of one measure (*ngawi*) of cassava, from 250 FCFA before the crisis to 1,500 FCFA now.<sup>26</sup> Such distortions have a considerable impact in a country that ranks 187 out of 188 on the Human Development Index.

## 2.6 Economic circuits at the heart of the conflict

Long-distance movement was among the first victims of the 2013 crisis and road space has remained a venue for violence ever since.<sup>27</sup> As a result, 'freedom of movement' (*libre circulation* in French) became a key stake in the political discourse of different parties to the conflict. In short, while every armed group claims to defend freedom of movement, their goal is in fact the polar opposite: to restrict free movement and maximize their own control over the various economic circuits traversing the national territory.

The CAR possesses several such circuits, and armed groups continuously try to position themselves on strategic nodes along trade routes to levy taxes, channel the movements of profitable flows, and sometimes monopolize the commercialization of valuable goods. In general, wherever one finds any form of concentrated economic activity, there will be taxes imposed on its circulation.

The economic exchanges that persist in the CAR today take place on a limited number of corridors, each associated with specific forms of economic circulation. Control over the main corridors in these circuits seems to be at the heart of the Central African conflict given its centrality to enabling the imposition of taxes.

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23 See "Rapport Général du Forum National de Bangui", 2015.

24 C. Tessandier et al, 2011, "Analyse du fonctionnement des marchés en relation avec la sécurité alimentaire des ménages en République Centrafricaine" Rome: WFP, p. 22.

25 FAO and WFP, 2016, "Mission FAO/PAM d'évaluation des récoltes et de la sécurité alimentaire en République Centrafricaine", Bangui : FAO/WFP, p. 14 & 46.

26 HCR et al, 2016, "Mission Inter-agences sur l'axe Bambari-Kouango-Zangba-Mobaye-Alindao", Bangui: HCR, OMS, Espérance, COHEB, COOPI and OCHA, p. 9.

27 It is dangerous for Muslims to go to predominantly Christian areas, and vice versa. Humanitarian convoys are regularly attacked and numerous incidents prevent them from accessing affected areas. See the Final Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts applying paragraph 23 (c) of resolution 2262 (hereinafter UN Panel of Experts) (S / 2016/1032), p. 12; Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts applying paragraph 59 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013) (S / 2014/762) para 200 and annex 59. See also the INSO website's CAR profile (available at: [http://www.ngosafety.org/country/central\\_african\\_republic](http://www.ngosafety.org/country/central_african_republic)) for updates on incidents against humanitarian organizations. The seasonal movement of pastoralists is often also accompanied by violence, see UN Panel of Experts (S / 2016/1032), para 21.

This report distinguishes between three main economic circuits: the cattle circuit, the Sudanese circuit, and the 'legal' circuit.<sup>28</sup> The **cattle circuit** is composed of livestock trade routes, roughly between the north of the country and Bangui, passing through cattle markets like those of Kaga Bandoro and Bambari. Armed groups often fight each other for control over strategic points on this circuit, at which it is possible to block or facilitate the movement of livestock. The **Sudanese circuit** concerns the trade routes used by Sudanese traders between Birao, Kaga Bandoro and Bambari. Roads connecting Sudan and the CAR are used for the export of coffee, honey and sesame to Sudan in exchange for manufactured goods consumed in ex-Seleka-controlled areas. The **'legal' circuit** concerns supply chains in the government-controlled west of the country, in particular the Bangui Garoua-Boulai corridor and the Oubangui river. These are used mainly for the import of manufactured goods on which Bangui relies.

Table 1. Overview of principal economic circuits

Circuit	Principal corridor	International contractors	Associated armed actor
<b>Cattle</b>	Zone around Bambari / Kaga Bandoro, to Bangui	Chadian and Sudanese pastoralists	MPC / UPC / 3R
<b>Sudanese</b>	Am Dafok – Birao – Ndele – Kaga Bandoro and Am Dafok – Birao – Bria - Bambari	Sudanese traders	FPRC / UPC
<b>'Legal'</b>	Garoua Boulai - Bangui	Cameroonian transporters	Government / MINUSCA

These circuits are also reflective of determinate social, politico-military and economic zones of influence. The Central African economy is strongly characterized by extraversion (dependence on external trade) and each of its main corridors link the CAR to neighbouring countries, thus facilitating economic exchange.<sup>29</sup> This exchange is undertaken through trade and military networks that transcend national boundaries and with which these circuits are closely intertwined: the cattle circuit with a Chadian network; the Sudanese with Sudanese networks; and the 'legal' corridor with Cameroonian affiliates.

As outlined in the table above and explored in the case studies that follow, each of these networks is connected to a different armed faction in the conflict in the Central African Republic, offering those involved in the network protection while monopolizing taxation on trade in this circuit. This implies, therefore, a logistical balkanization of the country, dividing it in along trade route affiliations.

28 This classification echoes other analyses on the relative importance of different sectors in the conflict economy in the CAR. Apart from the reports of the UN Panel of Experts, a report on the political economy of the conflict from 2015 highlighted the cattle and coffee circuits – in which Sudanese economic actors dominate – as one of the main sources of income for armed groups, apart from other natural resources such as minerals and timber. See Agger, Kasper, 2015, "Warlord Business: CAR's Violent Armed Groups and their Criminal Operations for Profit and Power", Washington: Enough Project, especially page 11.

29 See Tessandier *et al* 2011, op cit.



# PART 1: MAIN FINDINGS

## 3. Overview of main findings

This report identifies a total of 284 roadblocks. Table 2 gives breaks this total down per actor, and shows that **more than half (149 or 52%) of all roadblocks are exploited by ex-Seleka groups; 117 (or 41%) are operated by government agents; and 40 (or 14%) by anti-balaka factions**. It should be noted here that the number of roadblock operators is not commensurate with the total number of roadblocks surveyed because a number of barriers is operated by two different armed actors. Similarly, on most barriers controlled by the state, representatives of several different services are present.

Table 2. Number of roadblocks per actor

Actor	Number of roadblocks	Affiliation	Number of roadblocks
Ex-Seleka	149	FPRC	61
		UPC	42
		MPC	40
Other armed groups	55	RJ	16
		anti-balaka	40
		FPDC	1
State agents	115	Gendarmerie	92
		FACA	11
		Police	34
		Customs	14
		Water and Forests	29
		Mairie	12
		Phytosanitary	6
Other (unclear, peasants, village youths, ...)	6		

As is apparent from the disaggregated figures provided in the second column above, **although ex-Seleka groups control more roadblocks than governmental forces overall, the gendarmerie appears to be the main individual operator of checkpoints, with a presence on 92 or 32% of all roadblocks in the CAR**. The gendarmerie is followed by the **FPRC, present on 61 or 21% of the roadblocks**. **Third place is shared by the UPC, MPC and anti-balaka, each controlling around 40 or 14% of barriers**.

From a road user's perspective, on any given route, the level of taxes levied is a function of both the distance and intensity of use of the axis—the main corridors on which economic exchanges happen frequently, attract the most roadblocks. The specific security conditions in the area are also determinative of rates of levy.<sup>30</sup> As per Table 3, IPIS' data enables a calculation of the average density of roadblocks on a given road, as well as the approximate cost involved.

30 Tessandier *et al*, 2011 *op cit*, p. 38.

Table 3. Levies at barriers in the CAR

Route	Total KM	Number of roadblocks	Density of roadblocks	Average tax per roadblock (for a truck)	Total cost	Cost per KM
Bangui-Béloko	582	26	1 every 22 km	6.731 FCFA	175.000 FCFA (267 EUR)	301 FCFA
Sibut-Bangassou	550	27	1 every 20 km	22.093 FCFA	596.500 FCFA (EUR 910 EUR)	1.083 FCFA
Birao-Bambari	690	30	1 every 23 km	107.000 FCFA	3.210.000 FCFA (EUR 4.894 EUR)	4.652 FCFA
Birao-Kaga Bandoro	730	18	1 every 40 km	14.361 FCFA	FCFA 258.500 (EUR 394 EUR)	354 FCFA
Kaga Bandoro-Sido	170	10	1 every 17 km	42.500 FCFA	425.000 FCFA (648 EUR)	2.500 FCFA
Average	504	22	1 every 24 km	25.038 FCFA	933.000 FCFA (1.422 EUR)	1.778 FCFA

As Table 3 demonstrates, a traveller in the CAR will generally encounter one roadblock every 24 km, and a truck will pay an average of 25,000 FCFA per barrier encountered. A motorcyclist will pay an average of 1,000 FCFA per barrier. However, on some axes, taxes levied are well above average, especially on the Birao-Bambari route.

Appendix 3 contains a table disaggregating the data provided above for each route. This disaggregation highlights that: (1) escorts appear to have a tax-reduction effect, and that (2) levies imposed by the government cost the traveller much less than ex-Seleka levies. As explained in chapter 6, this is mainly due to the multiplication of customs taxes or so-called ‘free passage’ taxes introduced by various ex-Seleka generals.

As will be elaborated on in chapter 7, taxes for transporters on the Bangui-Beloko corridor are centralized at the two terminals on this route. The mixed escort ensures that transporters are not harassed at the many roadblocks on this axis.

Table 4. Number of roadblocks on every economic circuit

Circuit	Principal corridor	Number of roadblocks	Roadblock operators
Cattle	Zone around Bambari / Kaga Bandoro, to Bangui	62	MPC / UPC / FPRC
Sudanese	Am Dafok – Birao – Ndele – Kaga Bandoro and Am Dafok – Birao – Bria – Bambari	64	FPRC / UPC / anti-balaka
Legal	Garoua Boulai – Bangui	26	State services

This report identifies three main economic circuits on which illegal roadblocks concentrate: 62 barriers (or 22% of the total) are imposed by ex-Seleka groups on the cattle circuit; 64 (or 23%) by these same groups on the Sudanese circuit; and 26 barriers (9%) by state services on the legal circuit.<sup>31</sup> The rest of the roadblocks identified in this report are imposed on other traffic. Data collected over the course of this research indicates that ex-Seleka groups earn at least EUR 3.59 million a year from the taxation of the cattle circuit, and another EUR 2.38 million from the taxation of Sudanese traders.

31 Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of barriers along each circuit by the total of mapped barriers (284).

## 4. The political economy of roadblocks

### 4.1 Chapter summary

This chapter provides an overview of the key aspects of the political economy of roadblocks in the CAR. It addresses the following: the division between taxes levied at roadblocks and those paid to individual strongmen; the internal governance of roadblock revenues; similarities and differences between the strategies of different armed actors; and competition between different factions for control over roadblocks.

### 4.2 Introduction

A 'roadblock' in the context of this report can be understood as any point at which payment is required to proceed further along a given route. Official checkpoints are set up at different locations on trade routes to prevent the 'illegal' entry or export of products into a geographic area within the country. In practice, however, official checkpoints have turned into devices to illicitly generate private revenues. A roadblock can take the form of a barricade, or more discreetly, a small house, hut or shelter. It is sometimes called a 'post' because it is a place where agents of one hierarchy or another have been deployed. A more opaque category of roadblock can take the form of widely known obligatory passing points that are unmarked in the physical landscape. These roadblocks are 'virtual' to the extent that they do not entail physical barriers, but rather certain places or persons to which aspiring passers-by must refer themselves to pay a certain amount in exchange for the right to pass—for example, a 'comzone' (zone commander in rebel parlance).<sup>32</sup>

Roadblocks as revenue generating devices are only one manifestation of a broader political culture of politico-military entrepreneurship. Central African power dynamics have overwhelmingly been characterised by the use of the military might, public office and political power for personal enrichment on the part of both rebel leaders and those in public office. It is important to understand how these 'entrepreneurs of imposition'—a plethora of formal, informal, state or non-state actors exercising some form of power through imposition—generate revenues for their subsistence. In the CAR, state agents and elements of armed groups are either not paid, or paid very poorly. This implies that the generation of 'revenues' becomes a key concern for all. Each layer of their respective hierarchies can send agents to 'work the road' and generate revenues that they must send back up the hierarchy, while also offering these agents a means of survival. Positions in hierarchies of taxation systems are seen as a source for 'something to eat' (*ye ti têngo* in Sango).<sup>33</sup> This logic prevails among armed groups, as well as state services in the CAR.

### 4.3 The structure of rackets in the CAR

Ex-Seleka armed groups and government agents generally share a strikingly similar approach to generating revenue from trade routes under their control. Each operates through a combination of (1) roadblocks, (2) centralized customs taxes and (3) mandatory escorts on certain road sections.

#### 4.3.1. Roadblocks

Roadblocks have existed even before the onset of the current crisis.<sup>34</sup> Ex-Seleka armed groups have developed highly sophisticated roadside revenue generation systems. In general, armed groups simply replace the Central African state in areas under their control. They occupy abandoned state infrastructures and simply copy the state's organizational structure at these posts. This sees the establishment of parallel

32 Definition derived from Janvier Murairi, Peer Schouten and Saidi Kubuya Batundi, 2017, *"Pillage Route: l'économie politique des barrages routiers à Walikale et Masisi"*, Copenhagen/Antwerp : DIIS/IPIS.

33 Ngovon, Gervais, 2015, "Le contrôle des ressources de l'Etat, un enjeu des conflits en Centrafrique", *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*: 501-33, p. 504.

34 ICG 2014: 18-19; Global Witness 2015, p. 14.

state services — including FACA, Gendarmerie, Customs, Police, Municipality, Water and Forestry, and Phytosanitary services – to orchestrate the imposition of taxes.

Roadblock taxes are more or less fixed in accordance with the means of transport being levied, its cargo and the importance of the roadblock. Motorcycles, for example, are usually subject to a fixed tax of around 1,000 FCFA per roadblock per day (paid once upon first passage). Baggage, by contrast, is subject to a variable regime. Taxes are generally less variable at roadblocks through which greater volumes of traffic pass. This is because road users require stability and predictability to make such routes continuously economically viable. In order to plan their route or calculate profitability, transporters need to know in advance how much they will have to pay along the way. Thus, larger roadblocks like that of Kpokpo, near Kaga Bandoro (see the case study further down in this chapter), have a well-defined tax regime, whereas a small roadblock along an isolated feeder road may have radical fluctuations on sums levied, these sums being more likely to be subject to negotiations. This characteristic of the roadblock economy also provides some indication of the contours of its relationship with those subject to taxation – regular sudden changes in tax rates can generate real discontent among the affected populations about the entire roadblock system. This in turn affects the sustainability of the golden goose.

#### 4.3.2. 'Free Passage'

Armed groups do not limit themselves simply to taxing passage at roadblocks. From the outset, they have also introduced parallel customs clearance systems, requiring transporters to go through the 'virtual roadblock' of the *comzone* to pay large sums for the right to circulate in their fiefdom.<sup>35</sup> This kind of customs clearance has been maintained by ex-Seleka groups and copied by different individual strongmen within these groups as they continue to fragment into increasingly discrete factions. As it entails the centralization of levies from the most profitable posts, this kind of tax is paid to those highest in the hierarchy, and implies the right to circulate 'freely' in the area under the relevant individual's control. As such, it may or may not be accompanied a document such as a 'laissez-passer'.

This system is particularly visible in north-eastern CAR, where Sudanese traders are subjected to a series of customs duties levied by each of the ex-Seleka generals positioned along the few viable trade routes on that circuit (for example, the committee of Nouredinne Adam in Birao, General Hissene in N'Dele, or General Damane in Ouadda — see chapter 6). This increases the power of individual generals and in return gives traders direct access to the strongmen concerned (see below 'Competition over roadblocks'). This system, which mimics the basic principles of state formation, allows these armed groups to increase the benefits they themselves retain from long-distance trade, while repurposing roadside taxation as a means of paying their troops.

This system also entails the capacity to impose drastic restrictions on who can circulate on trade routes in areas under an armed group's control. For example, on the Birao-Bria axis, the only transporters of goods are either commanders of the FPRC themselves, or Sudanese traders who retain intimate links to the movement (see chapter 6). In the far north-east, some armed groups go as far as monopolizing all logistics, whereas others limit themselves to imposing taxes on freedom of movement.

Similarly, this type of restriction on logistical actors is also visible in areas nominally controlled by the government. Here, monopolies are granted—mostly to French companies—for the transport and importation of certain key consumption goods such as fuel, sugar and beverages. Just as merchants linked to armed groups contribute to their financing, these companies represent a significant part of the Central African government's revenue generation (see Chapter 7). With this dual system (roadblocks and 'free passage') in place all over the country, the political economy of trade routes in the CAR obeys the same logic in areas under government control and as it does in zones controlled by ex-Seleka factions.

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35 ICG, 2014, *op cit*, p. 18.

### 4.3.3. Mandatory escorts

Apart from roadblocks and ‘free passage’, mandatory escorts present a third means by which profit can be generated from control over trade routes. Indeed, armed groups as well as state forces and MINUSCA impose mandatory escorts on a number of main roads under their control. Ex-Seleka General Damane imposes escorts on the stretch of road between Ouadda-Mouka (see Chapter 6); the FPRC offers escorts to certain transporters between Kaga Bandoro and N’Délé; and a dedicated mix of state forces and MINUSCA provide escorts along the Bangui-Béloko corridor (see chapter 7). Finally, MINUSCA offers free armed escorts on the main roads between Bangui and Kaga Bandoro, Bangui and Bambari, and Bambari and Bria (see Chapter 5).



*Trucks leaving Kaga Bandoro, waiting for a MINUSCA escort*

## 4.1 Who is taxed? The case of NGOs

Humanitarian logistics is one structural victim of abuse by armed groups. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2013, armed groups have imposed taxes on NGOs passing their roadblocks.<sup>36</sup> The very high frequency of attacks on humanitarian workers by armed groups in the CAR means that levels of outsourcing in humanitarian logistics is high. Jeep-type vehicles are generally exempted from these abuses, but commercial trucks hired by NGOs are systematically required to pay or denied access/ rendered subject to attack.

Most commercial transporters in the CAR—Cameroonian, Sudanese and Central African— undertake missions for both NGO and intergovernmental agencies alongside their usual commercial activities.<sup>37</sup> When transporting humanitarian goods, the trucks are equipped with logos to make them recognisable as humanitarian vehicles. When a commercial trucker is contracted by an NGO or a UN agency, he pays a minor tax at roadblocks—a service fee for opening the roadblock—which never exceeds 20,000 FCFA. On his return journey, when the truck hauls more profitable commercial goods, the trucker once again falls under the regime of ‘big’ road taxes, which run up to 100,000 FCFA per roadblock.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> See Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2014/762) paras 194-195.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Bolloré, Bangui, 2016.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Bolloré and Atlas Logistique, Bangui, 2016.



For example, during the present research, a convoy of six trucks bringing World Food Programme articles to Batangafo returned to Bangui via Kaga Bandoro. To avoid returning empty, these trucks took passengers and cargo to make a small profit. The FPRC / MPC tax agents at a Kaga Bandoro roadblock then asked the drivers of two trucks that had taken on board a lot of passengers and baggage, to each pay 50,000 FCFA. The rebel in question explained:

*'If you do not pay, we will take out all passengers and cargo and you will leave empty, because regular transport vehicles pay us a license fee to operate freely, while you pay us nothing.'*<sup>39</sup>

The two trucks ended up paying 20,000 FCFA each.

On the return journey as a 'private' transporter, truck drivers are often obliged at rebel roadblocks to show their mission orders stamped by their contracting NGO.<sup>40</sup> For armed groups, trucks are thus still associated with their humanitarian client, even when they operate for other clients or themselves on their return journey. Annex 4 contains a mission order issued by an NGO and stamped by the UPC and the anti-balaka between Bangassou and Bambari. The mission order was obtained by IPIS during a trip on this particular trade route.

Officially, under the contractual terms with their NGO clients, transporters are prohibited from paying illicit fees or taxes at roadblocks. However, armed groups are aware that these transporters are well paid by their international clients and therefore, in practice, many are forced to pay the regular roadblock taxes for their security. Their clients are, at least informally, usually aware of this.<sup>41</sup> Even NGOs known for advocating freedom of movement and insisting on 'humanitarian space' are forced to pay.

## 4.2 Variations between parties to the conflict

Despite these convergences, there are important differences between the taxation strategies of the parties to the CAR's conflict. In general, ex-Seleka groups' control over road traffic differs from that of other armed actors. This is evidenced by the proliferation of roadblocks in areas under their control. When the State controlled road networks, there was usually a single checkpoint at an entry to a given town. However, armed groups have set up roadblocks at every entrance and exit to a given locality, thus radically multiplying the overall number of roadblocks in a single area. It is for this reason that a single locality can be the site of three to four roadblocks. Thus, for example, whilst there were around 25 State barriers between Bangui and Bangassou in 2011,<sup>42</sup> there are currently 37 armed group-controlled roadblocks.

Whilst they form part of armed groups' revenue generation strategies, roadblocks are also a feature of the restoration of state authority. If armed groups often simply take over former state checkpoints to impose their own tax structures, State agents likewise repeat this tendency, when they take over stretches of road formerly controlled by armed groups. Roadblocks are thus a constant, even after the departure of one party to the conflict.

Unlike other armed groups, anti-balaka groups often do not erect permanent barriers. Instead they engage in ad hoc or opportunistic ambushes or acts of extortion. If they feel threatened, they may sabotage the logistics of the enemy by barricading or otherwise sabotaging the road and/or destroying bridges.<sup>43</sup> They generally erect roadblocks only as part of efforts to put pressure on enemy groups. Although structural armed escorts by MINUSCA, which run mainly through anti-balaka territory, have

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39 Field observation, 2017.

40 Interview with a transporter for an international NGO, Bangassou, 2017.

41 Interviews with multiple humanitarian agents and logistical subcontractors, Bambari, Bangassou, Kaga Bandoro, Bangui, 2016-2017.

42 US Department of State, 2011, *op cit*, p. 24.

43 See, for example, Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2016/1032), paras 122 et 132.



largely thwarted their impositions, anti-balaka groups remain notorious for rendering particular routes extremely unpredictable and dangerous.

### Variations between actors: example of weekly markets in Ouham-Pendé

In areas controlled by the **anti-balaka**, weekly markets – the bedrock of economic exchange in the CAR – are not subject to structural taxation. For example, in Ouham-Pendé, the Yongoro, Bohong, and Ndim markets require only the payment of a “market ticket” – a tax paid by each seller to the “*Mairie*” (local authority). These tickets vary according to the size of the parcel and especially according to the origin of the merchant. Sellers of local agricultural products are taxed 50-100 FCFA, while those selling manufactured goods coming from Cameroun or Chad pay 100-500 FCFA.<sup>44</sup> The only anti-balaka imposition observed over the course of the present research was that, in some instances, they introduced themselves as a mandatory intermediaries for certain exchanges, such as an armed element mediating between sellers and buyers of goats at the Yongoro market.



*Livestock market in Bémal (June 2017).*

**Ex-Seleka**-controlled markets, on the other hand, are meticulously taxed. Take the example of the weekly Saturday market in Bémal, on the Chadian border. Each seller has to pass through to the joint MPC/RJ roadblock at the entrance to the market to pay taxes. Trucks full of produce arrive from Paoua on Friday nights but are not allowed to unload. Upon arrival they pass through the entrance barrier of Bémal, which is more intensely manned on market days. To pass, each truck pays 1,000 FCFA to the armed groups’ “police” agents and 1,000 FCFA to the parallel “gendarmerie”. The following morning, these trucks are then able to unload at the market in the presence of tax collectors from both the MPC and RJ. At the cattle section of the market, both sellers and buyers of livestock each pay 5,000 FCFA, or a total of 10,000 FCFA for each head of cattle exchanged. Generally, 100 heads of cattle are bought and sold at each weekly market, representing a profit of around 1,000,000 FCFA in livestock taxes alone for the armed groups. Upon leaving the market, buyers are subject to taxation according to the size and contents of their parcel.

Who gets to participate in profitable trade is also governed by the MPC / RJ coalition. Despite the official closure of the Chadian border, the Bémal market is flooded with Chadian traders who sell their goods at lower prices than Central African traders, whose products are more expensive because they are transported from Cameroon and heavily taxed along the way. In addition, many Chadian traders are close to the MPC and enjoy exemptions from roadblock and border taxes. They are also often taxed less at the market.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Observations at multiple weekly markets, May-June 2017.

<sup>45</sup> Interviews at Bémal, Paoua and Bembere with Chadian and Central African traders, as well as Chadian “smugglers” (who facilitate illegal border crossings), June 2017.

## 4.3 Internal governance of roadblock revenues

This section focuses on the sophisticated revenue management system developed by ex-Seleka armed groups. In general, roadblock revenues are used to finance three different cost posts: the supply of positions; funding for the commanders; and a fund for emergencies. If there is only one roadblock in a locality, the revenue is split up into a percentage attributed to each of these headers.<sup>46</sup> If there are several roadblocks, the revenues generated by each barrier are reserved for one of the three: one barrier for supplies, another for emergencies; and another just for the *comzone*—usually the barrier where taxes are highest.

One illustration of this system at work can be found where the MPC and the FPRC share power on the route between Kaga Bandoro and Sido, on the Chadian border.<sup>47</sup> From Kaga-Bandoro to Ouandago (about 56 km) one ‘administrative district’ falls under one MPC and one FPRC *comzone*. From Farazala (75 km from Kaga-Bandoro) onwards, the MPC reigns alone. Each of these *comzones* posts one individual at any given roadblock – one from the MPC and another from the FPRC. It is from these individuals that *comzones* collect their revenues at the end of the day. Roadblock chiefs also set aside a portion of the revenues generated to buy food for the next day and keep the rest in order to hand it over to the armed groups’ respective leader at the end of the week. The MPC only entrusts *comzone* or chief of roadblock positions to Chadians close to the hierarchy. Elements between different roadblocks communicate by satellite telephone to announce the arrival of a truck, as well as the details of the fees to be paid.

### 4.3.1. ‘Laissez piller’: rotation as a payment system

Elements stationed at roadblocks are subject to frequent rotation. This is because roadblocks provide a periodic income—a system that can be called ‘laissez-piller’.<sup>48</sup> This aspect of roadblock management gets at the heart of the strategic value of roadblocks for the political economy of the CAR’s conflict: without roadblock revenues, however meagre these might sometimes be, armed groups would be unable to retain their rank and file. An agent who is skilled in generating revenue will be permanently assigned to a profitable position, that is, one with heavy traffic.

Comzones also frequently move about, as they are obliged to visit each post on a daily or weekly basis to collect revenues. Comzones often keep the most profitable positions to themselves so that they can directly oversee revenue collection, though they regularly move between posts to inspect elements, distribute weapons and collect revenue. In this way, old state administrative buildings, customs posts, livestock markets and strategic barriers are often occupied by comzones.

At the level of individual roadblocks, those in charge are at the head of what is effectively a management committee for that barrier. This is composed of an MPC and an FPRC representative for each parallel ‘service’: ‘Police’, ‘Gendarmerie’, ‘FACA’, ‘Phytosanitary’, ‘Water and Forestry’ and ‘Customs’. As explained above, the names of these armed group ‘services’ derive from the fact that the administrations set up by the FPRC / MPC have simply copied state roadblock operational structures pre-existent to the seizure of territory by the armed groups themselves. The role of this committee is to collect funds, appoint elements to positions and organise their rotations. The *comzone* visits the roadblocks every weekend to recover profits from the committee. Each ‘service’ pays a fixed amount, depending on the profitability of the roadblock, traffic, and tax rates. As one element, assigned to one of the services at a joint MPC/FPRC roadblock for over a year, confided:

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46 In the area under MPC and FPRC control, this system is slightly different: here, the first component is used to stock up on ammunition. The second component is intended for supplying different posts with provisions. Finally, the third part is reserved for ‘emergencies’. In reality, only the ‘supply’ component is really taken into account. The purchase of ammunition and emergency funds are pretexts for the *comzone* to accrue money. In fact, it is up to the *comzone* to provide the necessary ammunition. State roadblocks roughly follow the same pattern, except that agents often earn a percentage of the revenues handed over to their supervisor.

47 This section draws on in-depth interviews with FPRC elements posted in this area over 2016 and 2017.

48 A play of words on ‘laissez passer’, a common French term for a permit of free passage, as well as on ‘laissez faire’, from Chauvin and Seignobos 2013, *op cit*, p. 143.

*'I'm here and I'm staying there, because I have always known how to fill the pockets of the committee. They always gain something with me, so I gain too.'*<sup>49</sup>

As illustrated by the Kpokpo roadblock case study below, a single roadblock can yield around 800,000 FCFA (about 1,200 EUR) per week.

#### 4.3.2. How much money does a roadblock generate? Kpokpo – a case study<sup>50</sup>

The case of the Kpokpo roadblock, five kilometres from Kaga-Bandoro in the direction of Sido, serves to illustrate broader ex-Seleka internal revenue governance mechanisms. Kpokpo is the first of a series of 10 barriers between Kaga Bandoro and Sido, a total distance of about 170 km. Kpokpo is a strategic and profitable roadblock as it is the entry and exit point for anyone traveling between the trade hub of Kaga Bandoro and Chad, a strategic axis for livestock and peanut trade.<sup>51</sup>

Table 5. Taxes levied at the Kpokpo roadblock

'Service'	Large truck	Motorcycle	Cargo
Gendarmerie	12.500 FCFA	1.000 FCFA per day per roadblock	500-1000 FCFA per passage per cargo
Police	12.500 FCFA		
FACA	20.000 FCFA		
Water and Forestry	10.000 FCFA		
Phytosanitary	10.000 FCFA		500 FCFA per animal
Customs	20.000 FCFA		
<b>Total</b>	<b>85.000 FCFA</b>		

Twenty-five men work at this roadblock. There are two heads of post plus two MPC and two FPRC soldiers for each the following parallel services: 'FACA', 'Police', 'Gendarmerie', 'Water and Forests', 'Phytosanitary' and 'Customs'.<sup>52</sup> The head of the position in Kpokpo is a southern Chadian of the Islamised Sara ethnic group. His name is Oumar and he oversees all activities. This post symbolizes entry into MPC territory.

As is often the case, the 'service' yielding the most revenue at this barrier is 'customs', which is required to generate 300,000 FCFA per week. The 'FACA' service needs to collect 150,000 FCFA, the 'police' and 'gendarmerie' 100,000 FCFA each, and the 'Water and Forestry' and 'Phytosanitary' services 75,000 FCFA. This means that this roadblock alone can generate a total of 800,000 FCFA per week for its hierarchy, excluding any additional profits that are divided up amongst armed group elements at the roadblock. If these quotas are not met, elements must resort to other tactics such as looting, cattle theft and exactions against the population, amongst other strategies, to secure their own revenues. Each 'service' tries to come up with strategies to maximize their own income in order to reach the weekly quota, as well as to keep some profit for themselves. Elements also earn money on the side by trading in narcotics, ammunition, and hunting weapons, amongst other things.

After the funds are collected, the Kpokpo roadblock committee supplies elements at the post with a bag of cassava (the staple food), grain or maize, and a sum of 15,000 FCFA for the week's expenses. For the supply of the posts, the comzones also resort to compulsory levies from the local population. In Kaga

49 Interview at Kaga Bandoro, September 2016.

50 These data were obtained through a series of in-depth interviews in 2016 and 2017 with an element that has been deployed for a long time.

51 At the time of our visit, there were only two active carriers on this section: El Hadj Bourma and Alafis. They supply the region with manufactured goods from Sudan at the Kaga Bandoro market and bring peanuts from Kabo to Bangui. Fieldwork and interviews with one of the few carriers on this axis, February 2017.

52 Again, the nomenclature of these services is copied from the state and adapted by armed groups (FPRC, MPC and UPC) to organize their troops.

Bandoro, all butchers give up at least two kilos of meat each morning, which are to be distributed among the troops. Most of the money goes to the upper hierarchy who use it for their own personal enrichment or for purchasing weapons and ammunition, etc.<sup>53</sup>

## 4.4 Competition over roadblocks

The UN Panel of Experts for the CAR recognizes that competition over rackets is a key source of violence perpetrated by armed groups who, paradoxically, claim to defend the interests of economic actors in the circuits concerned.<sup>54</sup> During their geographical expansion in 2012/13, the Seleka explicitly targeted the most profitable nodes in the country's network of trade routes.<sup>55</sup> Already in 2014, the Panel noted that politico-military alliances changed rapidly, and that these shifts were related to efforts to gain control over revenues from roadblocks and natural resources.<sup>56</sup>

According to analyses, the fissures between the ex-Seleka factions UFDR, UPC, and FPRC in 2014 were the result of disagreements over roadblock revenue sharing.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, in September 2016, the anti-balaka and FPRC/MPC clashed because of the erection of an additional roadblock in Ndomete, 10 km from Kaga Bandoro.<sup>58</sup> At the strategic transit point of Bang, on a pastoralist route at the border with Cameroon, there have been regular clashes between different groups since 2014.<sup>59</sup>

Armed groups, or factions of the same armed group, have clashed at a roadblock or other strategic points of passage such as border posts, cattle routes, junctions and trading hubs on numerous occasions. The cattle circuit, for example, is coveted by various ex-Seleka factions, leading to frequent confrontations over the control of strategic locations in order to dominate rackets (see chapter 5).<sup>60</sup> Similarly, the FPRC has aggressively expanded its hold over obligatory passage points on Sudanese trade routes to tax transporters, and continues its efforts to chase the UPC out of strategic nodes for livestock taxation (see chapter 6).<sup>61</sup>

### Case study: competition between RPRC and UPC

In an interview just before his death in February 2017, General Zoundeko, Chief of Staff of the RPRC, admitted that his relationship with Ali Darassa of the UPC had degenerated because of issues around roadblocks.<sup>62</sup> After the demise of the 2013 Seleka rebellion and their subsequent retreat to Bambari, the UPC and the RPRC had initially divided different strategic zones amongst each other. The more powerful UPC took control over all profitable posts and left the RPRC in control of the towns of Gambo and Bakala.

Previously, all taxes were levied at roadblocks. This allowed the groups that controlled them to generate substantial revenues. However, Ali Darassa subsequently centralised the payment of customs and other taxes at the level of his HQ at Bambari, thus weakening imposition at roadblocks. Zoundeko explained that his men had since lived in Bambari without any real means of subsistence. This led a substantial number of his fighters to integrate into the FPRC. Only General Zacharie Damane, initially associated with the RPRC, managed to carve out a small empire between Bria and Ouadda where he imposes a customs tax that is meticulously respected by the Sudanese (see chapter 6).

53 See Agger, 2015 *op cit*, p. 12.

54 Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2016/1032), p. 2.

55 Hilgert et al 2014 *op cit*, p. 39-40.

56 See Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2014/762) paras 58, 111-150.

57 See Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2014/762) para 64.

58 Human Right Watch, 2016. "Central African Republic: Deadly Raid on Displaced People", Washington: Human Rights Watch, p. 3.

59 IPIS 2014, *op cit*, p. 77, and MINUSCA, 2017, "Sécurisation des convois de marchandises : le retour progressif de la confiance" Bangui : MINUSCA, for recent confrontations.

60 Case of Muslims in Bambari in 2015, confidential source in UN (S/2016/1032) para 77.

61 For other examples of this logic, see Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2015/936) paras 79-80, 84 et 172; IPIS 2014 *op cit* p. 47.

62 Interview, Bambari, January 2017.

Damane, however, seems to be operating under personal title and his men associate themselves with his person rather than with the RPRC as a group.<sup>63</sup>

Seleka control over trade routes presents a quantitative rather than a qualitative change to local populations. To be sure, the level of taxation under ex-Seleka rule approaches asphyxiation, making many wish for the return of government. But for populations in CAR's remote hinterlands, the way in which armed groups today impose taxes at roadblocks doesn't represent a qualitative change to the situation when the Central African State was in control. This is because government imposition at roadblocks did not result in any real services for the local population. Feeling exploited by its government, local populations would rather be taxed by 'one of their own'.<sup>64</sup> In fact, some populations do derive some measure of protection from armed groups. For example, certain Fulani (or peuhl) are provided protection by the UPC, whilst those populations who feel threatened by the MPC/RJ alliance appreciate anti-balaka roadblocks in the neighbourhoods of Bossangoa and Paoua. Likewise, Chadian traders are protected by the MPC, with whom they have personal relations, when illegally going to the Bémal border market.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, on several occasions, communities have expressed their opposition to the removal of armed group roadblocks for security reasons,<sup>66</sup> fearing brutal vengeance from their enemies in the event that such checkpoints be removed.<sup>67</sup> By extension, roadblock issues have therefore become a source of conflict also between communities themselves. For example, leaders of the Christian community in Bangassou spread the rumour that some Muslim traders were not paying at UPC roadblocks, thus fuelling tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities in the region.<sup>68</sup>

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63 Interviews in Ouadda, Bambari and Bria, 2017.

64 See Lombard 2013 *op cit*.

65 Field observations, June 2017.

66 Case of Muslims in Bambari in 2015, confidential UN source.


67 Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2015/936), para 182.

68 Final report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2017/639), para 88.



## PART 2: CASE STUDIES

### 5. The cattle circuit



#### 5.1 Chapter summary

**Number of roadblocks: 62**

**Main operators of barriers: FPRC, MPC, UPC**

This trade circuit involves the movement of cattle from grazing areas towards Bangui, the centre of consumption of around 200 heads of cattle per day, or about 73,000 per year. On this circuit ex-Seleka armed groups seek to maximize their control over the cattle supply chain to Bangui. This control effectively yields a profit generated by the difference between the price of a head of cattle at the level of roaming herds upcountry (around 50,000 CFAF) and the price in Bangui (more than 500,000 CFAF).

Armed groups are involved at several points in the cattle supply chain. Firstly, they impose 'transhumance taxes' in grazing areas, which yield over 1 million EUR per year. Secondly, they impose taxes at the main cattle markets of Kaga Bandoro (controlled by FPRC/MPC) and Bambari (UPC), which generate at least 1.9 million EUR annually, as well as at regional markets like Kabo (MPC) and Mobaye (UPC). Thirdly, a series of roadblocks (14) and river-blocks (8) are erected between these markets and Bangui in order to tax the transport of livestock. Together, these roadblocks generate about EUR 420,000 per year in armed group financing. Research for this report indicates that the total profits made by ex-Seleka groups from



the cattle circuit amount to at least EUR 3.59 million per year. This amount excludes profits derived by armed actors from cattle theft and direct participation in cattle trade.

## 5.2 Introduction

The cattle circuit is one of the most important sectors of the Central African Republic economy. The pastoralist economy supports around 10% of the country's population.<sup>69</sup> Part of this population are the so-called Peuhl, Fulani or Mbororo, who are largely nomadic and migrate in accordance with the seasons.<sup>70</sup> More recently, their movement has shifted according to the distribution of threats, alliances and opportunities related to the CAR's conflict. Livestock in the CAR, currently estimated at between 1.5 and 2 million head of cattle,<sup>71</sup> plays an essential role in the economy. In 2008, it amounted to around 15% of the CAR's GDP.<sup>72</sup> In the dry season especially, Central African and Chadian herds graze in the northern part of the country. This seasonal movement is mainly effectuated by Arab and the nomadic Fulani herders. In the CAR, Arabs and Fulani herders are not only Central Africans, but also Chadians and Sudanese.

Different ex-Seleka factions associate themselves with different herders, and the control of the cattle circuit is a primary objective among those armed groups involved. The high value of cattle renders its movement heavily militarized.

## 5.3 The trade circuit

The cattle circuit involves the commercialization of livestock from the north of the CAR to the consumption centre Bangui. Here, some 200 cows are consumed per day – or about 73,000 per year.<sup>73</sup> Different armed groups try to control cattle trade routes to maximize the portion they obtain from the difference between the price of a head of cattle in the north of the country and in Bangui.<sup>74</sup> In northern CAR, an animal costs around 50,000 FCFA, while in Bangui the same animal will be sold for about 500,000 FCFA – ten times more expensive.

During the crisis, the cattle supply chain running through the CAR was severely disrupted.<sup>75</sup> Transhumance corridors continue to be disrupted, but the cattle supply chain from pasture to market has been thoroughly rearranged. This north to south movement can basically be divided into two main blocks: the north-eastern zone under the control of ex-Seleka groups and the western zone where road space is controlled by criminal networks in collaboration with local authorities.<sup>76</sup> For example, the 'Ndale Brothers', an autonomous anti-balaka faction, controls the road space around Bouar in the northwest of the country to such an extent that it has in fact replaced state elements in the vicinity.

The cattle markets of Kaga Bandoro and Bambari mark the southernmost edge of the zones of influence of ex-Seleka groups. There appears to be division between grazing areas in the Kabo-Batangafo-Kaga Bandoro zone, occupied by Arab herders (Mbarara, Salamat, Matanine, Toundjour) and controlled by the MPC / FPRC. On the other hand, grazing areas are said to belong to the Mbororo Oudda Fulani – nomadic and pastoralist Muslims – around Bria, Bambari and as far as Mobaye on the Congolese border, under—

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69 Hilgert and Spittaels, 2009, *op cit*, p.18.

70 There is a distinction between "small" transhumance (within the CAR) and "grand" (regional) transhumance.

71 Interview with national president of the FNEC, Bangui, 2016. See also FAO, "Enquête sur la transhumance après la crise de 2013-2014 en République centrafricaine", Bangui, 2015, p. 14.

72 Central African Government, "Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté pour la RCA (2011-2015)", 2011, p. 12.

73 Statistics from the Ministère de l'Élevage (Livestock Ministry) from slaughterhouses in Bangui, February 2017.

74 The cattle sector has numerous links with the CAR conflict: herd movement is accompanied by either the violent resistance of local populations or the imposition of free passage fees – a key issue in tensions between pastoralists in areas affected by transhumance. Moreover, much livestock-related violence relates to armed groups that simply steal livestock from their owners.

75 See FAO 2015, *op cit*; for the antecedents of this disturbance, see Chauvin 2012 *op cit* p.16-18.

76 Interviews in Bouar, May 2017; communication with expert and armed groups, September 2017. See also Final UN Panel of Experts report (S/2016/1032) annexe 7.1.

disputed—control by the UPC.<sup>77</sup> Each of these areas has specific corridors through which pastoralists pass with their herds.

Neither foreign pastoralists nor Central African herders bring their livestock directly to the markets of Kaga Bandoro or Bambari. In the MPC/FPRC area, large traders, many of whom act on behalf of Chadian ‘big men’ associated with ex-Seleka groups, go to the herders to buy cattle at a low price (between 50,000-100,000 FCFA). The cattle are then entrusted to Arab conveyors<sup>78</sup> who bring them to the Kaga Bandoro cattle market, where they are resold at a higher price (around CFAF 300,000).<sup>79</sup> In the UPC-controlled area, the same price differential exists between grazing areas and Bambari cattle market.

Because of threats to Fulani and other Muslim livestock traders, conveyors limit themselves to the cattle markets of Kaga Bandoro and Bambari. In order to prevent them from being robbed, “big men” provide them with escorts or weapons to defend themselves. This has caused the rising militarization of transhumance zones. The businessmen who order the movement of cattle to the south, are usually associated with a strongman of one or other ex-Seleka faction. In moving their cattle towards the markets, conveyors prefer pastoral tracks to main roads due to the heightened number of exactions that they face at the hands of armed groups on the latter.

## 5.4 The political economy of cattle

A large part of the difference in the price of cattle between grazing areas and Bangui is made up of taxes imposed by armed groups.<sup>80</sup> The latter have established a predation system around livestock commercialization that is summarized in the following table and explained further below.<sup>81</sup>

Table 6. Summary of taxes and costs in the supply chain

Point in the chain	Price of an animal	Transporting cost	Taxes per animal	Profits for ex-Seleka per year
As part of a herd in Chad/north of the country	50,000 FCFA		None	
Border market	100,000 FCFA		5,000-10,000 FCFA (ex-Seleka)	182.5 million FCFA (278,000 EUR) <sup>82</sup>
Grazing and transfer to market		Transporter, unknown cost	Transhumance/security tax (ex-Seleka), 5,000-10,000 FCFA	656 million FCFA (1 million EUR)
Bambari/Kaga Bandoro market	200-400,000 FCFA		34,000 FCFA (ex-Seleka)	1.241 billion FCFA (1.9 million EUR)
Bangui market		Truck, 50,000 FCFA (per animal)	10,000 FCFA (average tax per animal at roadblocks) <sup>83</sup>	275 million FCFA (420,000 EUR)
Bangui	300-600,000 FCFA			
Total			55,000 FCFA per animal	2.354 billion FCFA (3.59 million EUR) per year

77 Ali Darassa controls areas of high cattle concentration in Ouaka: around Baïdou de Bokolobo, part of the commune of Ooudjafoune, and the most important town of the Ouaka livestock communities. See Betabelet, Julie Roselyne, Alexis Maïna Ababa and Ibrahim Tidjani, 2015, “

78 *Ibid*, p. 558.

79 Local surveys. See also FAO/WFP 2016 *op cit* p. 42. The price of livestock varies according to breed, size, age and health.

80 See also FAO/WFP 2016, p. 42 note 46. This study notes that, in October 2015, the price of livestock was 87% higher than before the crisis.

81 It should be noted that the cattle circuit also includes a portion of western CAR, which is coveted by the 3R armed group and the anti-balaka. This area was not within the scope of this analysis due to logistical limitations.

### 5.4.1. Transhumance taxes

Ex-Seleka groups target customary passage points along pastoral corridors such as N'Dele, Kabo and Mbrès to establish transit fees. Under the guise of defending the free movement of *ardo* (livestock owners), they appoint dedicated “transhumance tax collectors” to capitalize on the movement of herds in their areas of influence by imposing them a “right of passage” or a “security” tax.<sup>84</sup> These agents travel by motorbike to cover as much territory as possible and maximize returns.

All MPC roadblocks are on key transhumance corridors and General Al Khatim, Chief of Staff of the MPC, often imposes armed escorts on transhumant herds in exchange for cash or a fixed number of cattle, depending on the size of the herd.<sup>85</sup> When passing through N'Dele<sup>86</sup>, cattle herders must pay up to 120,000 CFAF per herd to the “tax office” managed by Adome, a former FPRC Chief of Staff appointed by Nouredinne Adam. FPRC mobile units are posted along transhumance routes, mainly around Ngolongosso and Ngarba, to levy these taxes.<sup>87</sup> It is estimated by the UN Panel of Experts that transhumance taxes levied by the MPC and the FPRC could amount to EUR 1 million per year.<sup>88</sup> Meanwhile, the UPC imposes “tributes” on Mbororo Ouadda herders to guarantee their safety and free movement. These “tributes” are usually paid in kind (head of cattle).<sup>89</sup> The 3R group – present between the Cameroonian border and the RR4 road in the west of the country – while excluded from our research, is also known to target, secure and control transhumance routes.<sup>90</sup> Herders prefer to comply with these impositions than expose themselves to killings and raids by anti-balaka, despite the fact that the taxes they pay are constantly increasing.

### 5.4.2. Cattle Market Taxes

Ex-Seleka groups control the most important cattle markets in the country, namely those at Kaga Bandoro (under the control of the MPC/FPRC coalition), Bambari and the smaller regional markets around Mobaye (controlled by the UPC). Cattle markets are among the main sources of funding for these armed groups.<sup>91</sup> Research for this report suggests that these two cattle markets alone bring in at least EUR 2,4 million in funding for the armed groups involved annually.

This amount can be easily calculated as follows: together, the Kaga Bandoro and Bambari markets satisfy most cattle consumption in Bangui, which is about 1,300-2,000 head of cattle per week or around 73,000 animals per year.<sup>92</sup> Whilst transhumance is seasonal, demand in Bangui is continuous, which means that supply through both markets remains stable throughout the year. Even if at any point in time one of both markets might be under stress because of armed conflict, the other one will compensate and satisfy demand in Bangui. As shown in table 7 below, armed groups levy a total of 34,000 FCFA in taxes for each head of cattle that changes hands at either one of the cattle markets. That is about 10-15% of the local

82 Basis for calculation: assuming that half of the cattle marketed in Bangui passes by this kind of regional market at some point, it can be estimated that 36,500 head of cattle costing at least 5,000 FCFA would generate around 182.5 million FCFA (278,000 EUR) per year. This is, however, a very conservative estimate as regional cattle markets around Mobaye alone generate a roughly similar level of profits for UPC (see further below), without taking into account the numerous other border or regional markets. The exchange rate used in this report is 1 EUR for 656 FCFA (November 2017 rate).

83 This average is calculated on the tax levied on trucks divided by the average number of cattle (15).

84 For the FPRC, see the Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S / 2014/762), para 144 and annex 40.

85 Communication with United Nations source, 2017. See FAO (2016) “*Bulletin de la campagne de vaccination*”, p. 4.

86 Interview in N'Dele, 2017.

87 Mid-term report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2017/639), annex 5.10.

88 See the Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2015/936), para 172.

89 Interviews in Bambari, December 2016. See also the Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2014/762) para 144.

90 See Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2016/1032) para 216, (S/2016/694) paras 98-101. Previously, the FACA in this area were paying 200,000 FCFA per month for the continuity of their deployment. Source: FNEC interview, Bangui, 2016.

91 It is also for this reason that strategic livestock markets are the object of greed, consensus and conflict between the different armed groups, with control over them changing according to variations in the balance of power. In January 2016, the UPC tried to enter into profit sharing at the Kaga Bandoro cattle park; in early 2017, an alliance of convenience was formed between the ideologically opposed FPRC and anti-balaka factions to (unsuccessfully) try to dislodge the UPC from Bambari, the other lucrative node of the livestock marketing circuit.

92 Interviews with *Ministère de l'Élevage*, Bangui, 2016 and 2017; and observations at Bangui abattoir.

price of a head of cattle. If one assumes out of precaution that only half of the annual consumption in Bangui (or 36,500 heads of cattle) passes through the markets of Bambari and Kaga Bandoro (a very low estimate to ensure a high level of caution), one would arrive at 350 animals passing through each market per week. In this case, control over these cattle markets would entail roughly 620 billion FCFA (nearly 1 million EUR) per market in profits, for both the UPC and the FPRC/MPC coalition. That would mean a total of 2 million EUR deriving from control over these two cattle markets alone. Again, this a conservative estimate, based on very low numbers of cattle: interviews at both cattle markets indicate much higher figures are likely.<sup>93</sup>

As a result of this profitability, the armed groups involved at livestock markets have resisted multiple attempts by MINUSCA to establish a weapon-free zone and restore state services there.<sup>94</sup>

Table 7. Breakdown of taxes at cattle markets<sup>95</sup>

Actor	Cattle market at Bambari	Cattle market at Kaga Bandoro
Seller	5,000 FCFA: Registration (access to market, per herd) 2,500 FCFA: Cattle marking (per animal) 3,000 FCFA: Selling tax (per animal)	6,000 FCFA: Registration (access to market, per herd) 2,000 FCFA: Cattle marking (per animal) 6,000 FCFA: Selling tax (per animal)
Buyer	20,000 FCFA: Exit tax (per animal) 5,000 FCFA: "Visa" gendarmerie (per animal)	20,000 FCFA: Exit tax (per animal) 2,000 FCFA: Gendarmerie tax (per truck) 2,000 FCFA: Police tax (per truck)
Transporter	30,000 FCFA: Customs (per truck) 5,000 FCFA: Loading tax (per animal) 2,500 FCFA: Right to park (per truck) 1,500 FCFA: Phytosanitary tax (per truck) 2,500 FCFA: Water and Forests tax (per truck)	5,000 FCFA: Right to park (per truck) 40,000 FCFA: Trading tax (per truck) 8,000 FCFA: FACA barrier (per truck)
<b>Approximate total tax per head of cattle<sup>96</sup></b>	<b>34,000 FCFA</b>	<b>34,000 FCFA</b>

### Markets Controlled by MPC / FPRC

The MPC and FPRC have formed an alliance of convenience in certain areas. They jointly or separately control a number of cattle markets, including for instance in Kabo (MPC), Bémal (MPC/RJ), and Bria (FPRC),<sup>97</sup> as well as in the pivotal cattle trading town of Kaga Bandoro (FPRC/MPC). The latter is their main source of income in Nana Gribizi. According to several local sources, every Tuesday and Friday morning,

93 FPRC elements and cattle traders in Kaga Bandoro and Bambari gave figures twice as high, implying that most cattle consumed in Bangui would pass through either one of both markets. Source: interviews in Bambari, Bangui and Kaga Bandoro, 2016-2017.

94 Interview with MINUSCA Civil Affairs, September 2016.

95 Interviews with traders and transporters of cattle and ex-Seleka elements, Kaga Bandoro / Bambari, 2016-2017.

96 Basis of calculation: Amounts per truck are divided by 15, which is the average number of cattle per truck; amounts paid per herd (the size of which varies considerably) are used to round the approximate total fee. There will, in practice, be a possible variation of around CFAF 3,000 per head of cattle.

97 See Mid-term report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2017/639) para 72.



about 1,500-2,000 cows exchange owners here.<sup>98</sup> The head of the MPC in this area is the *Comzone* Ali Halafiss, son of Al Khatim. The FPRC chief in the region is Abdramane Fiesta.<sup>99</sup>



*Livestock at the Kaga Bando cattle market (September 2016).*

In terms of the mode of taxation employed in Kaga Bando, a committee consisting of representatives of each of the two armed groups manages a checkpoint at the entrance to the market. Here **sellers** must pay an access fee of 6,000 FCFA per herd of cows, which is at the same time registered by the committee as the property of the herder concerned. The vendor also pays a fee of 2,000 FCFA to brand each of the animals he takes into the market (all amounts discussed here are summarized in Table 7). At the end of the market day, the seller finally pays an additional transaction fee of 6,000 FCFA for each animal he sold that day.

Upon leaving the market, the **buyer** pays another 20,000 FCFA for the release of each cow, a tax called an 'exit tax'.<sup>100</sup> In return the buyer, typically a businessman from Bangui, receives a receipt as proof of purchase.<sup>101</sup> He has to take this receipt with him to the 'police' and 'gendarmerie' posts of the FPRC / MPC to have it validated for a fee of 2,000 FCFA each time.

The last actor to pay is the **transporter**. He is firstly charged a 'parking fee' of 5,000 FCFA to be able to load cattle at the market. After loading, he pays a tax, called a 'license', of 40,000 FCFA for his truck before being able to leave (this fee will usually be charged to the buyer who pays for the transport to Bangui). Finally, one kilometre after the cattle market but just before crossing the bridge and entering the administrative district of Kaga Bando, an armed group 'FACA' roadblock requires the transporter to pay 8,000 FCFA (see map). The total tax for each head of cattle at the end of this chain of transactions is therefore 34,000 FCFA (see table 7).

98 Friday is the big market day, where the number can rise up to 3,000.

99 Interviews with FPRC member, February 2017.

100 This checkpoint is managed by comzone Ali Halafiss, a son of Al Khatim, for the MPC, and Abdramane Fiesta for the FPRC.

101 The amounts sometimes seem to vary by 2,000 FCFA. In the past, when state services controlled the livestock market, the total tax paid for each head of beef was 6,600 FCFA (local representative of FNEC, September 2016).



In determining how much this market generates, a cautious estimate would, as indicated, calculate that there are approximately 350 heads of cattle sold at the Kaga Bandoro cattle market each week. This would mean that the groups receive about 47.6 million FCFA in cattle taxes, or more than 72,000 EUR, per month.<sup>102</sup> The two armed groups share these benefits equally.

Livestock that is waiting to be transported to Bangui or that has not been sold is still subject to a fee of 2,000 FCFA per capita. This fee grants the trader access to a pen in which these cattle can graze for a few days.

### *Markets under control of the UPC*

The Bambari cattle market operates largely in the same fashion as that of Kaga Bandoro, and sees almost the same volume of cattle. However, the UPC controls this cattle market. The UPC and the cattle herders in this area come from the same specific branch of the Fulani (or Peul) people. Since the departure of their leader Ali Darassa, it is the number two of the UPC, Hassan Bouba, who manages this very profitable node, despite efforts to re-establish state authority in the city. As in Kaga Bandoro, all actors involved in the cattle trade have financial obligations.

<sup>102</sup> Basis for calculation: 34,000 FCFA in taxes per animal multiplied by 350 animals every week brings the sum to 11,9 million FCFA per week. This weekly sum multiplied by four generates 47,6 million FCFA per month. This, however, represents a very low figure as in reality the number of cattle could be between 2 to 8 times as high, and thus so could the level of profits be, as well. According to interviews at Kaga Bandoro cattle market, every Friday the figure is closer to 2,000 head of cattle sold. This would already mean one million EUR per month in taxes. Also see Final Report of the UN Expert Group (S/2015/936) para 171, and Agger, 2015, *op cit* p. 27, note 98.



Unlike in Kaga Bandoro, buyers pay a fee of 20,000 FCFA for each head of cattle, as well as a 'visa' fee of 5,000 FCFA per truck at the UPC's 'Gendarmerie' post. They must also pay 1,500 FCFA for their cattle at the 'Phytosanitary' service. All levies from the cattle market are systematically transferred to Hassan Bouba at his home in the Hadji neighbourhood after the market closes. Whilst the overall composition of taxes and their amounts vary from those at the Kaga Bandoro cattle market, the total taxes imposed per transaction are essentially the same: around 34,000 FCFA per head of cattle in total (see Table 7). As in Kaga Bandoro, there are other costs that are not necessarily paid to the armed group but rather to some local youths, e.g. to load the animals onto the trucks (3,000 FCFA per head) or to catch and isolate single animals from the herd (2,500 FCFA).



Receipt issued to a cattle buyer by the UPC (October 2016)

Particularly since 2014, the towns of Mobaye, Zangba and Kouango in south-eastern CAR, and Pandou in the DRC, have also become important markets for economic exchanges with Bangui. Peul Mbororo breeders have flocked to this area, south of Bambari, in order to escape the violence and impositions taking place further north. In addition, since the crisis with the FPRC in early 2017, Ali Darassa has had to fall back to Mobaye, where he is managing the sale of cattle between Bangui and the DRC. According to some accounts, prices for cattle, and hence profits, could be higher here than in Bambari. It is reported that the UPC earns up to 7.5 million FCFA or 11,000 EUR per week on the taxation of cattle trade in this area:

*"Each sale of cattle earns CFAF 15,000 to members of the Seleka: 5,000 CFA francs paid by the breeder, 5,000 by the merchant and 5,000 by the butcher. If it is estimated that on average 500 oxen are sold on market days, the amount of the tax is 7.5 million FCFA per week."<sup>103</sup>*

Mobaye is accessible from Bangui by boat only during the rainy season, so profits only extend over a period of about six months, bringing in about 274,000 EUR annually to the UPC.

### *Involvement of armed groups in the livestock trade*

Armed groups not only monopolise livestock taxation at the most profitable points in the supply chain, but are themselves also involved in the livestock trade. A substantial proportion of the cattle traded at Kaga Bandoro market comes from herds owned by Chadian army commanders. Other animals are owned by ex-Seleka figures who have obtained them through taxation or theft. Ex-Seleka commanders also often buy cattle in the north themselves to resell it at a profit on the Kaga Bandoro market, or in Bangui through their intermediaries. In mid-2017, the MPC and FPRC resorted to closing down the Kaga Bandoro cattle market for a few days at a time in order to choke supply to the capital. This was designed to enable their middlemen to sell their own cattle in Bangui at a better price.<sup>104</sup>

Moreover, before he left Bambari, a portion of the cattle marketed in Bangui belonged to Ali Darassa, having been obtained by him through force. As armed groups do not pay taxes, they make big profits

<sup>103</sup> This figure includes both the Mobaye market and other surrounding markets (Alindao, Langandji, Zangba, Kouango). See Betabelet et al 2015 *op cit* p. 561.

<sup>104</sup> Source: interviews with cattle transporters and ex-Seleka elements in Kaga Bandoro, September 2017.

in engaging in such trade.<sup>105</sup> This applies especially in the two cattle trade hubs, Kaga Bandoro and Bambari, but also on smaller regional markets.<sup>106</sup>

### 5.4.3. Taxation of cattle transport

Apart from taxes on transhumance and at cattle markets, taxation of transport routes further along the supply chain presents a third source of funding for armed groups. This mainly concerns the roadblocks between Bambari/Kaga Bandoro and Bangui, as well as the 'river-blocks' between Mobaye and Bangui.



*Reçu d'un acheteur de bœuf délivré par l'UPC (octobre 2016)*

### *Taxation of trucks*

From Kaga Bandoro and Bambari, cattle is transported to Bangui by truck (formerly called "bétailières"). The trucks often leave Bangui filled with humanitarian aid for non-governmental organizations operating in Bambari or Kaga Bandoro, and return to the capital with cattle.<sup>107</sup>



*Truck transporting cattle from Kaga Bandoro to Bangui the day after the market (September 2016)*

<sup>105</sup> Interviews with ex-Seleka elements in Kaga Bandoro and Bambari, and with regional and national FNEC representatives, from September 2016 to February 2017.

<sup>106</sup> Here, involvement is related to collection from production areas or regional markets such as Mobaye, also controlled by the UPC.

<sup>107</sup> See Agger, 2015 *op cit* p. 10.

A trip from Bambari or Kaga Bandoro to Bangui costs 50,000 CFAF per animal.<sup>108</sup> Livestock buyers pay this amount to their carrier and have the trucks accompanied by two of their own men, who take care of the cattle during the trip and pay taxes for the cattle at roadblocks. In general, each truck can carry around 14 to 17 head of cattle. The transporter usually also takes on some consumer goods and even passengers, the extra profits of which can then be used to pay roadblock taxes for the truck itself.<sup>109</sup>

When operating in Bambari, cattle transporters pay an annual fee to allow them to 'move freely' in areas under the control of the UPC. A semi-trailer truck pays 300,000 FCFA, a six-wheel truck 150,000 FCFA and a ten-wheel truck 250,000 FCFA.<sup>110</sup>

The roads connecting Bambari to Bangui and Kaga Bandoro to Bangui are heavily punctuated with roadblocks. There are 12 roadblocks between Kaga Bandoro and Bangui and 10 between Bambari and Bangui.<sup>111</sup> All these barriers are occupied by Central African state agents, with the exception of the entrance barriers at the cities of Kaga Bandoro and Bambari. These demarcate the frontier to the ex-Seleka sphere of influence and are controlled by the MPC/FPRC alliance and the UPC, respectively.

On these strategic barriers, truckers and their cargoes are each subject to a different tax regime. After paying the loading fee at Kaga Bando cattle market, the transporter pays an extra 41,000 FCFA at the exit barrier held by the MPC and FPRC (an amount divided among the nine agencies or ‘services’ of these armed groups).<sup>112</sup> This tax applies to all trucks, irrespective of direction of travel.

Approximately 60 trucks leave Kaga Bandoro in convoys twice a week. This means that taxes deriving from cattle transport amount to about 19.68 million FCFA (or around 30,000 EUR) per month at this roadblock alone.<sup>113</sup> The new owner of the cattle is equally obliged to show the payment receipt for the cattle he received at the market. Other cargo is subject to a different tax regime depending on the nature of the load (see chapter 6).

Until early 2017, the western part of Bambari was under the control of the anti-balaka faction of 'General' Gaëtan Boadé, now the leader of the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR).<sup>114</sup> This meant that transporters exiting the cattle market for Bangui had to pass through his fiefdom, paying 10,000 FCFA for livestock at his roadblock each trip.<sup>115</sup>


EX MOUVEMENT DES (PCUD)  
\*\*\*\*\*  
ZONE OUAKA

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité - Dignité - Travail  
\*\*\*\*\*

**TAXES DES TRANSPORTEURS DE BOEUF**

N° 211 / (PCUD) 230C/P.D.G. 2016  
N° de véhicule : RENAULT Marque : RENAULT  
Destinateur : BAN G. LIA Date : 22.12.2016  
Somme à verser : 10.000 F CFA (Dix mille France CFA)

En foi de quoi ce présent billet est délivré pour servir et valoir ce que de droit./

Fait à BAMBARI le : ..... / ..... / 2016  
Le Général   
**Gaetan BOADE**

RECEPTE  
N° 123456789  
DATE 22/12/2016

Receipt of taxes paid to Boadé by a truck driver (December 2016)

108 Interviews with livestock carriers, Kaga Bandoro, September 2016 and Bambari, December 2016.

109 Livestock carrier interview, Banqui, February 2017.

110 Interviews with livestock carriers in Bambari 2017.

111 Eight of these barriers on both axes are on the Banqui-Sibut shared section.

112 Amount for a small six-wheel truck; a 10-wheel truck pays even more. Interview with transporters at the transit stop of Kaga Bando, September 2016.

113 Agger, 2015, *op cit*, p.11, reported that at the time the UPC reportedly earned between \$210,000 - \$420,000 a year from livestock taxation between Kaga Bandoro and Banqui.

114 Gaëtan Baodé left the city in February 2017 but the anti-balaka remain there (see Mid-term report of the UN Group of Experts (S/2017/639) para 53).

115 Motorcyclists were obliged to pay a monthly fee of EUR 10 for free passage between the UPC- anti-balaka zones separated by the bridge.

Between Kaga Bandoro or Bambari and Bangui, trucks pass around 10 roadblocks where they are illegally charged between 10,000 FCFA and 20,000 FCFA in total. These sums are paid to multiple state services that are ubiquitously present. For the entire trip, these taxes easily amount to 100,000 FCFA.

Aside from official roadblocks, the long axes linking Bambari and Kaga Bandoro to Bangui are likewise teeming with numerous anti-balaka self-defense groups. They do not operate permanent roadblocks, but maintain a hostile posture towards Muslims. To ensure the stability of livestock supplies to Bangui, MINUSCA provides escorts to convoys of transporters. These escorts are synchronized to the rhythm of the bi-weekly cattle markets.<sup>116</sup> Each escort accompanies around 60 to 70 trucks, though incidents and attacks against cattle convoys attributed to anti-balaka continue to be a frequent occurrence.<sup>117</sup>

### *'River-blocks': boat taxation*

Apart from the land corridors connecting Kaga Bandoro and Bambari with Bangui, the Oubangui River plays an important role as a corridor for the transport of cattle. The transport of livestock between Mobaye and Port Sao in the Ouango district of Bangui represents a journey of 1,200 km and is conducted by boats called "*baleinières*". During the rainy season, when the water level in the river is sufficiently high, about three *baleinières*, each carrying over 70 head of cattle, take this route on a weekly basis.<sup>118</sup> Along this route, the *baleinières* are obliged to moor and pay for 'formalities'.

The UPC controls five of these 'river-blocks' on the stretch of river between Mobaye and Kouango, namely at Mafunga, Zangba, Maneuver, Toko and Kouanga.<sup>119</sup> At each of these checkpoints the *baleinières* pay a 10,000 FCFA tax called a '*manifeste*', plus 10,000 FCFA per head of cattle. During each rainy season,<sup>120</sup> the UPC can earn around 10.5 million FCFA or 16,000 EUR per week from such taxes.

Taxes for other types of cargo that these boats can carry amount to around 200,000 FCFA per river-block. The exact amount depends on the nature and quantity of the cargo, with a rate of, for instance, 500 FCFA for salt; 2,000 FCFA per package of flour; 300 FCFA for soap; and 500 FCFA per passenger.<sup>121</sup> The journey between Mobaye and Kouango is, however, not always used by *baleinières* because of varying levels of insecurity.

The *baleinières* currently limit their journey to the stretch between Kouango and Bangui. This route is currently operated by 18 boats a week. This route is busier, not only because it is navigable all year round, but also because there is a high volume of exchange taking place at the Congolese market of Pando, across the river from Kouango. Here, it seems, terms of trade are more favourable than in the CAR, thus attracting higher numbers of traders. Most of the *baleinières*—of a type larger than the ones servicing Mobaye—carry foodstuffs and about 150 head of cattle from Kouango to Bangui. On this section of river there are three "river-blocks" controlled by the gendarmerie together with elements of a local anti-balaka self-defence group. These river-blocks are positioned at Mbata, Danga and Ombela. At every post, illegal taxes of 2,000 FCFA per animal are imposed, or 90,000 FCFA per boat loaded with various cargo — tariffs that cost only half of those imposed by the UPC further upstream.<sup>122</sup> Until late 2016, the anti-balaka faction of '*12 Puissances*' retained exclusive control over nine barriers on this particular stretch of river.<sup>123</sup> The *baleinières* had reached an agreement with *12 Puissances* around taxes (see the complete document in Annex 5). However, this agreement was not respected and has since subsided.

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116 There are efforts to allow farmers to reach Bangui. Today, pastoralists sell their livestock in Damara, 70 km from Bangui, avoiding the taxes levied on the cattle circuit.

117 For a recent example, see La Nouvelle Centrafrique, 2016, "*Embuscade anti-balaka au village Gbakomalékpa, 2 morts, 3 blessés*", October 14.

118 Interviews with captains of *baleinières* boats, 2016 and 2017, see also Betabelet *et al* 2015 op cit, p. 571.

119 Commanders: Sorongo (Kouango), Abaka Anu (Zangba), Sale (Mobaye).

120 The route between Kouango and Mobaye is navigable only during the rainy season.

121 Interviews with riverboat captains, September 2016 and February 2017.

122 Interview with chief of *baleinières* boats, July 2017. See also Allaroum, Max. 2016. "*RCA: des tracasseries sur le Haut-Oubangui*", *BBC Afrique*, October 21.

123 Namely, in Landja, Modale, Zawara, Danga, Mbata, Ombela, Possel, Kref, and Dengou. Interviews with *baleiniers*, September 2016. See also the Final report of the UN Expert Group (S/2016/1032) paras 150-152.



## 5.5 Conclusion

The interests of ex-Seleka armed groups are, in sum, deeply intertwined with the commercialization of livestock in the CAR – from the purchase and transfer of cattle to regional markets, to the taxation of their transport towards Bangui. Armed groups are currently involved at nearly all stages of the cattle supply chain towards the capital. It is, by extension, likely that almost every portion of beef eaten in Bangui contributes to the financing of these armed groups.


This involvement in the cattle trade is very profitable for armed groups. Taken together, all the profits generated by different ex-Seleka groups from the cattle circuit add up to an estimated 3.59 million EUR per year – an amount that could in reality be much higher. Indeed, whilst this may seem a significant sum, it represents only a percentage of the total livestock economy in the country. If one takes the basic price of a head of cattle to be 50,000 FCFA in the north of the country, the final price in Bangui to be 500,000 FCFA, and the estimated transport cost to be 100,000 FCFA, then armed groups could potentially earn up to 350,000 FCFA per animal. Our estimates suggest that the taxes imposed along the marketing channel represent at least 60,000 FCFA per head of cattle, or 15% of the added value. Crisis, structural insecurity and in particular roadblocks, have all further inflated transport prices, with consequences for the consumer in Bangui. According to a 2016 FAO study, meat prices had increased by 80% in 2015 compared to 2013, before the crisis.<sup>124</sup> Since the purchase of beef makes up 30% of household expenses in the CAR, this has important implications for Central African households.

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124 See FAO/WFP, 2016, *op cit*, p.42, footnote 46.



## 6.6. The Sudanese circuit



### Map 3: Sudanese circuit

## 6.1 Chapter summary

**Number of roadblocks: 64**

**Main operators: FPRC, UPC**

The 'Sudanese circuit' consists of those trade routes in the CAR that are utilised by Sudanese merchants. These trade routes enter the CAR from Sudan and split off into the directions of Bria/Bambari and N'Dele/Kaga Bandoro (see Map 3 above). Over these routes, manufactured goods from Sudan (basic necessities, but also weapons) are exchanged for Central African natural resources (mainly coffee, but also bamboo and minerals). As Sudanese trucks and their cargo are attractive objects of predation, various ex-Seleka factions vie for control over obligatory passage points along these trade routes where taxation is particularly effective. Sudan is also a pivotal source of ammunition for armed groups, increasing the strategic importance of control over these trade routes. Both routes are currently controlled by an FPRC/MPC alliance, with the exception of the stretch between Bambari and Bria, which is coveted by the UPC and an FPRC/anti-balaka alliance.

About two trucks a week travel along the Ouadda-Bria-Bambari axe, solely during the dry season. Nonetheless, the different ex-Seleka groups along this route collect an estimated FCFA 192 million or EUR 300,000 per year at the 32 roadblocks positioned along it. On the Birao-N'Dele-Kaga Bandoro axe, the FPRC and MPC control 18 roadblocks. These yield nearly 32.4 million FCFA (50,000 EUR) in taxes from Sudanese trucks during the dry season. The FPRC also imposes a 'customs' tax on Sudanese

traders that brings in an additional 20 million FCFA (30,500 EUR) annually. Finally, the FPRC taxes the Sudanese-dominated bamboo trade around Birao for around 1,300 million FCFA (2 million EUR) per year. This means that in total, the Sudanese circuit contributes around 2.38 million EUR to financing ex-Seleka armed groups. This amount, however, excludes taxes on motorcyclists, small traders, and private passenger luggage along these routes, as well as the cattle sector analysed in the previous chapter.

## 6.2 Introduction

The “Sudanese circuit” encompasses a large area covering the north and northeast of the CAR that is affected by trade with Sudan. Sudanese traders have always played a significant role in Central African trade. Their long-distance commercial networks have traditionally extended all the way down to Bangui, where there was a dedicated ‘Sudanese market’ in the PK5 neighbourhood.<sup>125</sup> This Sudanese trade circuit was, however, brutally disrupted by the 2013 conflict. Today, the circuit is limited to areas controlled by ex-Seleka groups and Sudanese traders have become the umbilical cord for supplies to the north and north-eastern regions of the country.<sup>126</sup>

This chapter provides an overview of the new economic and political geography that has been established around the roads that are used for trade with Sudan. Traffic on these two axes is very limited, with only a few Sudanese trucks passing per week. The inaccessibility of the majority of roads in this area during the rainy season, incessant taxation at roadblocks and frequent hold-ups have practically extinguished long-distance exchanges. Nonetheless, the limited trade volume that persists remains crucial to the political economy of conflict in the CAR.

## 6.3 The political economy of Sudanese trade

The FPRC controls most of the area covered by the Sudanese circuit, although their power in the area is fragmented. In order to guarantee their security as much as possible, Sudanese traders only travel heavily armed and have developed sophisticated security strategies to navigate these two axes.<sup>127</sup> They forge alliances with the various strongmen who reign on these Central African roads, accepting shifting tax regimes, partaking in the logistics arrangements put in place by armed groups, and supplying the latter with weapons and men.

### 6.3.1. Birao-Kaga Bandoro

On the Birao-N’Dele-Kaga Bandoro route (see Map 3 above), about two Sudanese trucks per week are practically the only source of non-perishable goods (sugar, milk powder, bottled water, medicine, oil, clothes, household items, etc) for the remote towns scattered along this road. In return, Sudanese traders buy up natural resources such as sesame, honey, wax, wood, and bamboo from the area around Birao (see case study at the end of the chapter). On the stretch between N’Dele and Kaga Bandoro, there is a little more traffic: if around five to eight Sudanese trucks travel between Birao and Kaga Bandoro every

<sup>125</sup> Tessandier *et al*, 2011, *op cit* p.25.

<sup>126</sup> Sudan’s role is not limited to economic interests. It also represents a strategic rear base, especially for the FPRC, as well as for the UPC. Sudan and Chad both have a history as source territories for armed group rank and file, and armed group supplies, including essential consumer goods and weapons. Along these trade routes, Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, poachers and armed bands are known to plunder and exploit the ex-Seleka ‘empire’, which extends from Am Dafok in the northeast to Bambari the centre-east. These different kinds of group have been observed on numerous occasions during fieldwork. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates the number of foreign mercenaries in the CAR at 500, particularly among the ranks of ex-Seleka groups (“Urgent measures are needed to deter foreign mercenaries and fighters and prevent further violence in the CAR”, Geneva/Bangui: OHCHR, 19 October 2016).

<sup>127</sup> They are either armed or accompanied by armed Sudanese poachers (see Final report UN Panel of Experts (S/2015/936) para 109), or ex-Seleka escorts (see below).

week during the dry season, between N'Dele and Kaga Bandoro, around 10 to 16 trucks circulate. Two businessmen, commonly known as "Tigana" and "AB", are practically the only non-Sudanese traders authorized by the FPRC to shuttle between these two urban centres with their trucks, provided they are escorted by FPRC elements.<sup>128</sup>

There are a total of 18 roadblocks between Birao and Kaga Bandoro (a distance of 730 km. See Annex 3 for a full list). As elsewhere, armed groups have simply occupied the administrative buildings formerly belonging to the State and adopted its nomenclature to organise the imposition of taxes.

The FPRC retains exclusive control over the section of road between Birao and the Azené crossing. From Azené to Kaga Bandoro, control over roadblocks and their benefits is shared between the FPRC and the MPC.<sup>129</sup> The only exception is the strategic town of N'Dele, which has been under the control of the FPRC faction of Abdoulaye Hissène and the MPC since 2016.

Sudanese traders pay a periodic 'free circulation' tax to the FPRC of 1 million FCFA (1,500 EUR) for the right to travel the Birao-N'Dele route and 2 million FCFA (3,000 EUR) for the stretch between Birao and Kaga Bandoro.<sup>130</sup> This 'customs' tax for the area under the control of the FPRC is paid to the 'management committee' of Nouredinne Adam in Birao (see the case study on bamboo below). If around 15 trucks pay this fee each dry season, this would represent at least 20 million FCFA (30,000 EUR) per year. Sudanese trucks are also occasionally accompanied by armed FPRC escorts along the entire route. These escorts are divided into three stretches of road: Am Dafok-Birao, Birao-N'Dele, and N'Dele-Kaga Bandoro. For this escort, the transporter pays 65,000 FCFA on each section.<sup>131</sup> These escorts serve to confirm to rebels manning each roadblock that the 'free circulation' payment has been made.

In addition, the Sudanese truck drivers pay 'formalities', varying between 5,000 and 20,000 FCFA at each of the 18 roadblocks. It is estimated that payments from these 18 barriers bring in at least 32.4 million FCFA (50,000 EUR) per dry season for armed groups.<sup>132</sup>

Finally, the Sudanese truckers and their occasional passengers pay for cargo separately. The total of these taxes can vary between 30,000 and 100,000 FCFA per truck per roadblock. It seems that Sudanese traders are often able to avoid such taxes through agreements with the ex-Seleka. Particular traders might, for instance, been exempt from it during the period when an armed group still has payment for weaponry outstanding. Tigana and AB, the abovementioned Central African businessmen who obtained the authorization to circulate between N'Dele and Kaga Bandoro, are forced to pay between 35,000 and 50,000 FCFA per roadblock.<sup>133</sup>

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128 Interview with MPC element in Ndele, 2017.

129 Under *comzone* Mahamat Sallet stationed in Azené.

130 Interview with Sudanese trader, Kaga Bandoro, 2016.

131 Interview with Sudanese trader, Kaga Bandoro, 2016. Also see Final report of UN Panel of Experts (S/2015/936), para 157.

132 Basis for calculation: five trucks per week correspond to 20 trucks per month, multiplied by the six months of dry season (120 trucks). When multiplied by 18 barriers, this equates to 2,160 times the 15,000 FCFA tax, thus generating 32,400,000 FCFA.

133 Interview with driver of one of these trucks, N'Dele, 2017.

### Case study: taxation of bushmeat

A second source of revenue for elements deployed along the Birao-N'Dele road is poaching. Situated around the Ouandjia-Vakaga Reserve, bush meat traders (mostly women) are able to travel safely from N'Dele to Gordil to buy bush meat because they're able to travel on trucks belonging to the UN's logistics subcontractor ECOLOG. This contractor facilitates the provision of humanitarian supplies along this route and is escorted by MINUSCA. In order to obtain the right to trade in poached meat, these traders must pay 5,000 FCFA to the FPRC *comzone* stationed at the roadblock in front of the former residence of the Northern Region Development Project (*Projet du Développement de la Région du Nord*, or PDNR). In return, the *comzone* ensures the security of these female traders until their return to N'dele by giving instructions to armed elements not to assault them. On their return journey, these traders pay 'formalities' to the FPRC's 'Water and Forestry Service' at each roadblock according to the volume of bush meat they are trading. This payment can range between 5,000 to 25,000 FCFA per barrier. Finally, poachers themselves pay a fee of 2,500 FCFA per hunting expedition to the FPRC's 'Water and Forestry Service'.<sup>134</sup>

The MPC and FPRC also profit from control over the regional trade hub of N'Dele. Here, they tax businesses in the city, as well as at the weekly cattle market at Akourssoubak. On market days, sellers pay a tax for market access, and buyers – often from N'Dele – pay a fee depending on the volume of their parcels.<sup>135</sup> It is estimated that the profits of the FPRC on all these taxes in the N'Dele vicinity amount to around 2.5 million FCFA (3,800 EUR) per month during the dry season.<sup>136</sup>

### 6.3.2. Birao-Bambari: the coffee circuit



Sudanese trucks on the Bambari-Ouadda road (February 2017)

Traffic between Birao and Bambari is dominated by the commercialization of Central African coffee to Sudan on one hand, and the import of manufactured goods and arms from Sudan on the other.

134 Interviews in Gordil, 2017.

135 Interviews with tradesmen, N'Dele, 2017.

136 UN confidential communication, 2016.



Between Am Dafok and Bria, all long-distance transport and trade is in the hands of the Sudanese.<sup>137</sup> In the Ouaka and Lower Kotto regions, at the end-point of this route, a large and profitable market exists for the production of coffee for export via Sudan.<sup>138</sup> As the main source of cash inflow in the Bambari and Kouango sub-prefectures, the production of coffee engages a large community of local planters and a whole network of Sudanese buyers allied with ex-Seleka groups. These buyers descend to the region during the annual purchase period, roughly between January and April. The coffee is then further exported onwards to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. All along the supply chain, from the areas of cultivation up to the Sudanese border, a whole series of points exist where taxes are collected.

The coffee producing areas in this region have been controlled by the UPC for a long time. However, since the intrusion of the anti-balaka in 2017, this control has become more tenuous. By contrast, the road that connects this region to Sudan is under the control of the MPC/FPRC alliance, which is hostile to the UPC. This route is itself divided into two blocks, with Bria at the centre. The first block extends from Bambari to Bria and the second from Bria to Am Dafok. This division is the result both of the organization of economic exchange and relations between armed actors. Bria is the last town on this route that remains connected to Bangui. The first part of the road, from Bambari to Bria, is in fairly good condition, and transportation is provided mostly by Central African transporters – though often commissioned by Sudanese traders. As the roads are subject to a proliferation of FPRC, anti-balaka and UPC roadblocks, transit is usually undertaken in MINUSCA-escorted convoys. Despite this protection measure, these convoys are still often victim of anti-balaka attacks.<sup>139</sup>

Table 8. Taxes paid by Sudanese trucks along the coffee circuit

Location	Actor levying the tax	Bambari → Sudan	Sudan → Bambari
Production zone (Kouango/Alindao)	Darassa (UPC)	800,000-1,000,000 FCFA (1,600-2,000 EUR) <sup>140</sup>	
Bambari	Babou (UPC)	150,000-750,000 FCFA (300-1,500 EUR) <sup>141</sup>	150,000-300,000 FCFA (300-600 EUR): Customs tax
Bria	FPRC	100,000 FCFA (200 EUR) <sup>142</sup>	150,000-300,000 FCFA (300-600 EUR): Customs tax
Bria-Ouadda	Damane (RPRC)	600,000 FCFA (1400 EUR) <sup>143</sup>	1,250,000 FCFA (25,000 EUR): Customs tax
Mouka-Bria	Damane (FPRC)	75,000 FCFA (150 EUR) <sup>144</sup>	75,000 FCFA (150 EUR): Escort
Ouadda-Ouanda-Djallé	Chete Ali (FPRC)	100,000 FCFA (200 EUR) <sup>145</sup>	250,000 FCFA (500 EUR): Customs tax
<b>Cost per truck over the entire route</b>		<b>1,925,000-2,725,000 (2,935-4,155 EUR)</b>	<b>1,875,000-2,175,000 (2,860-3,315 EUR)</b>

137 With the exception of the military-commercial contractor, General Djouma of the FPRC. General Djouma is at the same time a wholesaler in Bria and the owner of a truck that commutes between that city and Nyala in Sudan. He often exports wood, honey, sesame, coffee and wax, returning with merchandise for his shops. In Bria, he is also suspected of illegally supplying war material from Sudan to the FPRC: Interviews in Bria, 2017.

138 See report UN Panel of Experts Final report (S/2014/762) para 145.

139 MINUSCA supply-trucks move along this route twice a week. Carriers and private vehicles take the opportunity to benefit from the MINUSCA escort.

140 This includes: 600,000 FCFA for the circulation fee (per season) as well as 100,000 FCFA for passage at each barrier.

141 This includes "customs taxes" and various other taxes.

142 "Caisse café" to be paid at each roadblock.

143 This includes: a "Caisse café" tax of 100,000 FCFA at the four roadblocks under the control of Damane, as well as 40,000 FCFA of taxes per barrier at all four barriers (this latter sum is composed of 10,000 FCFA for each of the "services" established by Damane in the name of FACA, Police, Gendarmerie and Water and Forests).

144 For an obligatory escort.

145 A "caisse café" tax of 100,000 FCFA is to be paid at two roadblocks.



Table 8 summarizes the range of taxes levied along the trade route between Bambari and Sudan. In total, there are 32 rebel roadblocks between Am Dafok and Bambari: 15 manned by the FPRC, four by Zacharie Damane, 10 by anti-balaka, and five by the UPC (see Annex 3 for a full list). It should be noted that a number of barriers are currently co-managed by FPRC and anti-balaka.

These roadblocks are the main funding mechanism for these armed groups in the area. However, the way the Sudanese circuit is taxed is more complex. This is because armed groups have adapted their strategies to different commodities that circulate along it, as well as the particular ‘moment’ in the supply chain (production area, market, border) in which the roadblock intervenes. For example, as we will explore below, there is a specific tax regime for trucks travelling in one direction (from Sudan to Bria), and another for those going in the opposite direction. In addition to direct taxation at roadblocks and imposed escorts, armed group strongmen also resort to a number of more centralized taxes in areas under their command.

These mechanisms of imposition can be traced by beginning at source. The coffee supply chain begins at the plantations in the Bambari region. According to the Office of the Regulations for the Marketing and Control of the Conditioning of Agricultural Products (ORCCPA), Ali Darassa imposes ‘customs’ taxes and obligatory ‘permissions to circulate’ on Sudanese traders between Ngakobo (south of Bambari) and Bambari for a total of 600,000 FCFA per season (for six months), plus 100,000 FCFA in taxes per coffee-bearing truck per roadblock.<sup>146</sup> Due to pressure on the UPC since 2017, its tax regimes have had a tendency to seek increased rates of revenue. At Alindao, between Bambari and Kouango, the price of coffee currently varies between 350-400 FCFA per kilo. However, coffee producers now also pay a fee of 7,000 FCFA for each transaction. Moreover, where previously, Sudanese traders or their intermediaries had paid 100 FCFA<sup>147</sup> per kilo of coffee purchased in Alindao, they are now forced to pay 600,000 FCFA per trip for each coffee-carrying truck irrespective of quantity purchased.<sup>148</sup> In order to disrupt the circuit, the anti-balaka have erected obstacles on the stretch between Alindao, Kongbo and Mobaye since early 2017. They have also begun targeting MINUSCA and transporters that might be allied to the UPC.<sup>149</sup>

In Bambari itself, the UPC has simply copied the register of State taxes. The armed group demands 70 FCFA per kilo of coffee bought, 1,000 FCFA for its ‘Phytosanitary Service’ per bag, and a 70,000 FCFA ‘customs’ tax for each truck leaving Bambari with coffee.

From Bambari to Bria, there are 10 roadblocks that are controlled by different armed groups (FPRC, anti-balaka, UPC). Payments at the roadblocks



<sup>146</sup> Communication from ORCCPA, June 2017.

<sup>147</sup> Until the crisis between FPRC and UPC in early 2017, Sudanese traders used to arrive at small regional markets to buy coffee directly from producers. Because of the increase in taxes and the alliance between the FPRC and the Sudanese, the latter are no longer welcome in the area controlled by the UPC. Since then, the majority of Sudanese traders don't dare to visit Bambari and increasingly limiting themselves to Bria or Ippy, at the limit between the zones of influence of the FPRC and the UPC. Nevertheless, Sudanese traders like Nagrasj, owner of "Ouaka Café", continue to operate in UPC-controlled areas through Central African intermediaries. As a side-effect, therefore, this increased insecurity has paradoxically opened up a space for small Central African traders to intervene as intermediaries in the coffee trade between the plantations, the Bambari market and the Sudanese traders in Bria.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with a coffee farmer and Sudanese trader in Alindao, March 2017. This also applies to other products such as peppers (*piment*), the farming of which is dominated by Sudanese who remain in the area around Bambari.

<sup>149</sup> Confidential communication MINUSCA, July 2017.

have almost disappeared ever since MINUSCA started organizing escorts, though anti-balaka attacks against the convoys persist.

In the town of Bria, the Goula and ROUNGA factions of the FPRC – who have been vying for control of the city since the summer of 2017 – impose an annual tax on Sudanese transporters which varies in function of the carrying capacity of their vehicle. The taxes imposed by the FPRC are 300,000 FCFA for a semi-trailer truck, 150,000 FCFA for a six-wheel truck and 250,000 FCFA for a ten-wheel truck.<sup>150</sup> At the roadblock at the entrance of Bria, the FPRC demands an additional 250,000 FCFA for each truck.

The stretch of road from Bria to Ouadda is under the control of ‘General’ Zacharie Damane of the RPRC. He operates four roadblocks at which Sudanese trucks pay FCFA 10,000 to each of the ‘services’ in place at each roadblock: Police, Gendarmerie, Phytosanitary, and Water and Forestry. In addition to these regular taxes at roadblocks, Damane levies a special ‘coffee counter’ tax, which entails that every truck carrying coffee must pay 100,000 FCFA at each of the four roadblocks he controls. Trucks heading in the other direction—and thus do not carry coffee—are subject to another tax regime. Damane obliges them to pay a ‘customs tax’ in Ouadda for each trip to Bria. This amounts to CFA 1.25 million (almost EUR 2,000) per truck. Again, this is in addition to payments to the different ‘services’ present at his roadblocks.

Finally, Damane also maintains an escort system. All Sudanese trucks must engage an escort in Ouadda or Mouka to ensure the safety of the truck on this short stretch of 110 KM. The cost of the escort is CFAF 75,000 per truck, of which CFAF 50,000 goes to the soldier escorting the truck and CFAF 25,000 is for the hierarchy. The escort system rotates between Damane’s elements so each of them have a chance to periodically benefit from it to occasionally complement their salary.<sup>151</sup>

In Ouadda, the ‘customs’ and ‘escort’ taxes are paid to a certain Mahamat, a Sudanese businessman operating in this town. He doubles as the delegate for Sudanese traders to Damane. When a Sudanese truck arrives, he accompanies its driver to make sure all relevant charges are paid to Damane. Either the driver receives a receipt or the transaction is simply recorded in a ledger. The mediation assistance of the delegate himself costs 10,000 FCFA.

Between Ouadda and Ouanda-Djallé (a distance of 150 km), there is only one locality of note, namely Soumaka (15 kilometers from Ouanda-Djallé). The roadblock there is under the control of the FPRC, led by Chete Ali. Each truck pays around 50,000 FCFA to Ali’s roadblock here, as well as a customs tax of 250,000 FCFA in Ouanda-Djallé.

Between Ouanda-Djallé and the Sudanese border, the Sudanese circuit has been disrupted as a result of FPRC exactions. Since early 2017, Sudanese carriers have managed to carve out a new route to bypass the 10 very expensive roadblocks located along this stretch. Currently, they take a route that exits Ouanda-Djallé to enter Sudan directly (see map 3 above). If they make the trip in the opposite direction, they start at the Am Dafok border post to pick up goods and passengers, pass through Sudan, and enter the CAR closer to Ouanda-Djallé. This detour allows the Sudanese traders both to save millions of FCFA in roadblock taxes, as well as to avoid Sudanese customs taxes.<sup>152</sup> One side-effect of this strategy, however, has been that the few localities that dot the regular road are currently abandoned by long-distance economic exchange and have become increasingly isolated.

In sum, the Sudanese circuit remains a lucrative business for the armed groups. By imposing a total in taxes of up to CFAF 2 million (or around 3,000 EUR) per truck (see Table 8), armed groups can earn about CFA 192 million (293,000 EUR) each dry season.<sup>153</sup>

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150 Note that this structure is the same in Bambari.

151 In reality, escorting Sudanese trucks on this stretch of road is not really necessary because there are no additional security constraints. Sudanese traders are armed, and if Sudanese trucks can leave Am Dafok as far as Ouadda, and Mouka as far as Bria, without escort, they wouldn’t have to pay 75,000 FCFA to be accompanied on this short stretch by an armed element. Damane surely imposed this ‘service’ in order to make money for his elements.

152 Interviews with Sudanese carriers, Am Dafok, 2017.

153 Compare with Agger, 2015, *op cit*, p. 11, which calculated between \$ 200,000 - \$ 240,000 a year for the taxation of coffee between Bambari and Sudan.

## Case study: Sudanese business around Birao



*Trucks in Birao being loaded with bamboo (February 2017)*

Although Birao is currently no longer a node in the coffee circuit and experiences high levels of insecurity, it continues to be frequented by a number of Sudanese traders. This is because of its lucrative bamboo trade. The Sudanese dominate the exploitation of the vast bamboo (locally called '*bambou de chine*') fields around Birao, and this production constitutes one of the few economic activities that creates jobs for the local population in an otherwise largely idle area. Tightly controlled by the FPRC, a dozen Sudanese trucks loaded with bamboo leave Birao on a daily basis, heading towards Sudan to export the bamboo to consumer markets in Ethiopia, Egypt, China, etc. There is no physical roadblock in Birao, but all bamboo traders are forced to pay specific bamboo taxes at the 'virtual roadblock' constituted by the sultanate.

The Sultan of Birao (Mr. Ahamat Moustapha Am-Gabo) holds a historically prestigious position and still enjoys great influence today. This makes him a privileged person in conflict resolution. The Sultan also oversees the management committee established by the FPRC leader, Nourredine Adam.<sup>154</sup> When Sudanese transporters pass through Birao to go to Bria or Bambari, they stop in order to pay a 'customs tax' to the Sultan. Moreover, before engaging in the bamboo business, an entrepreneur has to obtain authorization from the Sultan.

A typical truck can load up to 600 bundles or 12,000 pieces of bamboo.<sup>155</sup> A trader pays the Sultan 750,000 FCFA per truck, of which 500,000 FCFA is for the bamboo (which is for the one who supplies the bamboo, minus a percentage for the sultanate) and 250,000 FCFA is a customs tax. Based on these figures, bamboo can be estimated to bring in at least 420 million FCFA (640,000 EUR) in taxes per dry season in Birao alone.

The FPRC also charges bamboo trucks bound for Sudan at the Dongoré and Amkourmaye roadblocks,<sup>156</sup> as well as at Am Dafok near the Sudanese border. Given the current lack of coffee transporters, bamboo is the main source of income at this border post. Each truck pays around 310,000

<sup>154</sup> The local FPRC *comzone* (called Adam Prof) has his office in the palace of the Sultan. The other members of the committee, like the FPRC *comzone*, remain largely invisible, except a certain Goumtou, who is responsible for collecting taxes from traders. He is also responsible for the only hostel in the area, which has twelve rooms and houses international NGO staff and passers-by.

<sup>155</sup> A bundle consists of 20 pieces of bamboo. So a truck loads up to 12,000 pieces of Chinese bamboo.

<sup>156</sup> According to the UN Panel of Experts, peacekeepers banned the erection of barriers on this stretch, but in 2016 there were mobile barriers. See Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2016/1032), para 70.

FCFA, which comprises a customs tax of 250,000 FCFA, as well as 10,000 FCFA to each of the so-called 'services' present at FPRC's border post (Police, Gendarmerie, FACA, mayor, Water and Forestry, and Phytosanitary), amounting to a total of 60,000 FCFA. If about 10 trucks loaded with Chinese bamboo cross the border post each day, the local *comzone* Abdel would receive no less than 3 million FCFA. For the entire dry season, this would amount to about 900 million FCFA (1.4 million EUR). Interestingly, Sudanese traders also resort to subcontracting additional bamboo transports across the Sudanese border using small mule carts in order to avoid the export taxes that only apply to commercial scale trade (by truck). The amounts involved mean that each week Nourredine Adam himself travels to Am Dafok to collect the revenues.<sup>157</sup>

The total taxation of bamboo in the CAR, at Birao and Am Dafok combined, earns the FPRC nearly 2 million EUR per year.

Despite this, employment aside, the bamboo trade hardly contributes to development in Birao. Indeed, anyone in Birao who makes any money prefers to invest it in cities like Nyalla in Sudan, where strongmen like the Sultan, FPRC leaders, and the Garba family<sup>158</sup> have built their homes.

## 6.4 Conclusions

The Sudanese circuit—that is, Sudanese trade in the Central African Republic—brings in at least 2.38 million EUR annually for those armed groups that control the trade routes concerned. It is therefore not surprising that the FPRC, the anti-balaka and the UPC<sup>159</sup> are fighting over control of this circuit. Nevertheless, by imposing their own various taxes at each point in the supply chain, these armed groups are discouraging traders from engaging in commercial activities along this route. Many Sudanese traders have become refugees or have abandoned their business in the CAR to return home. The breakdown of such long-distance exchanges with Sudan has also had direct repercussions for people living in the area controlled by ex-Seleka groups. This is because it has become increasingly difficult to obtain medicine, milk powder and other basic manufactured goods normally imported from Sudan into the CAR.<sup>160</sup>

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157 Interview with tax collector at the barrier, Am Dafok, 2017.

158 Owner of the company "*Garba et Frères*" specialized in diversified trade (general stores, hardware stores, import and export of various products). The family is suspected of involvement in illicit business in complicity with Sudanese entities and under the protection of the Sultan.

159 See UN Panel of Experts Final report (S/2015/936) p. 160, annex, para 4, and Final report of the UN Panel of Experts (S/2014/762) para 98.

160 Moreover, it is notable that most of the imported products have in fact expired. Observations at Am Dafok, Birao, 2017.



## 7. The “legal” circuit



Carte 4: circuit légal

### 7.1 Chapter summary

**Number of roadblocks: 26**

**Main operators: State services**

This chapter discusses the ‘legal’ circuit in western CAR. This circuit is called ‘legal’ because it is the only main trade circuit completely under nominal control by Central African government forces, thanks in large part to the efforts of the MINUSCA mission. It is comprised of three corridors in southwestern CAR: the Bangui-Beloko road, over which 80% of CAR’s imports are shipped from the Cameroonian port of Douala; the Oubangui river, supplying cement and 80% of the fuel used in Bangui from ports in the Congo’s; and the Gamboula road, over which a large portion of government-taxed exports pass. Given their indispensable role in connecting Bangui to the outside world, it is no exaggeration to call these three corridors constitute the arteries of the Central African government. Logistics on these corridors is largely the domain of French concessionary companies, and contribute the bulk of government revenues, projected at around 75 billion FCFA (EUR 150 million) in 2017. This represents 55% of the State’s own annual income and 20% of its budget.

Despite intense security measures—such as escorts provided by MINUSCA and a dedicated Central African mixed brigade—a string of 26 roadblocks is strewn along the Bangui-Beloko corridor, targeting mainly smaller traders who fall outside of, or wish to avoid, the escort system in place. Predatory taxation practices at government-operated roadblocks is structural and risks undermining already fragile State-society relations.



## 7.2 Introduction

The last major economic circuit in the CAR consists of government-controlled trade routes in the southwest of the country. These are the Bangui-Bouar-Douala (in Cameroon) corridor, the Gamboula road, and the Oubangui river linking Bangui to the ports of both Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. The Central African Republic is a landlocked country that relies on imports for about 50 percent of its basic consumer goods.<sup>161</sup> The CAR generally, and Bangui in particular, are mainly supplied with manufactured goods by river and through the Bangui-Bouar-Douala corridor. As such, it would be no exaggeration to say that the stability and functioning of the Central African government are dependent on these routes. Eighty percent of the fuel consumed in Bangui is imported via the Oubangui River by the French logistics group Bolloré, which has a formal partnership with the Central African government. The road corridor through Cameroon is the shortest route to reach the Atlantic coast and is the only road in the country that is useable year-round.<sup>162</sup> It alone accounts for 80% of Central African imports and exports. The third route in this circuit, towards Gamboula, is used mainly for the export of timber (by the companies SEFCA, VICA, TIMBERLAND and TANRI-BAMBA) and minerals.

These routes constitute one of the State's three main sources of revenue, generating tax revenues that make up around 20% of the government budget. In addition to the vital importance of these routes to supplying Bangui, their economic significance is also why there is such a large concentration of UN and Central African troops on the Bangui-Bouar-Douala route. Indeed, control over revenues generated along this route has been one of the key stakes of contest during successive Central African civil wars.<sup>163</sup>

## 7.3 The trade circuit

The river and the Bangui-Bouar-Douala road are together responsible for 90% of Bangui's supplies of consumer and manufactured goods, with the exception of basic agricultural products and cattle (see Chapter 5). Eighty percent of the fuel and cement consumed in Bangui are imported via the river, while the road corridor is used for lighter manufactured consumer goods. While these two corridors are crucial for imports, all three corridors are also the main routes for the export of Central African products, such as timber and livestock. On the river, large-scale transport is provided uniquely by SOCRATRAF, while on the road between Bangui and Cameroon, about 300-400 trucks (75-80% of which are Cameroonian) guarantee supplies to the capital.<sup>164</sup>

The two corridors are managed in the form of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) between the Central African State and the French companies Total (which holds a monopoly on fuel supply for the whole country) and Bolloré (which has held a monopoly over logistics in the Central African Republic since 1996). Bolloré Africa Logistics is also a 60% shareholder in SOCATRAF, the company managing the container terminal of the port of Bangui. The other 40% is owned by the Central African State. The port's cargo section is managed by SDV (SCAC DELMAS VIELJEUX), another subsidiary of the Bolloré group. SOCATRAF handles Total's fuel, but also cement, flour, sugar (the sale of which in CAR is monopolized by the French company SUCAF), vehicles and manufactured goods for daily consumption. Central African "pousseurs" (smaller barges and boats) transport cattle, timber planks and various other goods (honey, groundnut, corn) to Brazzaville and Kinshasa.

A SOCATRAF barge can transport up to 500 tons or carry five to six trucks (cf. a truck can load only 50 tons). SOCATRAF transports around 120,000 tons annually between Bangui and the ports of the two

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161 Tessandier *et al*, 2011 *op cit*.

162 Logistics operators call it the "legal corridor" and the military the "MSR" (main supply road).

163 See Ngovon, 2015 *op cit*.

164 There are around 100-150 trucks owned by CAR carriers on the corridor. Nevertheless, many Cameroonian trucks in the fleet are matriculated in the CAR because it is cheaper. Interview with DG SOCATRAF, Bangui, 2016.

Congos.<sup>165</sup> For these reasons, fuel transported by river is 50% cheaper than fuel transported by road, and a bag of cement is 500 FCFA (1 EUR) cheaper.<sup>166</sup>

In addition to its monopolistic position in logistics on the Oubangui River, Bolloré also owns a fleet of 300-400 trucks managed by 10-15 carriers (90% of whom are Cameroonian). These carriers provide transportation on the road corridor between Douala and Bangui.<sup>167</sup> Finally, the Bolloré group is also the owner and sole operator of the Douala International Terminal (DIT) at the port of Douala.<sup>168</sup> Bolloré is thus able to offer its customers an integrated multimodal service in a closed circuit fully operated by subsidiaries of the group. Since SOCATRAF is the result of a PPP with the government, the Bolloré group can streamline customs clearance processes between the countries concerned.

## 7.4 The political economy of the circuit

The control of the Bangui-Bouar-Douala and Gamboula roads is an important source of state revenue through import and export taxes. Customs revenues generated over it are projected at around 75 billion FCFA (EUR 150 million) in 2017. This represents 55% of the State's own annual revenue, and 20% of its budget.<sup>169</sup> The government appears to prefer giving monopoly concessions to foreign companies instead of developing the much more fragmented domestic industry, because concessions are easier to tax (a widespread phenomenon in Africa).<sup>170</sup> The supply of Bangui and the financial importance of these corridors explain the high degree of militarization along the two routes. In 2013, during the crisis, trade on the road corridor decreased by 50% under the control of the Seleka.<sup>171</sup> Trucks were forced to pay a total sum of 213,900 FCFA at multiple roadblocks between Beloko and Bangui.<sup>172</sup> Not surprisingly, much of the French military's efforts during the Sangaris mission were dedicated to restoring government control over the corridor.<sup>173</sup>

This constriction of this artery to Bangui was a traumatic experience for the then incumbent Central African government, as well as for the people. Since then, elaborate security measures have been put in place. These start at the moment trucks are loaded. National security forces – the police and gendarmes – are present at the truck parking facility on Avenue des Martyrs in Bangui. Once loaded, the trucks leave in convoys of 80 to 150 to the checkpoint of PK12 (KM 12) marking the city's exit. Here, they are met by humanitarian vehicles heading out, and a team of 55 international peacekeepers and 80 elements of the dedicated Central African 'mixed brigade' take over the escort as the convoy heads for Sibut, the first escort changeover point.<sup>174</sup>

MINUSCA escorts along the corridor started in January 2014. According to Global Witness, the Seleka had also provided escorts when they controlled the corridor.<sup>175</sup> In 2016, MINUSCA escorted a total of 31,661 vehicles along this corridor and the RN2 towards Kaga Bandoro.<sup>176</sup> The FPDC of Miskine, which had hitherto frequently attacked trucks on the road to Cameroon, was now prevented from assaulting these transports and was brought within the terms of DDR in 2017.<sup>177</sup> However, in August 2017, the FPDC seemed to make a reappearance in reinstating a roadblock that had been dismantled two years earlier in Zoukombo.<sup>178</sup>

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165 See Bolloré Transport and Logistics, "Qui nous sommes: Bolloré Africa Logistics en République Centrafricaine", at <http://www.bollore-africa-logistics.com/qui-sommes-nous/filiales-en-afrique/republique-centrafricaine.html>.

166 See Tchoulén, Merlin Bertrand. 2012. "Etude de l'amélioration du système de transport routier des marchandises en vrac dans l'espace CEMAC: cas du DGFT", Master's thesis, Higher Institute of Transport.

167 Interview with CEO of SOCATRAF, Bangui, 2016.

168 See Bolloré Ports, "Réseau Mondial: Douala International Terminal, Cameroun", at <http://www.bollore-ports.com/reseau-mondial/afrique/port-de-douala-cameroun.html>.

169 See Ministry of Finance and Budget (2017) "Rapport d'Execution Budgetaire du premier semestre 2017", p.4.

170 See Marchal, Roland 2015. "Being rich, being poor. Wealth and fear in the Central African Republic" In: Carayannis, Tatiana and Louisa Lombard (eds.). *Making Sense of the Central African Republic*, Zed Books: London.

171 See IPIS 2014, *op cit* p.39-40.

172 See Bangda, Bernard. 2015. "Cameroun-Rca : Grèves à répétitions de camionneurs à Garoua-Boulai". Bangui: Bernard.

173 Interview with former Sangaris, Bangui, February 2017.

174 Interview with individual responsible for escorts in MINUSCA, February 2017.

175 Global Witness, 2015, *op cit*, p. 14.

176 MINUSCA, 2017, *op cit*.

177 See Final report UN Panel of Experts (S/2016/1032) para 104 and Final report UN Panel of Experts (S/2015/936) para 200.

178 MINUSCA Internal Reporting, August 2017.

Despite the evident effectiveness of the UN escort system, this practice has also been criticized. In 2015, Global Witness criticized it for facilitating the export of timber by companies suspected of financing armed groups during the time when the anti-balaka controlled the corridor.<sup>179</sup>

The armed presence of peacekeepers also did not put an end to attacks on truckers. This has led the Central African government to reinforce the UN troops with its own escorts. In December 2015, it created a mixed economic 'surveillance brigade', made up of 80 customs agents and elements of the gendarmerie endowed with eight vehicles. To finance this new protection measure, truck drivers are asked to contribute. The National Union of Central African Employers (*Union Nationale du Patronat Centrafricain* or UNPC) levies a fee of 25,000 CFAF per vehicle for an escort between Bangui and Beloko (on the Cameroonian border).<sup>180</sup> Truckers have criticized this mandatory contribution, which is to be paid on both the outward and return journey, because it adds to the 'import tax' of 100,000 FCFA already collected by the UNPC in Beloko. They also cite a lack of transparency regarding the use of the collected funds.<sup>181</sup>

There are eight official roadblocks on the road linking Bangui to the Cameroonian border: the three customs posts at PK12 (exit to Bangui), Bouar and Beloko (border post on the Central African side, in front of the Cameroon post of Garoua-Boulai), and the five toll stations in Ndéré, Birlo, Bossembélé, Yakolé and Bossemtélé (see map of official posts in Appendix 6). At each of those, transporters pay 2,000 FCFA (4 EUR).

Despite the legality of these eight barriers, officers currently manning these posts demand illegal payments from carriers. In addition, there are other illegal barriers on the corridor: 26 were mapped in total between Bangui and Beloko as part of this research (see Annex 3 for a full list). The sheer density of high-value traffic seems to function as a magnet for illegal taxation. This is, however, not a new concern. In 2009, the OECD noted that

*"on the road section between Bangui and the Cameroonian border, the main economic axis of the country, the taxes (legal and illegal) would oscillate between 50 and 60% of the cost of transport (...), the gendarmerie and the police are the two bodies making most use of this method of financing".<sup>182</sup>*

As is noted earlier on in this report, the gendarmerie is today still the single largest roadblock entrepreneur in the CAR. In 2011, truckers cited harassment (excessive taxation) as the main constraint on their activity.<sup>183</sup> Indicating the extent of the problem, the overall cost of illegal taxes can amount to between 40 to 70% of the final price of goods.<sup>184</sup>

### The power of transport unions

Because of their capacity to block the logistical flows on which Bangui relies, truck unions have a strong negotiation stance vis-à-vis the CAR government. Unions of Cameroonian and Central African truckers<sup>185</sup> organize periodic strikes, blocking supplies to Bangui, in order to make their claims known to MINUSCA and the governments of Cameroon and the CAR. Such strikes have led to the creation of the mixed economic brigade; MINUSCA's replacement of Bangladeshi peacekeepers by other nationalities in carrying out escorts; and several periodic interventions to dismantle roadblocks.<sup>186</sup>

179 Global Witness, 2015, *op cit*.

180 Interviews with USCC, 2016.

181 Expression de Centrafrique, 2016, October 17, "UNPC: arnaque ou état centrafricain bis?", at <http://www.expressiondecentrafrique.com/unpc-arnaque-etat-centrafricain-bis/>.

182 OECD, 2009, "Suivi des Principes d'Engagement dans les États fragiles - Rapport Pays République Centrafricaine", p.22 -29.

183 Tessandier *et al*, 2011, *op cit* p.38

184 Interviews with USCC, see Tchoulen, 2012, *op cit* p.37

185 The main unions are the Union of Central African Drivers and the National Union of Professional Transport Drivers of Cameroon (*l'Union Syndicale des Chauffeurs Centrafricains et le Syndicat National des Chauffeurs Professionnels des Transports du Cameroun* – SYNCPROTCAM).

186 See Malebingui, Annette Maélaïne, 2015. "L'USCC suspend les activités et demande le renforcement de la sécurité sur le corridor Bangui Garoua-Boulai", RJDH.

Currently, each truck partaking in an escorted convoy between the border town of Garoua-Boulai and Bangui (as well as in the opposite direction) pays 50,000 FCFA (100 EUR) in advance. This sum includes all potential legal roadblock taxes and allows the convoy to continue without stopping along the way, except for a change of escort. The introduction of this effective system has seen state agents presently manning roadblocks along the route lose a substantial part of their income. This has in turn increased predation on small trucks and traders. Thus, paradoxically, although escorted truckers do not stop at the roadblocks, the number of barriers along these routes has increased. Between PK12 and PK26, for example, there are now five roadblocks and the main payers are motorcyclists and truckers covering shorter stretches.

Along other axes under government control, road users are also victims of harassment. For example, an agent of a logging company explained how his trucks are often forced to clear the same cargo three times at different customs posts along the roads in southwestern CAR.<sup>187</sup>

## 7.5 Conclusions

The 'legal' circuit provides the Central African Government with the bulk of its home generated revenues, representing around 55% of the State's own annual income for 2017 – that is, 20% of its overall budget. Security over the routes that comprise this circuit is tantamount to the survival of the State and notable strides have been made in ensuring the efficient flow of traffic along the principle routes. However, these efforts have also seen the displacement of subsistence predation to the targeting of smaller players.

State agents principally resort to extortion at roadblocks because they are not, or are very poorly, paid by the State. Their livelihood depends on their ability to impose taxes along the road. However, as the UN Panel of Experts points out regarding similar situations involving military agents, there is a notable risk that State agents engaging in this type of behaviour further alienate the population from the incumbent government.<sup>188</sup> Possible solutions to this quandary include, on the one hand, the government guaranteeing the good behaviour of officers assigned to roadblocks, for example, through periodic surveillance and ensuring adequate supplies to such personnel. On the other hand, the government might also consider a centralized tax system through a 'one-stop-shop' or 'single window' approach, involving the centralized payment of all fees at a single checkpoint. Thought might also be given to increasing the use of the banking system for transactions by which carriers are affected (that is, truckers no longer paying State agents cash but instead presenting them with payment receipts). Decree 12.148 of 2012, which outlines legal barriers already in existence, could guide current road tax policy, and the revival of the special mobile control and roadblock surveillance brigade proposed by this decree could be an initiative that would benefit from the support of the international community.

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187 Confidential interview, Bangui, September 2016.

188 Final report UN Panel of Experts (S/2015/936), para 207.

## 8. Conclusions

According to a Central African proverb, “The State ends at PK12”. And indeed, the majority of trade routes entirely escapes governmental control in the CAR. Armed groups have put in place elaborate mechanisms – often modelled after the State’s earlier taxation regime – to extract a maximum of profits from their control over crucial points on long-distance trade routes. These parallel taxation systems cluster along trade routes and constitute one of the main sources of funding for all parties to the conflict in the CAR. Appreciating the stakes involved in control over road is therefore crucial to better understand the conflict dynamics both between armed groups and the state, and armed groups themselves.

Field research conducted for this report was conducted over a one year period, and resulted in the mapping of 284 roadblocks in the Central African Republic. This has enabled the identification of three main trade circuits at the heart of the political economy of roadblocks in the CAR: the first revolves around cattle trade; the second comprises Sudanese trade routes, including coffee exports; and finally, the “legal” circuit or government-controlled trade routes. The analysis of these three circuits demonstrates the financial gains that armed groups derive from them, and reveals them to be an important stake in the conflict between armed groups and the Central African government. This study has revealed that ex-Seleka groups make a profit of close to EUR 7 million per year from their control over two of these circuits.

In 2009, the OECD aptly summarized the dilemma of the development of roadblocks in the Central African Republic as follows:

*“This challenge sits ... at the intersection between the possibility of economic recovery and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Without reducing the abusive levies imposed on rural producers, pastoralists and traders, there will be no escape from the subsistence economy nor an increase in commercial trade: increased economic activity does not mean increasing profits, if they are annihilated by the transport costs resulting from insecurity and abusive taxation.”<sup>189</sup>*

This observation remains valid today. Indeed, although the situation has since deteriorated to such an extent that the OECD’s reference to “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” ought to be replaced with today by “Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR)”, the issue remains ubiquitous throughout the country. Most roadblocks today are operated by armed groups. They constitute a serious obstacle to peace and development as their profitability means that these groups have a strong interest in maintaining them, thereby restricting the crucial economic recovery needed to enable the country to transition away from a conflict economy.

It is hoped that this report will contribute to a better understanding of the political economy of the conflict in the CAR, and that the detailed information it presents can help pave the way for stabilization and peace in the Central African Republic.

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189 OECD, 2009, *op cit*, p. 29.



## 9. Annexes

### Annex 1. Decree 12.148 on road barriers

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
CHEF DE L'ETAT



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité - Dignité - Travail


#### DECRET N° 12.148

#### FIXANT LES BARRIERES EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,  
CHEF DE L'ETAT

- Vu** la Constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
- Vu** la Loi Constitutionnelle n°10.005 du 11 Mai 2010, modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la Constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
- Vu** le Décret n°10.156 du 11 Mai 2010, portant promulgation de la Loi Constitutionnelle n°10.005 du 11 Mai 2010, modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la Constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
- Vu** le Décret n°11.032 du 18 Avril 2011, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
- Vu** le Décret n°11.034 du 22 Avril 2011, portant nomination des Membres du Gouvernement et ses modificatifs subséquents ;
- Vu** l'Arrêté interministériel n°007/04, fixant les barrières légales et réglementant les contrôles sur les axes routiers et voies d'eau en République Centrafricaine ;
- Vu** le rapport de Mission n°2, relatif à la poursuite des opérations de la Mission Mixte sur les dysfonctionnements constatés au niveau des corridors de désenclavement et autres axes routiers du 20 Février 2012 ;
- Vu** le rapport des Experts du Comité Interministériel chargé de mener des réflexions en vue de la mise en place des mesures réglementant le contrôle des barrières sur les axes routiers et voies d'eau en République Centrafricaine ;
- Vu** le rapport du Comité des Experts examiné et validé par la Réunion interministérielle du 15 Juin 2012.

**DECRETE**

- Art. 1<sup>er</sup> :** Les barrières en République Centrafricaine ainsi que les entités autorisées à effectuer les contrôles sont fixées conformément au Tableau ci-joint en annexe.
- Art. 2 :** Les missions de contrôle des barrières sont dévolues aux Services de la Gendarmerie, de la Police, des Eaux et Forêts, des Douanes et les autres entités désignées (en annexe) en fonction de la spécificité des barrières.
- Art. 3 :** Les Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) ne sont pas habilitées à effectuer des contrôles sur les barrières.
- Art. 4 :** L'exécution des missions de contrôle aux barrières ne donne pas lieu à un paiement en contrepartie des opérations effectuées à l'exception des opérations douanières (à la frontière et/ou au Bureau de dédouanement des marchandises) ou des contrôles phytosanitaires et zoo-sanitaire à la frontière dont les modalités seront définies par arrêté interministériel en application de la Loi 65.61 du 03 Août 1965.
- Art. 5 :** Une Brigade Spéciale de Contrôle Mobile et de Surveillance des barrières sera créée et coordonnée par le Ministère de la Défense Nationale, des Anciens Combattants, des Victimes de Guerre et de la Restructuration de l'Armée pour assurer le contrôle et la répression des cas d'exaction ou de violation des dispositions du présent Décret.
- Art. 6 :** Les cas d'exaction, de trafics et d'extorsion de fonds auprès des usagers en violation des dispositions du présent Décret, entraîneront pour leurs auteurs, les sanctions de dernière rigueur (radiation, révocation) sans préjudice de poursuite judiciaire.
- Art. 7 :** Les supérieurs hiérarchiques directs informés de la violation des dispositions du présent Décret par leurs hommes de rang ou les agents de l'Etat placés sous leur responsabilité, et qui n'ont pas pris les mesures qui s'imposent, seront considérés comme complices et sanctionnés comme tels.
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- Art. 8 :** Les victimes d'exactions, de trafics ou d'extorsion de fonds doivent informer la Brigade Spéciale de Contrôle Mobile et de Surveillance des barrières et/ou les autorités administratives ou judiciaires les plus proches.
- Art. 9 :** Chaque barrière doit être identifiée par un panneau où seront inscrits le nom de la barrière, les entités représentées et les modalités de paiement pour les droits à acquitter.
- Art. 10 :** Les différentes mesures relatives à la surveillance, au contrôle et à l'organisation des barrières, doivent être publiées et affichées au niveau de chaque barrière et largement diffusées.
- Art. 11 :** Le présent Décret qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré, publié au Journal Officiel et Communiqué partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le 29 JUIN 2012



**LE GENERAL D'ARMEE**  
**François BOZIZE**

ANNEXE DU DECRET N°...DU ....

FIXANT LES BARRIERES EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
<b>1. ENTREES ET SORTIES DE BANGUI</b>				
1	PK12	Gendarmerie Police (DST) Bataillon de Protection et de Sécurité des	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant Néant
2	PK 9 (Axe MBAÏKI) LOROMBOIS	Gendarmerie Police (DST) BPSI  Douanes Eaux et Forêts  Commerce	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant  Droits et taxes, TEL  Néant  Néant
3	M'POKO- BAC	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
4	Port Amont	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
5	Port Beach	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
6	Port SAO	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
7	Embouchure M'POKO	FACA AMPHIBIE Phyto-sanitaire Zoo- sanitaire	Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire	Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire
8	Route de LANDJIA	Gendarmerie BPSI Eaux et Forêts	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant  Néant

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
9	PORT SOCAF	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
10	PORT ETAT	Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
11	PORT VILLA KOLONGO	Police - Immigration Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT FACA AMPHIBIE PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
<b>2. BANGUI – GAROUA MBOULAI (FRONTIERE CAMEROUN)</b>				
<b>2.1. PK12 – GAROUA MBOULAI</b>				
12	PK26 (Axe Boali) PONT MBERE	Gendarmerie Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
13	BOSSEMBELE	Gendarmerie BPSI	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
14	Sortie Bossembele (Axe Yaloke)	Gendarmerie Police (DST) BPSI	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant Néant
15	BOSSEMPTLE	Gendarmerie Police (DST) Douane	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscale et économique	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL
16	BOUAR	Gendarmerie Police (DST) Douane Eaux et Forêt	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscale et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
17	BABOUA	Gendarmerie Police (DST) Douanes  Eaux et Forêts	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscale et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant



N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
18	BELOKO (Frontière Cameroun)	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST FACA DESARMEMENT PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
<b>3. Axe BAORO – GAMBOULA – KENTZU</b>				
19	CARNOT	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
20	BERBERATI (Sortie WAPO)	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
21	GAMBOULA	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
<b>4. BERBERATI – NOLA – NYANTCHI – LIBOKO</b>				
22	MOLAÏ	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
23	FRONTIERE NOLA	Gendarmerie Police Immigration DOUANES  COMMERCE EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle Import/Export Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
24	YAMANDO	Gendarmerie DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
25	LOPPO	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
26	NYANTCHI	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
27	LIBOKO	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
<b>5. BOSSEMPTELE – BOZOU – BOCARANGA – BANG</b>				
28	BOZOU PK5	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
29	BOCARANGA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
30	BANG	Gendarmerie Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire  Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
31	PONT MBERE	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
<b>6. AXE BANGUI – FRONTIERE TCHAD</b>				
<b>6.1. BANGUI – BOSSANGOA – BETOKO – GORE (TCHAD)</b>				
32	BOSSANGOA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
33	NANA BAKASSA	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
34	NANGA BOGUILA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
35	CROISEMENT BEBOURA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
36	POSTE BETOKO (Frontière BEKA)	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasseProtection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
<b>6.2. BOSSEMPTELE – BOZOU – PAOUA – BETOKO – TCHAD</b>				
37	BOZOU	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
38	PAOUA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
39	BEMAL (ENTREE BETOKO)	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
40	POSTE FRONTIERE BEKA VERS GORE	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS  COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique  Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes  Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant  Néant
41	KAGA BADORO (Croisement NDOMETE)	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES  EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle fiscal et économique  Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant  Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
6.3. AXE SIBUT - KAGA BANDORO - SIDO (FRONTIERE)				
42	KABO	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant
43	SIDO	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant
6.4. DAMARA - KABO - SIDO				
44	OUANDANGO	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant
45	ENTREE BOUCA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant
46	BATANGAFO (Direction KABO-SIDO)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
6.5. BANGUI - DEKOA - NDELE - GARBA				
47	NGUERENGOU PK30 (AXE DAMARA)	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant
48	SIBUT ENTREE (Face Mairie)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
49	MBRES	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
50	AZENE (Croisement)	EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant
51	KOUKOUROU	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
52	BAMINGUI	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
53	BANGORAN	EAUX ET FORÊTS	Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant
54	NDELE	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sûreté Contrôle de Sûreté	Néant Néant



N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
55	WOUI	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
56	KOUNDI	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
57	GARBA	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
<b>7. AXE BANGUI – SOUDAN</b>				
<b>7.1. SIBUT –BAMBARI – BANGASSOU – BEMA (Frontière République Démocratique du Congo)</b>				
58	GRIMARI	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
59	BAMBARI ENTREE	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
60	BAMBARI SORTIE (DIRECTION IPPY)	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
61	ALINDAO	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
62	KONGBO (Croisement)	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
63	BANGASSOU ENTREE	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
64	NGABA PK30	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant
65	OUANGO BANGASSOU	Gendarmerie Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
66	BEMA	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
67	SATEMA	Gendarmerie Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant Néant

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
<b>7.2. AXE BANGASSOU - RAFAI - OBO - BAMBOUTI (FRONTIERE SOUDAN)</b>				
68	AGOUMAR (PK7 ROUTE DE RAFAI)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
69	DEMBIA	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
70	ZEMIO	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
71	MBOKI	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
72	OBO (axe BAMBOUTI PK7)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
73	BAMBOUTI	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
<b>8. AXE BAMBARI - BRIA - BIRAO - AMDAFOCK (FRONTIERE SOUDAN)</b>				
74	IPPY ENTREE (PK5 AXE SOUDAN)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
75	BRIA ENTREE	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
76	BRIA SORTIE (AXE OUADDA)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
77	OUADDA - PK5	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
78	OUADDA DJALLE	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
79	DELEMBE	EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant



N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
80	BIRAO ENTREE PK5	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
81	AMDAFOCK	Gendarmerie Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
<b>9. BANGUI – FRONTIERE REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO</b>				
<b>9.1. BANGUI - M'BAIKI – MONGOUMBA</b>				
82	FISSA	Gendarmerie EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant
83	M'BAIKI ENTREE (Croisement DEDE)	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
84	MONGOUMBA	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
85	ZINGA	Gendarmerie Police - Immigration Police DST PHYTO-SANITAIRE ZOO-SANITAIRE DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS COMMERCE	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Certificat Phytosanitaire Certificat Zoo-sanitaire Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes Contrôle Import/Export	Néant Néant Néant Taxes phyto-sanitaire Taxes zoo-sanitaire Droits et taxes, TEL Néant Néant
<b>9.2. AXE MBAIKI – SCAD – BAGANDOU</b>				
86	SIPPO	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
87	BAGANDOU	Gendarmerie Police DST EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Néant
<b>9.3. AXE BODA - YALOE</b>				
88	BODA - PK5	Gendarmerie Police DST DOUANES EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle de Sécurité Contrôle fiscal et économique Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant Néant Droits et taxes, TEL Néant
89	BOLAYE	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
90	BOGANANGONE	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
91	YALOE	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant

N° d'ordre	Points des Barrières	Services habilités	Natures de Contrôle ou Formalités	Droit à acquitter
<b>10. BANGUI – FRONTIERE REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO</b>				
<b>10.1. AXE BANGASSOU – MOBAYE - KOUANGO</b>				
92	MOBAYE	Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
		Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
		DOUANES	Contrôle fiscal et économique	Droits et taxes, TEL
		EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant
93	KOUANGO	COMMERCE	Contrôle Import/Export	Néant
		Gendarmerie	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
		Police DST	Contrôle de Sécurité	Néant
		EAUX ET FORÊTS	Contrôle sur les armes et munitions de chasse Protection faune et Vérif. sorties grumes	Néant



## Annex 2. Overview of armed groups in the Central African Republic

The landscape of armed groups in the Central African Republic has considerably fragmented since 2015. Today, the Central African Republic has over 15 active armed groups, divided into three main categories: ex-Seleka, anti-balaka and ‘independents’.<sup>190</sup> The summary information below focuses on the armed groups identified during the mapping of the roadblocks carried out for this report. It should be noted that, while some groups have not been identified during the present mapping, this does not mean that they do not engage in any kind of road predation.

### Ex-Seleka

This category of armed group originally formed part of the Seleka revolution, initiated by former president Michel Djotodia. Four groups forming part of the so-called “ex-Seleka” were identified in this study: the FPRC, MPC, UPC, and RPRC.

The **FPRC** (*Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique*) has its headquarters in N'Dele and is headed by General Nourradine Adam, a Runga native of the city. This group claims to aspire to the reunification of the Seleka alliance and aims for a division of the country or a comprehensive political agreement. The FPRC controls the northeast of the country, in parts in alliance with the MPC.

The **MPC** (*Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique*), lead by Mahamat Al Kathim, consists of various armed groupings under semi-independent ‘generals’ from Chad. Its leadership is composed of Chadian Arabs who have formed strategic military and economic alliances with the FPRC / Mokom anti-balaka and RJ. Since July 2017, the group has been fragmented because of abuses against Muslims in areas where it operates, including in Kaga Bandoro.

The **RPRC** (*Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique*) under Zakaria Damane, has control over a limited area around Bria and Ouadda. Rather than acting under the name of the RPRC, however, Damane (of the Gula ethnic group) seems to pursue his personal interests and his men declare their allegiance to his person rather than to the RPRC *per se*. In October 2016, the RPRC formed an alliance with the FPRC and the Mokom anti-balaka to attack the UPC and Fulani communities in key positions. These attacks were accompanied by claims that, among other things, the UPC and Fulani communities were foreigners exploiting local resources.

The **UPC** (*Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique*) is a Fulani armed group. The Nigerien Fulani Ali Darassa is its leader, following a rebel career under Baba Ladde in Chad. The UPC claims to protect Fulani communities from the abuses of other armed actors and communities. The UPC occupies the southeast of the country, with strategic posts around key transhumance, agricultural and mining sites. However, since early 2017, the group has been put under pressure by shifting alliances between anti-balaka, the FPRC, MPC and RPRC.

### Anti-balaka

The term “anti-balaka” encompasses a whole amalgam of self-defence or banditry groups, more or less structured, and of Christian persuasion. They arose as a response to the Seleka’s takeover in 2013.<sup>191</sup> Today, the anti-balaka are largely a reactive armed mobilization, and their assertions of control over trade routes are a function of the threats they perceive from other armed actors. Some anti-balaka groups

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190 For an up-to-date overview, see Nathalia Dukhan (2017) “Splintered warfare: Alliances, affiliations, and agendas of armed factions and politico-military groups in the Central African Republic,” Washington: Enough Project.

191 Some factions already existed as self-defence groups and others were created by former President Bozize and have ex-FACA among their ranks.

are relatively permanent, while others are more ad hoc and informal, mobilising more around concrete incidents.

Among the most notable anti-balaka factions are Gaetan Baodé's **RDR** (*Rassemblement des Républicains*). This movement is active in the vicinity of Bambari in Ouaka, and seems to pursue a more local agenda. This faction has historically clashed with rival anti-balaka fighters representing a more nationalist program lead by Maxime Mokom (associated with former President François Bozize). In the West, anti-balaka controlled by the "**Ndale brothers**" control the area around Bouar and collaborate openly with local State services.

## Other

Apart from these key players, there are other armed groups such as **RJ** (Revolution and Justice) in the northwest of the country. The latter appeared as a response to the Seleka rebellion, but currently operates as a vassal group of the MPC General Bahar. The group is led by Raymond Belanga although his leadership is becoming increasingly contentious, with two factions currently in existence.

Since December 2015, the group **3R** (*Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation* or 'Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation') emerged in the west of the country, led by Abass Sidiki. Its stated purpose is to defend the Fulani against the abuses perpetrated by anti-balaka and RJ. In areas of north western CAR not covered by this study, 3R is thought to control key cattle routes between the Cameroonian and Chadian borders and to benefit from economic circulation in the region, particularly cattle. It engages in regular clashes with the anti-balaka and the RJ related to cattle theft and imposing taxes on Fulani communities.

A whole amalgam of Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries, poachers, and armed pastoralists also contribute to insecurity in the country.

### Annex 3. Barriers and taxes on a selection of the main routes in the CAR

Bangui-Garoua Boulai**		Kaga Bandoro-Sido		Bira-Bambari		Bira-Kaga Bandoro		Bangassou-Sibut	
Roadblock	Amount	Roadblock	Amount	Roadblock	Amount	Roadblock	Amount	Roadblock	Amount
PK12		Kpokpo	85.000	Am Dafok	300.000*	Bira		Gambo 1	10.000
Gbaloko		Patcho	20.000	Dongore		Boromata1	1.500**	Gambo 2	37.500
Danzi		Ouandago 1	30.000	Amkourmaye	300.000*	Boromata2	1.500**	Pombolo	57.000
Kpobanga		Ouandago 2	25.000	Bira		Nda		Kembe 1	25.000
Zeregongo		Farazala 1	20.000	Delembé		Aïfa		Kembe 2	7.000
PK26 1		Farazala 2	30.000	Seregobo		Mile		Kembe 3	37.500
PK26 2		Farazala 3	20.000	Tahala		Gordil 1	25.000	Dimbi 1	27.500
M'Poko Ndere		Zoubanga	35.000	Koumbal		Gordil 2		Dimbi 2	14.000
Boali 1		Kabo 1	20.000	Ouandja		Akoursoulbak	5.000**	Dimbi 3	13.000
Boali 2		Kabo 2	20.000	Ouanda-Djallé	290.000*	Koundi		Kongbo 1	6.000
Lambi crossing		Kabo 3	30.000	Soumaka	50.000	N'Dele	12.000**, 50.000	Kongbo 2	15.000
Bossebele 1		Moyenne Sido	30.000	Ouadda	1.330.000*	Dangavo	10.000	Kongbo 3	41.000
Bossebele 2		Mbo	15.000	Mbali	45.000	Bangoron	45.000	Kongbo 4	25.000
Yaloke 1		Sido	45.000	Mouka	55.000	Bamingui	15.000	Pavika 1	15.000
Yaloke 2				Boungou-pont	35.000	Yambala	12.000	Pavika 2	10.000
Zawa				Boungou	55.000	Koursou	16.000	Alindao 1	14.000
Bossempte 1				Bria	50.000	Azené	40.000	Alindao 2	20.000
Bossempte 2				Ngoubi		Kota Male	17.500	Alindao 3	15.000
Baoro 1				Ngoboudoh		Ngrevai	20.000	Alindao 4	30.000
Baori 2				Mbroutchou		KM17		Alindao 5	25.000
Bouar 1				Latiyou		Kaga Bandoro		Bokolobo 1	10.000
Bouar 2				Ippy1				Bokolobo 2	32.000
Gallo				Ippy2				Croisement Digui	20.000
Babua				Ippy3				Bambari 1	58.000
Beloko 1				Walapanda				Bambari 2	10.000
Beloko 2				Baïdou				Grimari	12.000
				Tagbara				Sibut	10.000
				Gotchélé					
				Kombélé					
				Bambari	700.000*				
Total	175.000**		425.000		3.210.000*		258.500**		596.500

\* Includes customs taxes paid to the personnel manning the post

\*\*Reduced tax rate due to MINUSCA escort

This table has been compiled by the authors based on passage through each mentioned barrier, as well as interviews with carriers during the reporting period. All amounts were observed in the field during trips made with trucks; amounts vary depending on cargo and volume.





NATIONAL BRIGADE

DE GRIMBOLE 14/10/2016

LE BRIGADE

DIMBI PAR LE SIG.



Vu au retour par le chef  
de poste de BOLOBO  
- 14/11/16 A 18h 13mn

*[Signature]*

Vu de passage au poste de  
Kembé Le 16/11/2016 par  
le chef de poste



Vu de Passage Par la Brigade  
Gendarmerie Territoriale  
de KEMBE. Le 14-11-2016  
Le chef de Poste



Vu de passage par la  
poste de BokoloBO  
le 15-11-2016



Vu de passage par  
BT de GRIMARI  
le 17-11-2016

*[Signature]*

**Annex 5. Agreement between APBMEC (Association des Propriétaires des Baleinières et Menues Embarcations de la Centrafrique) and Thierry Lebene aka «12 Pouvoirs» to establish taxes on the river barriers, made on November 7, 2015.**

Bangui, le 7 Novembre 2015

**TARIF DES MARCHANDISES POUR LES FORMALITES A PAYER PAR  
POSTE DES ANTI-BALAKA BANGUI-KOUNGO**

<u>ALLER</u>	
Sac farine	= 200 F
Sels	= 25 F
Carton savon 80	= 50 F
Carton Cube	= 50 F
Carton biscuit	= 25 F
Sac soude	= 100 F
Casier bière	= 75 F
Carton pille	= 100 F
Grande cuvette	= 50 F
Tôle	= 25 F
Balle choisie	= 250 F
Fût essence	= 500 F
Carton médicament	= 500 F
Carton bonbon	= 25 F
Carton fil à pêche	= 50 F
Sac tapette L8	= 500 F
Palette tapette	= 100 F
Palette tomate	= 50 F
Sac pièce dame	= 500 F
Pneu moto	= 50 F
Carton pièce détachée	= 500 F
Moulin	= 500 F
Mousse	= 250 F
Lit	= 250 F
Meuble salon	= 500 F
Carton divers	= 500 F
Groupe électrogène	= 250 F
Sac natron	= 200 F
Carton pille	= 100 F
Carton cigarette	= 250 F
Sac thé	= 250 F
Radio	= 50 F
Pousse-pousse	= 250 F
Vélo	= 250 F
Carton machette	= 500 F
Sac oignon	= 500 F
Filet oignon	= 500 F
Grande marmite	= 25 F
Douzaine parapluie	= 100 F
Fer à béton	= 100 F
Carton pointe	= 50 F

## RETOUR

Bœuf	= 2.000 F
Porc	= 250 F
Chèvre	= 250 F
Mouton	= 250 F
Panier poisson (Nguéndo)	= 500 F
Fut d'huile	= 500 F
Bidon d'huile de 20 litres	= 50 F
Sac étoile café engrener	= 500 F
Sac café non décortiqué	= 250 F
Sac courge	= 250 F
Pretin	= 250 F
Panier d'oranges	= 250 F
Panier de rôniers	= 250 F
Frigo	= 500 F

En foi de quoi, le présent document a été signé pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

MODALE

ZAWARA

DANGA

MBATA

POSSEL

NDJOUKOU


NDENGOU

Le Général



Thierry LEBENE

Le Commandant de  
Zone - OUMBA




Thibault - ZONI

Le Coordonateur  
Sous-préfecturale de DAMARA

Constant B.E. MAHANI

RECEVU  
LE 10/05/2011  
PAR  
LE PRÉSIDENT DE L'APBMEC  
LE 10/05/2011

Le Président de l'APBMEC





**Annex 6. Map of conventional and unconventional corridors, checkpoints and juxtaposed border control posts (Cameroon Ministry of Transport).**

